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REGULATING FETAL RESEARCH

The Controversy
Research on the fetus embraces a complex mixture of ethical,
legal, and medical issues. The effort to regulate it has been characterized by a struggle between doctor-researchers who support
fetal experimentation to eliminate or alleviate a variety of ills
which afflict mankind, and a lay population which opposes fetal
experimentation as an assault on the sanctity of human life.
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The controversy has been fueled by the debate on abortion.'
Much fetal research has taken place on fetuses scheduled for
abortion; and as the number of abortions has increased, this research has become more visible and frequent.2 At root, both practices compel a response to a vexing question: When do the full
rights of personhood attach to a developing human being?
Many in the research community assert that a fetus is not
human, or at least is not protectible in a fully human sense.' They
laud the substantial benefits which are accruing from fetal experimentation, pointing out that the general, overwhelming purpose
of such experimentation is to improve prenatal care for fetuses
which are to be carried to full term. Their detractors, however,
view the doctor-researchers as callous, impersonal investigators
who place scientific inquiry over regard for human life. They
believe a fetus is a fellow human being who should not be subjected to unwarranted scientific manipulation.'
1.

Types of Research

To disentangle the threads of this dispute, an understanding
of the nature of fetal experimentation is necessary. Medical researchers engaged in fetal experimentation have concentrated on
four areas of study: First, research concerning the growth and
development of the fetus in utero; second, diagnosis and observation of fetal diseases and genetic disorders; third, improvement
of fetal therapy and pharmacology; and fourth, research on the
nonviable fetus ex utero. Each of these areas is discussed separately below.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1973, at 20, col. 3.
Scarf, The Fetus as a Guinea Pig, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at
13. Nearly 900,000 abortions were performed in the United States in 1974, an increase of
30% in two years. In New England there were 51,700 legal abortions in 1974, compared
with 6,700 in 1972. Boston Globe, Feb. 3, 1975, at 2, col. 5.
' See generally, Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 547 (1975).
1 Those opposed to fetal research point to the possible "brutalizing" effect such
practices can have on community ethical standards. They point to the example of research
on children: In the nineteenth century, children from orphanages were used in research
projects. It is generally agreed that the effort to protect the fetus is simply an extension
of the humanitarian impulse to protect children which resulted in child protection statutes-a relatively recent phenomenon. For a general discussion of the legal protection of
children see Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection,66 COLUM. L. REv. 679,
680-86 (1966).
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a. Growth and development
There is still a paucity of knowledge about the physiological
development and the sequential changes in the biochemical
growth of the fetus.' The study of fetal growth and development
in utero is essential, since medical practitioners must first comprehend the intricacies of fetal anatomy, physiology, organ function, sensory capacity, and metabolism in order to meaningfully
diagnose and treat fetal disorders before birth.
Much experimentation in this area is conducted on dead
fetuses through autopsy or on live fetal tissue or organs excised
from dead fetuses. Other experiments have involved the monitoring of fetal response and behavior through ultrasound and by fetal
electroencephalogram.' To acquire a better understanding of fetal
metabolism, researchers have examined both fluid withdrawn
from the amniotic sac surrounding the fetus and samples of blood
taken from the umbilical cord.7 Other studies have involved the
injection of nonradioactive tracers (such as carbon-13) into the
amniotic cavity in order to monitor the dispersal or absorption of
those tracers.8
b. Diagnosis
Researchers concerned with improving the diagnosis of fetal
disorders have considered the problems of genetic defects, neural
tube defects, Rh incompatibility, and Respiratory Distress Syndrome. This research has had a largely predictive purpose and is
designed to permit physicians to assess the health and development of the fetus in utero.
The diagnostic technique used in most cases is amniocentesis, a procedure which involves withdrawing fluid from the
amniotic sac surrounding the fetus for subsequent analysis.' First
I Marx, Drugs During Pregnancy:Do They Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 Sci. 174,
175 (1973).
1 Mahoney (principal investigator), The Nature and Extent of Research Involving
Live Human Fetuses, in THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETus: APPENDIX 4 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mahoney Report].
Id. at 10-11, 23.
Id. at 13.
Kaback, Leisti, & Levine, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in ENDOCRINE AND GENETIC
DISEASES OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 1241, 1243 (2d ed. L. Gardner ed. 1975).
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used as a clinical procedure in 1882, this technique, combined
with substantial progress in tissue culture research, has greatly
expanded the intrauterine diagnosis of chromosomal and metabolic disorders. However, amniocentesis is capable of detecting
only the most severe disorders; 0 and there is a slight chance that
it may harm the fetus." Fetoscopy and ultrasound may prove to
be superior for diagnostic purposes, but both are still in the early
stages of development.
Often diagnostic research is undertaken in conjunction with
the treatment of prenatal disorders. In the case of Rh incompatibility, Respiratory Distress Syndrome, and neural tube disorders-major causes of infant mortality- intrauterine therapy
may be available if the condition is diagnosed. For example, in
the case of Respiratory Distress Syndrome, corticosteroids can be
administered to correct certain chemical deficiencies which cause
lung immaturity in the infant. Diagnostic procedures may also
be employed to determine whether the physician should induce
premature birth to avert serious harm to the fetus and the mother
which could result from certain prenatal disorders if the preg3
nancy were carried to full term.
Diagnostic research may reveal the presence of such grave
abnormalities that abortion would be recommended. However,
advances in medical knowledge through further research may actually result in saving many fetuses from abortion. For example,
if both parents carry a gene for certain kinds of serious disorders,
such as Tay Sachs, there is currently a one-in-four chance of their
having a severely defective child. Given these odds, many parents
choose to abort. As a result of research on the prenatal diagnosis
of blood diseases, however, these parents can find out if their
fetus is free of serious defects; and the mother may then decide
to carry it to full term."
11Id. at 1243. Of more than several hundred disorders, only slightly more than sixty
can be diagnosed using amniocentesis; however, virtually all chromosomal abnormalities
are potentially detectable with the use of amniocentesis. Id. at 1258. See also Levin,
Oxman, Moore, Daniels, & Sheer, Diagnosisof CongenitalRubella In Utero, 290 NEW ENG.
J. OF MED. 1187 (1974).
Mahoney Report 11.
I at 10.
Id.
' Id. at 25.
" Boston Globe, Feb. 15, 1975, at 24, col. 1. Five women with either sickle cell trait
or Cooley's anemia trait elected not to have abortions when fetoscopy-a new technique
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Fetal therapy and pharmacology

The purpose of pharmacological research is to discover which
drugs and agents administered for maternal and fetal care during
pregnancy are the safest and most effective. Drug transfer studies
are frequently undertaken to determine whether certain drugs
will cross the placental barrier and have an impact on the fetus,
or will instead affect only the mother. 15 Often drug transfer research involves only an autopsy examination of fetal tissues.
Since the average woman takes six drugs or agents during or prior
to discovering her pregnancy, researchers have retrospectively
examined the impact of those drugs on fetuses following abortions
or natural births."6 The effects of analgesics, hormones, birth control pills, addictive drugs, insulin, anticonvulsants, anesthetics,
and drugs taken for maternal disease treatment have all been
studied in this manner. 7
Recently there has been a movement in the research community to expand the scope of pharmacological research. Researchers have sought to concentrate exclusively on fetuses scheduled for abortion, since they are able to utilize experimental drugs
without fearing the adverse consequences on research subjects
who will survive."8 While animal experimentation must precede
research on human subjects for purposes of eliminating avoidable
research risks, there is no alternative to testing on human subjects at some point, because of significant physiological differences between animals and humans. The most notable example
of the need for preliminary testing of drugs on human subjects
occurred in the development of rubella vaccine. Researchers developed a rubella serum that did not pass through animal placentas and presumably was safe for use by pregnant women. In subsequent testing on human subjects, however, the vaccine passed
through the placenta and damaged the fetus. As a result, doctors
for examining the fetus in utero-and removal of a sample of fetal blood from the placenta
revealed that their fetuses were free from defects. Id.
," See Marx, supra note 5, at 175. See also Philipson, Sabath, & Charles,
TransplacentalPassage of Erythromycin and Clindamycin, 288 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1219
(1973).
'1 Forfar & Nelson, Epidemiology of drugs taken by pregnantwomen: Drugs that may
affect the fetus adversely, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTIcs 632 (1973).
'7 Mahoney Report, Table I at 15.
" Id. at 36-39.
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were able to caution mothers to refrain from taking rubella vaccine prior to or during pregnancy." Had there been no prior testing on fetuses to be aborted, another thalidomide-type disaster
might have occurred.
d. Research on fetal tissue and nonviable fetuses ex
utero
The vast majority of reported research on fetuses ex utero is
restricted to dead fetal subjects. After the death of a fetus, many
tissues can be utilized to study tissue and cell growth as well as
metabolic and cellular function. 0 Tissue cultures from human
fetuses have become indispensable for the growth of certain viruses and for the development of viral vaccines to combat major
illnesses.?' According to one authority:
[TIhe legal prohibition of the investigative use of embryonic and
fetal tissues derived from dead human embryos or fetuses . . . will
gravely retard the advancement of medical knowledge in many
areas. Examples of such areas are: (1) the further understanding of
the causes and development of means for the prevention of fetal
abnormalities; (2) the alterations in cellular mechanisms underlying
transformation of normal human cells to cancer cells and the immunologic factors involved in resistance to cancer; and (3) the development of vaccines not now available against viral and other infectious
micro-organisms such as varicella virus, cytomegalovirus and the
agents of hepatitis and mycoplasma. Regarding the last-mentioned
area of investigation, it should be realized that the development of
the prophylactics now generally employed in the prevention of poliomyelitis, measles and German measles stemmed from the results
of original studies with human embryonic tissues.Y

In addition to experimentation involving dead fetuses and
fetal tissue, research has been conducted on nonviable ex utero
fetuses which exhibit signs of life. This type of research is extremely rare: No more than 20 cases were reported out of 3,000
citations of fetal research throughout the world in the last decade.13 Experimentation ranges from simple observation and

11

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HumAN SuJEcTs OF BIoMEDicAL

AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUs: REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS,

in 40

Fed. Reg. 33,530, 33,534-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FETAL RESEARCH REPORT].
" Mahoney Report 22.
21 Id.
2 Letter from Dr. John F. Enders to the Editor, 290 NEW ENO. J. OF MED. 1199 (1974).
2 FETAL RESEARCH REPORT 33,534.
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monitoring of fetuses with instruments such as EEG, X-rays, and
radioisotope scans," to more invasive procedures designed to artificially maintain fetal life functions for purposes of developing an
artificial placenta which would enable doctors to increase the
potential for survival of premature infants.25
2.

Abuses

Despite the minimal risk associated with much, but certainly
not all, fetal research and its beneficient objectives, abuses have
taken place." Some experiments, such as the administration of
drugs of unknown danger to fetuses to be aborted, involve practices about which there might be reasonable disagreement. Similarly, research on the nonviable fetus which involves only measurement or minor invasive procedures is not likely to stir heated
debate.
Other experiments on the nonviable fetus, however, raise
serious ethical questions. For example, in one preliminary attempt to develop a fetal incubator, 15 fetuses (9-24 weeks' gestation) obtained from induced abortions were immersed in a salt
solution containing oxygen at extremely high pressure, in an attempt to provide oxygen for the fetuses through the skin.2 As the
determinants of life were a pulsating umbilical cord or visible
heartbeat, the fetuses' chests were opened whenever necessary to
observe their hearts. In this experiment, four fetuses were supported artificially, i.e., denied death, for 22 hours.2 1 In another
example, a study to determine fetal brain metabolism of ketone
bodies, the heads of eight fetuses (12-17 weeks' gestation) were
severed from their bodies after heartbeat had ceased . 2 While
death had technically occurred, life at the cellular level continued
Mahoney Report 22.
Id. at 24-25.
2 Cf. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1354 (1966)
(describing 22 unethical experiments involving human subjects). At one eastern hospital,
terminally ill patients were injected with live cancer cells without obtaining their informed
consent. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S,2d 818
(1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
2 Goodlin, Cutaneous Respiration in a Fetal Incubator, 86 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL.
571, 578 (1963).
n Id.
2 Adam, Raiha, Rahiala, et al., CerebralOxidation of Glucose and D-BOH-Butyrate
by the Isolated Perfused Human Fetal Head, 7 PEMIAThiC RESEARCH 309 (1973).
',
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in the brain, and thus it was possible to measure the extent to
which fetal cerebral tissues30 could metabolize D-BOH-Butyrate as

an alternative to glucose.

B.

Regulating Fetal Research
The potential value of fetal research has not stilled the voices
of those who view it as an unwarranted assault on the integrity
of living human beings. The protest against fetal research has
taken several forms, including the use of the criminal process
against doctor-researchers 3' and the promulgation of state statutes designed
to limit the types of research which may be under32
taken.

1 Id.

1' Two cases have commanded national attention: The Massachusetts "graverobbing" incident and the trial of Dr. Kenneth C. Edelin. See Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975,
at 1, col. 4.
The Massachusetts "grave-robbing" cases were triggered by a journal article written
by three Boston doctors. See Philipson, Sabath, & Charles, supra note 15. The article
described an experiment to determine which of two drugs reaches a fetus in sufficient
concentration to prevent congenital syphilis where the mothers are allergic to penicillin.
All of the women who participated in the experiment had requested abortions and had
provided their written consent to the research. The article came to the attention of the
Boston City Council and the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office. Indictments were
returned against the three doctors who wrote the article and a pathologist who assisted
them in the experiment. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975, at 5, col. 1. The doctors were charged
with "grave-robbing" in violation of a state statute. Id. Their cases are still pending.
In the process of investigating the "grave-robbing" incident, a representative of the
Suffolk County District Attorney's Office found two dead fetuses in the county mortuary.
One was allegedly 24 weeks old; and a certificate listing the cause of its death could not
be located. Dr. Kenneth Edelin, the doctor who performed the abortion, was indicted for
the manslaughter of the aborted fetus. In his instructions to the jury, the judge stated that
a fetus is not a person until birth, that birth is defined as "the process which causes the
emergence of a new individual from the body of its mother," and that a person is one who
is born, that is, outside the body of the mother. Despite the fact that the only eyewitness
for the state testified that the fetus showed no sign of life when it was removed from the
mother, the jury convicted Dr. Edelin of manslaughter. Several of the jurors said their
guilty finding was based on the belief that Dr. Edelin was negligent in not attempting to
save the life of a premature infant while performing an abortion. A picture of the fetus
had a powerful effect in moving the jury toward conviction. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975,
at 4, col. 6. On appeal the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered a directed verdict for
aquittal. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976).
32 There is a wide variation among states as to the limitations their statutes impose
on fetal experimentation. Certain statutes, for example, limit experimentation on ex utero
fetuses and yet fail to prohibit or regulate in utero experimentation. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25956 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 28-4,161 (1975). Other statutes impose a nearly universal ban
on fetal experimentation, excluding only those measures designed to preserve the life or
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The most pervasive regulation of fetal research, however, has
been at the national level. In July 1974, in response to research
on fetuses and other subjects who might lack the capacity to
consent, Congress passed the National Research Act. The act
applies to all federally funded fetal research" and provides for the
establishment of regulations governing the limits of permissible
research and the procedures to be followed in undertaking such
research.

As a preliminary step to the promulgation of regulations, the
act provided for the establishment of a National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. The Commission was assigned the responsibility of
studying the various kinds of research in progress, and reporting
its conclusions and recommendations regarding appropriate research and research protocols to the Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.3 7 In performing its initial assignment, the Commission held hearings and solicited the oral
and written views of experts from a broad range of disciplines.3
health of the aborted child. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035 (Vernon, Cum. Supp.
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-310, -311 (Supp. 1975).
Among the most comprehensive of the state statutes is that enacted by Massachusetts. It prohibits the use of live human fetuses, whether in utero or ex utero, as subjects
for scientific laboratory research, or other forms of experimentation. However, procedures
"incident to the study" of the fetus in utero are not prohibited if, in the physician's
judgment, the study will not "substantially jeopardize" the life of the fetus, and if the
fetus is not the subject of a planned abortion. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (Supp.
1975). Diagnostic or remedial procedures to determine or preserve the life or health of the
fetus are specifically permitted. Id. For a more detailed analysis of several state fetal
research laws, see Note, Fetal Experimentation:Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1197-207 (1975).
m National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, tit. II, 88 Stat. 348 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as National Research Act]. See 120 CONG. Rac. S11,776 (daily ed. June 27, 1974);
119 CONG. Rzc. 29,213 (1973).
u 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1976). As the federal government provides the money to
support a significant percentage of research pertaining to human subjects, and, as all
research on human subjects is required to conform to federal guidelines before funds are
provided, the federal regulations are of vital and far reaching importance.
National Research Act §§ 202, 205.
IId. § 201(b)(1). The members of the National Commission were selected and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. When
finally constituted, the Commission consisted of three physicians with a knowledge of
research, two medical ethicists, three lawyers, two psychologists, and one public representative. FETAL RESEARCH RPOirr 33,530.
3, National Research Act § 202(b).
See FETAL REsEARCH REmORT 33,536-42.
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The legislative history of the enabling statute, pre-existing codes,
and other materials relating to research on the fetus were consulted, as were the draft rules and policy guidelines of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." The final recommendations of the Commission were submitted to HEW and were
incorporated in large part into the regulations issued by the Department. 0
Following a definitional section," the Department's regulations provide for the establishment of two Ethical Advisory
Boards, one advisory to the Public Health Service and the other
advisory to all other agencies and components of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.4" The function of the boards
n
in

Id. at 33,531. The papers and reports submitted to the Commission are compiled

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE

FETus:

HUmAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
(1975). The Department's draft

APPENDIX

rules and policy guidelines emphasize informed consent and prior review as the principal
means for protecting human research subjects. They require an extra layering of committees to assess risk, monitor consent, and evaluate the ethical implications of particular
research. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,653-54 (1974). See notes 190-244 and accompanying text
infra.
,* The regulations are found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.301 (1976). While the regulations
and recommendations are similar in many respects, they differ on the question of whether
to permit research on a nonviable fetus ex utero which would alter its duration of life. The
Department concluded that the continuation of research to develop an artificial placenta
is in the public interest. See note 164 and accompanying text infra. In justifying its
decision to permit the research, the Department stated that it was "persuaded by the
weight of scientific evidence that research performed on the nonviable fetus ex utero has
contributed substantially to the ability of physicians to bring to viability increasingly
small fetuses." 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975). But see note 184 infra concerning the Department's proposed amendments to the regulations.
" 45 C.F.R. § 46.203 (1976). For the purposes of this article, the relevant definitional
sections are:
(c) "Fetus" means the product of conception from the time of implantation until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the
fetus, that it is viable.
(d) "Viable" as it pertains to the fetus means being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of available
medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration . . . . If a fetus is viable after delivery, it is a premature infant.
(e) "Nonviable fetus" means a fetus ex utero which, although living,
is not viable.
(f) "Dead fetus" means a fetus ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary
muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached).
.

Id. § 46.204.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

is to render advice concerning the ethical issues present in those
classes of proposals which each board determines must be submitted to it.'" In addition, the regulations expand the functions
of Institutional Review Boards in local hospitals and similar institutions" in connection with activities involving fetuses, pregnant
women, or human in vitro fertilization. 5 No research award may
be made by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
until the appropriate reviewing bodies certify the research application. 6

General limitations are placed on all research activity. 7 Prior
to commencing fetal research, studies on animals and nonpregnant individuals are required. When nontherapeutic research is
conducted, the risk to the fetus must be minimal; if the research
is therapeutic and conducted on either the mother or the fetus,
the risk to the fetus must be the least possible consistent with
achieving the objectives of the research."
Finally, the regulations also place limits on specific areas of
research. These include provisions which relate to research activities directed toward pregnant women as subjects,4 activities involving the dead fetus, fetal material, or the placenta,m research
carried out in connection with abortion,5 in utero research, 5 and
experimentation on the nonviable fetus ex utero.53
Id. § 46.204(c), (d). The proposals potentially include any grant or contract sought
by the applicant for "supporting research, development, and related activities involving:
(1) The fetus, (2) pregnant women, and (3) human in vitro fertilization." Id. § 46.201(a).
11To obtain funding for research involving human subjects, an organization must
establish an Institutional Review Board whose function is to review and either approve or
disapprove research proposals. In addition, where the research involves risk to human
subjects, the Institutional Review Board must conduct continuing review throughout the
course of the project; insure that informed consent has been obtained; and determine that
the risks to the subject are outweighed both by the benefits to the subject and by the
knowledge to be gained through research. Id. § 46.102. See text accompanying notes 23240 infra.
' Id. § 46.205.
" Id. §§ 46.204(e), 46.205(b).
" Id. § 46.206.
Id. § 46.206(a)(I)-(2).
I' § 46.207.
Id.
Id. § 46.210.
" Id. § 46.206(a)(3)-(4).
s'Id. § 46.208.

" Id. § 46.209.
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II.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE REGULATIONS

Scope of Analysis
The remainder of this article will analyze the legal issues
raised by sections 46.208 and 46.209 of the Department's regulations, i.e., research on the fetus in utero and on the fetus ex utero.
These sections of the regulations were chosen partly for reasons
of economy in an article of this length, and partly because the
most baffling problems are in the areas selected.54
Initially it may be helpful to clarify some important terms
which will be used throughout the analysis. The words fetal
experimentation or fetal research provide little clue to the complexity of the topic. Part of the problem is that we are considering
a "being" in different environments and stages of growth, and
A.

51Serious questions are also posed in those areas omitted from discussion. Research
on a premature infant (a fetus ex utero ascertained to be viable) is subject to the laws
and regulations governing research on children in general; but that area of the law is itself
unclear. The new regulation governing research on the dead fetus, fetal material, and the
placenta contains vexing definitional questions. It states that such research "shall be
conducted only in accordance with any applicable State or local laws regarding such
activities." 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1976). These statutes, however, leave open perplexing
questions. For example, the question of when death occurs, or perhaps, in the case of
fetuses, when life occurs, must be answered.
In the case of the fetus, it is not irreversible changes which preclude a return to normal
functioning that signal death, but an absence of adequate physiological development
which precludes the attainment of normal functioning. Conceptually, however, it is difficult to regard the time before "life" begins as death. For a discussion of this issue and an
analysis of state laws bearing on the issue of research on fetal tissue and remains, see
Capron,The Law Relating to Experimentation with the Fetus, in THE NATIONAL COMmISSION FOR THE PROTECTON OF HUMAN SuaJECTS OF BIoMmncAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
RESEARCH ON THE FETuS: APPENDIX (1975) [hereinafter cited as Capron Report].
In addition, research on the pregnant woman presents a plethora of problems, hardly
solved by the new regulations. By what calculus, for example, do we measure the degree
of therapeutic experimentation permissible on a mother which may cause harm to her
unborn child? The regulations bar nontherapeutic research on the mother except where
"the risk to the fetus is minimal."45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a)(2) (1976). But therapeutic research on the mother may be conducted in accordance with her wishes, id. § 46.207(b)(1),
with the sole limitation that the fetus be placed at risk to the minimum extent possible.
Id. § 46.207(a)(1). Thus the regulations may be a poor guide to doctor-researchers in
specific situations. What kind of risks are we talking about? Who measures the probability
of harm and magnitude of harm which may be inflicted? If an activity will meet the health
needs of the mother but will not provide significant benefit, and if the same activity
involves an immeasurable risk to the fetus, are we prepared to say that the research should
proceed? If doctors or hospitals refuse to proceed, are we prepared to absolve them from
liability if the health needs of the mother are neglected? Is a father's consent irrelevant if
he must share the burden of supporting a potentially defective offspring?
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these differences may be critically important in defining whether
that being has legal personhood. Thus one must distinguish carefully between fetuses in utero and ex utero and between fetuses
which are previable, nonviable, or viable. A fetus in utero before
the time of viability is previable, because it will in the normal
course of events grow into viability; on the other hand, a fetus ex
utero before the time of viability is nonviable, because, given the
current state of technological development, there is no way it will
attain viability.5 5 Similarly, a careful distinction must be made
between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation., If the
objective is to benefit the subject, the experimentation is therapeutic; whereas if the main objective is to benefit others through
the acquisition of new knowledge, it is nontherapeutic. 7 Even the
word experimentationshould be defined. It refers to all nonstandard procedures utilized for diagnosis, therapy, or the acquisition
For a definition of viability see note 41 supra. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri
statutory definition of viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems." Id. at 2831. For a discussion of the Department's minimum criteria
for viability see note 169 infra.
' Even the free substitution of words such as "experimentation," "research," "test,"
and the Department's more nebulous "activity" may be confusing. Experimentation, for
example, appears to have a more invidious connotation than the word research.
57

The objectives of experiments on human beings cover a wide spectrum, but may be classified roughly as therapeutic or nontherapeutic. Many
experiments are intended to benefit the subject (therapeutic experimentation). Frequently a doctor must treat a patient with an untried method
because no "accepted" treatment exists. A doctor may also use a new
method of treatment where other procedures are regarded as "standard practice," thinking that the new method will prove more beneficial to his patient
or be equally beneficial to his patient but lead to improved treatment for
other sufferers of similar disorders. On the other hand, many experiments
are not intended to benefit the subject (nontherapeutic experimentation),
but are conducted solely in the pursuit of new knowledge. The subject might
be a patient under a doctor's care for an unrelated ailment ... or he might
be a healthy volunteer. Different standards should govern therapeutic and
nontherapeutic experimentation. The therapeutic purpose itself serves to
justify a doctor's exposing a terminal leukemia patient to substantial risk in
an effort to prevent or postpone imminent death, while a stronger independent justification should be required for allowing a researcher to expose a
healthy volunteer to a similar risk simply to gain new knowledge.
Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99, 101 (1967). See also
Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 SYaAcusE L.
REv. 1067, 1069 n.12 (1973). Cf. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afi'd,
493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
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of theretofore unknown information, and all standard procedures
performed for the same reasons but not in a context where such
procedures would be customary practice. 58
Lastly, in considering risk, it is important to assess the
probabilityof harm that may result from an experimental procedure. Is the likelihood one in one thousand, one in fifty, or
unknown? In the use of new therapies or the pursuit of new knowledge, physicians or medical researchers may have a general notion of risk; but the very newness of their activity may make a
precise calculation impossible. One should also assess the
magnitude of harm which may result. For example, is damage, if
it occurs, likely to be measured in terms of minor, transient injury
or life-long impairment of a vital organ?" The answer to this
question may depend partly upon a consideration of the interests
which are put at risk. Are we concerned with protecting "health,"
i.e., the physical, mental, or emotional well-being of the research
subject or other affected persons, or "human dignity"? 0 The latter concept, while nebulous in content, may be our paramount
concern; the concept relates not to tangible injury, but to the
preservation of values associated with individual human autonomy and worth.
B. Research on the Fetus In Utero
1. Legal Status of the Fetus In Utero
The first issue raised by the Department's regulation controlling in utero experimentation' does not go to the regulation itself
but to the rationale upon which it is based: What rights does a
fetus possess which entitle it to the protection afforded by the
regulations? This section will examine different areas of the law
which have dealt with the fetus in utero in an attempt to deter'62
mine when such a fetus acquires certain interests or "rights.
For another definition, see Martin, supra note 3, at 549.
For a discussion of this problem in another area, see Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's
Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969,
at 43-47.
See Martin, supra note 3, at 554-56.
*' The regulation is quoted in the text accompanying note 127 infra.
, For a more complete discussion of the rights of the fetus in utero in property,
criminal, and tort law, see Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due
Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 236-44 (1969).
"
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a. Property law
Anglo-American property law has long accorded the fetus
legal recognition. In an early English case, an unborn child was
held to be one of the "children living" at the time of the testator's
demise.6 3 Three years later, another English decision rebutted the
contention that a fetus is a nonentity:
Let us see, what this nonentity can do. He may be vouched in a
recovery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in
value. He may be an executor. He may take under the Statute of
Distributions. He may take by devise. He may be entitled under a
charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may
have a guardian."

American law followed the English lead. In 1834, Hall v.
Hancock" held that a grandchild born almost nine months after
the testator's death was a beneficiary under a bequest to such
grandchildren "as may be living at my death." Most states have
followed this Massachusetts opinion." Cases have held that a
devise of land vests in an unborn child prior to its birth,67 and that
a child may be an income recipient under a trust before birth. 8
The cases recognize, however, that the property rights of a
child in utero are not perfected until and unless the child is born
alive. 9
Doe v. Clarke, 2 H. Bl. 399, 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (C.P. 1795).
"4Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 331, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (Ch. 1798)
(citations omitted).
0 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834).
" See, e.g., Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E. 551 (1927); Tomlin v. Laws, 301
Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922); In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238, 326 P.2d 264 (1958); In
re Estate of Trattner, 394 Pa. 133, 145 A.2d 678 (1958); Guilliams v. Koonsman, 154 Tex.
401, 279 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
" Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
" Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938).
11G. PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENcE 396 (4th ed. 1972). See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). Liberal construction of fetal property interests apparently stems
from an attempt to carry out testator intent (the presumption being that a testator would
not wish to exclude any of his issue); but such intent is viewed as applying to live-born
children. This point of view is contested by Professor David Louisell, who argues that, in
the process of litigation, it is natural that the cases would be decided after a child has
been born, and that, under the circumstances, it is "superfluous" and "only dictum" for
courts to require a "live birth" in order to establish legal rights:
[S]uch decisions proceed more from a pragmatic sense of fairness and realism than from a philosophic conclusion of the existence in utero of autonomous human life. But this is only speculation. And whatever the motivation
for the decisions, they are clear-cut holdings that a child in gestation is a
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b.

Criminal law

Some legal scholars maintain that the common law refused
to recognize feticide as homicide unless the child was fully born 0
and then died as the result of the prenatal injuries." This is
disputed by others who believe that the early common law required not birth but quickening,12 or animation, for a fetus to be
protected by the laws against homicide." Whatever the early
English law, it is generally agreed that by the mid-seventeenth
century the common law had adopted the "born alive" theory.
Most American jurisdictions have followed the "born alive"
theory." Some state courts, however, have held that a fetus shall
human person, hence an autonomous legal entity capable of possessing property.
Louisell, supra note 62, at 237. The courts were not required to decide directly whether a
fetus in utero has all the rights of a born child. In some jurisdictions, however, the question
has been explicitly resolved by statute contrary to Professor Louisell's position. See CAL.
CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954) ("in the event of its subsequent birth"); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 554.30 (West 1967) ("posthumous children"); N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW
§§ 2-1.3, 6-5.7 (McKinney 1967) ("posthumous children"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 15
(1972) ("in the event of its subsequent birth"); TEx. PRoB. CODE § 66 (1956) ("posthumous
children"). See also Capron Report, supra note 54, at 28 n.ll0.
70 "Fully born" means that the fetus is entirely separated from its mother, with an
entirely independent life, with the umbilical cord cut, and with its own breathing and
heart action. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ct. App. 1936);
Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
1' Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138
N.E.2d 516 (1956); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ct. App.
1936); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d
634 (Wyo. 1963); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 29 (2d ed. 1969); Means, The Law of New
York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation
of Constitutionality,14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
11 "Quickening" is the stage of development "when the motion of the fetus becomes
perceptible, usually about the middle of the period of pregnancy." State v. Patterson, 105
Kan. 9, 181 P. 609, 610 (1919).
11H. DE BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, III, ii, 4, quoted and translated
in Means, supra note 71, at 419, presents a description of 13th century English law: "If
there be anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison whereby he causes
an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and especially if it be animated,
he commits homicide."
, If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no
murder; but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or
other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature,
in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
3 COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (1648), as quoted by Means, supra note 71, at 420.
,1 Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d
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be regarded as a human being for the purpose of homicide statutes when it has reached viability. 6 Several courts have required
only a showing of "quickening" in fetal manslaughter cases." A
number of others have extended the definition of "human being"
for the purposes
of manslaughter to include the fetus from the
"moment" 7 of conception. 7
c.

Tort law

Early American tort law, as exemplified by the language of
Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,8 denied recovery for fetal injury on the ground that "the unborn child
was a part of the mother at the time of the injury."" Until World
War II, the Dietrich decision was followed universally. Courts
based their opinions on Justice Holmes' erroneous knowledge of
biology and on the difficult questions of causation involved in
linking tortious conduct to prenatal injury.
467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); Harris
v. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 12 S.W. 1102 (1889); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo.
1963). "'Person,' when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who
has been born and is alive." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(1) (McKinney 1975).
" See People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947). But see Keeler v.
Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
71 Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86 (1872); Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233
(1923).
"1
'"[Mloment of conception' is a figment of the imagination, since conception like
everything else is a process which takes time." Williams, The Legalization of Medical
Abortion, THE EuGEoics REviEw, Apr. 1964, at 19, 21, cited by Brodie, The New Biology
and the PrenatalChild, 9 J. FAm. LAW 391 n.2 (1970). Also, "conception is a 'process' over
time, rather than an event." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973) (citing a number of
"new biology" articles).
11 State v. Elliott, 206 Ore. 82, 289 P.2d 1075 (1955); State v. Atwood, 54 Ore. 526,
102 P. 295, aff'd on rehearing, 54 Ore. 526, 104 P. 195 (1909).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), will now, presumably, protect a physician from a
charge of murder or manslaughter where the fetus dies in utero as a necessary result of
abortion. See text accompanying notes 111-23 infra for a discussion of Roe v. Wade. The
recent resolution in the case of Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976),
reaffirms this conclusion. Freedom from a charge of homicide is more problematical in the
experimentation context where a physician, not knowing the lethal effects of his experiment, injures a fetus which dies as a result. Capron Report, supra note 54, at 17.
The impact of Roe is completely unclear in more generalized situations involving
homicide, as in the case of a man who fatally injures a fetus while beating a woman.
Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1975, at 16, col. 1. Depending on the wording of the applicable state
statute, a charge might be brought whether the fetus dies before or after birth.
138 Mass. 14 (1884).
11Id. at 17.
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In 1946, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, S1 a federal district court rejected
the rationale and conclusion of Dietrich and declared that injuries to a viable unborn child were compensable in an action by
the child after birth. The Minnesota Supreme Court extended
this reasoning soon afterward, holding that a personal representative could maintain a wrongful death action for fetal injuries to a
viable fetus. 3 Other courts quickly followed this trend, leading to
"the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the
whole history of the law of torts." 4 Today, virtually every American jurisdiction permits recovery in tort for prenatal injuries.8 5
Differences still exist, however, in the requirements for actions by
a surviving child and actions under wrongful death statutes; consequently, each area will be explored separately."8
1. Action for prenatal injuries by a surviving child
Since such a claim is brought by the child himself, it is
apparent that the tortfeasor's liability is prospective, contingent
on the unborn child's live birth. 7 Thus, a child who suffers nonfatal prenatal injuries, but who dies in utero before birth from
independent causes, cannot maintain an action for those injuries." The status of the unborn child in respect to its right of
recovery is not that of a legal person capable of asserting an
independent right, but that of a separate living entity having a
potentiality of legal personhood not fully recognized until birth.
A number of courts have implied that recovery for prenatal
injuries is limited to cases where the alleged injury occurred at a
viable stage of gestation." The principal rationale for this requirement is the difficulty in proving that a defendant's actions were
the proximate cause of the child's previable injuries. However,
2 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
Id. at 337.

Cf. La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960) (holding that the
unborn fetus is a "child" and a "person" entitled to bring an action for a parent's death
prior to the child's birth).
11Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 68 n.4, 279 N.E.2d 339, 342 n.4 (1972); Keyes
v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
" See, e.g., the hypothetical case posed in Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d
75, 80 n.9 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
' Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore.
690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
'3
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the viability requirement has been widely criticized as arbitrary
and unsatisfactory in limiting a potential tortfeasor's duty of
care. Prosser has argued that compensation for prenatal injuries
should not hinge on the stage of fetal development at the time of
the injury, since the child sustains the same harm after birth
regardless of the time when the injury occurs. 0 In accord with
Prosser's view, the current trend has been to eliminate the viability requirement in actions for prenatal injuries." Most jurisdictions which have recently ruled on the issue allow recovery for
prenatal injuries even if the injury occurs early in pregnancy,
before either viability or quickening.2
2.

Action for wrongful death

A wrongful death action may be brought in cases where a
child does not survive to assert a claim. Neither the difficulty in
assessing appropriate damages nor the difficulty in proving causation has been deemed sufficient to bar the action. But while
every state permits recovery for wrongful death, 3 there is sharp
disagreement with respect to whether a live birth is required in
order to maintain a wrongful death action. Courts in several jurisdictions require it, maintaining that there has been no harm to a
"person" until the fetus is born alive.94
Arrayed against these authorities are more than a score of
W. PROSSER, supra note 84, at 337-38.
Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) (statutory construction); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (fetus 6
weeks old at time of injury); Daley v. Meier, 33 IIl. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961);
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (statutory construction); Torigian v.
Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (fetus 3 1/2 months at time
of injury and 5 3/4 months at birth can recover although it died 2 1/2 hours after birth);
Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (injury to fetus at 4 months);
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), appeal
granted, 283 App. Div. 914, 129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1954) (fetus 3 months at time of injury);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (fetus I month at time of injury); Sylvia
v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971).
32 W. PRossE,
supra note 84, at 337 n.31, lists seven jurisdictions (California, Georgia, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) as having
expressly discarded the viability and quickening requirements.
Ild. at 337.
" Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels v. Skelly
Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140
(1964); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614,
371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
"
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jurisdictions which permit an action for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus regardless of whether it is born alive. 5 One state,
Georgia, permits such an action for children injured when not yet
viable but only "quick.""6 In order to permit recovery in these
cases, courts have held that the unborn fetus is a "person" or
"minor child" as a matter of statutory construction. In a recent
case regarding the fetus' statutory status, Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores,97 the Alabama Supreme Court declared:
We recognize the cases cited by appellee construing the term "minor
child" as not including a fetus, but are not persuaded that such a
strict construction here would insure the necessary growth of the law
in this vital area and the individual justice of the case before us.9

The court held that the purpose of the Alabama wrongful death
statute was to preserve human life, and that therefore a live birth
was not a prerequisite to liability. 9 The court criticized the "live
birth" requirement as being illogical, since under such a standard
a tortfeasor's liability depends not on the seriousness of his
wrongful conduct, but on whether the injured child is able to
survive his injuries for at least a moment after birth. A wrongdoer
00
is thus rewarded if his conduct kills a fetus immediately.
15Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (Super.
Ct. 1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1971); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Valence v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951); State ex rel. Odham v.
Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d
785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Ore. 258, 518 P.2d
636 (1974); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Baldwin v. Butcher,
184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d
14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
" Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
'7 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974).
* Id. at 98, 300 So. 2d at 356 (footnote omitted).
"Id.
Ild. at 97, 99, 300 So. 2d at 355, 357. The Illinois Supreme Court was persuaded to
eliminate the "live birth" standard for wrongful death actions on this same rationale.
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I1. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1974). In denying fetal
"personhood" in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun attempted to reconcile his position with
the fact that so many jurisdictions regarded the unborn fetus as a "person" under their
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d. Welfare law
Until recently, another context in which the law appeared to
be in conflict with respect to fetal status was in the definition of
a "dependent child" in the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 0 The statutory interpretation of
"dependent child' ' 02 had caused much confusion in the courts,

because nowhere in the statute was there mention of the unborn.
The statute referred simply to needy children "under the age of
eighteen." HEW regulations 0 3 made matching funds available to
the unborn, but the regulations were not mandatory, and the
Department had approved state plans which made funds available to the unborn as well as plans which did not.'0 '
Four out of five federal courts of appeals which have recently
considered this issue concluded that an unborn child qualified as
a "dependent child" under the Social Security Act, and that a
pregnant woman was, therefore, eligible to obtain AFDC benefits
prior to her child's birth. 05 The Fifth Circuit, for example, dewrongful death statutes. Permitting parents to recover in tort for the wrongful death of
their fetus, he asserted, is not based on the theory that the unborn child is a person in
the full sense, but rather is designed to vindicate the parents' interest in the potentiality
of human life. 410 U.S. at 162. Blackmun's view is difficult to reconcile with the fact that
the wrongful death statutes are not framed in terms of "potential children." In construing
the statutes, the courts have struggled to determine whether legislatures intended to
include the fetus in the class of "persons" covered by the statutes. Moreover, it does not
disprove legal personhood to say that a wrongful death suit for an unborn fetus is designed
only to vindicate parental interests, since a wrongful death action always vindicates the
interests of the family of the deceased. The fact that parents may recover in tort for the
wrongful death of their child in no way diminishes the legal personhood of children.
In Great Britain the recent Law Commission Report on Injuries to Unborn Children
considered the question of when parents may bring an action "for loss of their unborn
child." The Commission recommended that such an action should be barred unless the
fetus survives for at least 48 hours after delivery. Even before presentation of the Report
to Parliament the 48-hour requirement was criticized as being illogical, partly on the
ground that it might encourage doctors to take extraordinary measures to keep a fetus
alive merely to satisfy a technical requirement. The Times (London), Sept. 12, 1975, at
14, col. 1. All attempts at line drawing ignore the fact that biological development lies on
a continuum.
" See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). For a detailed analysis of this subject
see, Note, Eligibilityof the Unborn for AFDC Benefits: The Statutory and Constitutional
Issues, 54 B.U.L. Rv.945 (1974).
10 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) (a statutory definition of "dependent child" for the
purposes of the Social Security Act).
"0 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.90(c)(2)(ii), (c)(3) (1976).
' See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 579-80 n.5 (1975).
' The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits had upheld fetal eligibility prior to
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clared that "[a]n unborn child's lack of status as a 'person' for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes does not affect the status of an
unborn child as a 'child' within the language of the Act. . . .
The Seventh Circuit based its finding of eligibility on the administrative practices of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and its predecessors, which had permitted prenatal benefit payments since 1941.107
The Supreme Court held, however, that it was not mandatory for states receiving federal assistance under AFDC to provide
benefits to pregnant women, since the unborn child did not qualify as a "dependent child" as defined by the Social Security
0 Because the Court based its holding
Act. 1°
on statutory construction, it expressly reserved the question of whether HEW has the
statutory authority to approve federal participation in state programs which elect to continue payments for unborn children. 01
Had the Court concluded that the unborn were indeed dependent
children, it would have faced a serious equal protection issue in
those states which excluded the unborn from coverage." 0
e.

Roe v. Wade

Although the trend prior to 1973 appeared to be in the direction of expanding legal recognition of fetal interests, in that year
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,"' the landmark decision in the area of abortion. The Court held that a woman's right
Burns v. Alcala. Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 1000
(1975); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.
1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 999 (1975); Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 421 U.S. 926 (1975); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated,
420 U.S. 999 (1975). The above decisions were all vacated as a result of Burns v. Alcala.
The Second Circuit denied fetal eligibility. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974).
Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 926 (1975).
"
Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 999
(1975).
' Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
10 In Wisdom v. Norton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare exceeded its statutory authority in permitting states to confer AFDC benefits upon the unborn child. 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir.
1974). In Burns v. Alcala, however, the Supreme Court refrained from determining
whether HEW exceeded its statutory authority. 420 U.S. at 586.
"' Such a holding would have enunciated a view of fetal personhood inconsistent with
its holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. The Court further explicated its position on a woman's constitutional rights to
abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) and Bellotti v. Baird,
96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976).
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of privacy is protected by the fourteenth amendment,"' that the
decision to have an abortion falls within this right,"' and that the
right to an abortion is fundamental and can only be subject to
regulation when there is a compelling state interest.' The state
has two legitimate interests: maternal health and the protection
of the potentiality of human life." 5 Each interest acquires increasingly greater significance as the fetus develops during pregnancy.
This maturing of significance permits limited state regulation to
foster maternal health during the second trimester and provides
the state with a compelling interest in proscribing abortion in
order to protect the potentiality of human life during the third
trimester or after viability, except where an abortion is necessary
to protect the health of the mother. '
With respect to fetal rights, what did Roe decide? The Court
held that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."'1 7 A fetus in utero therefore
enjoys no fourteenth amendment rights and, in all probability, no
other constitutionalrights until after birth, since the Court's constitutional analysis was not limited to the fourteenth amendment."' A state may choose not to restrict abortions even after
viability; and a fetus has no constitutional right to object, despite
the harm that might occur." '
"

410 U.S. at 153.

113 Id.

Id. at 155, 163.
,, Id. at 162.
,, Id. at 162-65.
Id. at 158.
"' Id. at 157. It is unlikely that the Court would be so inconsistent as to deem the
fetus a nonperson for purposes of abortion and a person for other purposes.
"I Although Roe may appear to some to be the logical and ultimate extension of the
Court's concern for privacy in matters of sexual conduct enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), it has not gone
without detractors. Professor John Ely, criticizing the decision as an unjustifiable extension of the constitutionally protected right to privacy and as court-made legislation, said:
What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right [a woman's
freedom to choose an abortion] is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue,
any general rules derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's
governmental structure.
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36
(1973).
Certainly the Court in Roe has substantially expanded the notion of privacy. It is one
thing to protect the privacy of the home and of those intimate sexual activities between
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Although Roe held that the fetus is not a person in the fourteenth amendment sense, this decision does not necessarily mean
that the fetus is not entitled to protection. As Roe acknowledged,
the state has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life."' 2 Whether a previable or viable
fetus, as a potential human life, should be accorded protection
should depend on a balancing of the interests asserted in a particular context, and those interests may differ in situations other
than abortion.
When the mother's fundamental right to privacy is involved,
the state may regulate only when its interest is compelling. Roe
held that the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of
2
human life becomes compelling when the fetus reaches viability '
(during the third trimester of gestation); thereafter, the mother's
fundamental privacy right to abortion can be subordinated to the
state's interest in protecting the viable fetus, except where the
22
mother's life or health is endangered.
However, Roe leaves unanswered the question of the scope of
the mother's fundamental privacy right. The decision might be
husband and wife which take place within the home. It is another thing, however, to
expand the concept of privacy in its sexual sense to abortion-to confer a privacy right in
the reproductive sphere after conception, within the first trimester of pregnancy and
essentially within the second as well.
The result in Roe v. Wade, but not its legal reasoning, has been defended. Tribe, The
Supreme Court 1972 Term, Forward:Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life

and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15-32 (1973). Professor Tribe argues that the question of
"when life begins" has become an essentially religious issue, not resolvable by resort to
the slippery slope of biological development, and that if governmental decisions are based
on the pervasive interference of religious groups in legislative considerations, the establishment clause must be invoked unless there are compelling, wholly secular reasons for
the legislation. As in Roe v. Wade, Tribe asserts that the government may intervene only
after viability, because only at that point in time is the fetus in the same status as an
infant for the secular purpose of protecting it from infanticide.
'" 410 U.S. at 162. See note 114 and accompanying text supra. The potentiality
concept is inapposite, however, to protection of the nonviable fetus which, by definition,
is physiologically incapable of attaining viability. See notes 141-42 infra. Nevertheless, the
nonviable fetus may be entitled to protection based on a fundamental "dignity" concept:
The fetus, simply because it is a member of the human family, must be accorded certain
considerations. See note 135 infra. See also note 100 supra.
12,410 U.S. at 163. The Court defined "viability" as that point of development at
which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid." Id. at 160. The Court added: "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id.
'" See note 116 supra.
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interpreted to confer on the mother an unfettered right to do what
she pleases with her fetus until the third trimester, but it can also
be narrowly construed as a determination of the respective rights
of mother and fetus only in the context of abortion. While Roe
acknowledges a mother's fundamental right to terminate her
pregnancy,'2 it does not expressly grant a right to manipulate
fetal existence in any other context; nor does it expressly grant
the mother a right to consent to in utero experimentation.
If the mother's privacy right in Roe is broadly construed to
encompass absolute control over the fetus in the first two trimesters, the state might nevertheless assert a compelling interest in
protecting the potentiality of life at a point earlier than viability
when a procedure such as nontherapeutic experimentation,
rather than abortion, is planned. And if Roe is strictly construed
to apply only to abortion, then there is no precedent to assume
the mother's fundamental privacy right includes fetal experimentation, and state regulation to protect the fetus' potentiality for
a full life need not be justified by a compelling interest. The state
would merely have to demonstrate a rational basis for the assertion of its interest. Thus, even though Roe deems the fetus a
nonperson for constitutional purposes, it may nevertheless be entitled to protection where the state demonstrates a compelling
interest in the potentiality of life in the nonabortion context, or
where the fundamental rights of the mother are not at issue.
A somewhat analogous situation arises in cases involving the
state's power to restrict experimentation on animals. Animals,
like the fetus, enjoy no constitutional rights. 2' Yet a rational
basis for the statutes banning cruelty to animals 25 in most, if not
all, states can be found in the dehumanizing and brutalizing
effect on society of needless cruelty inflicted on helpless creatures. These statutes, attacked as unconstitutional takings of
123That the constitutionai right of privacy encompasses a woman's right to obtain an
abortion is difficult to square with cases holding that a person has no absolute right to
bodily privacy. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 787 (1966) (involuntary blood test
for criminal evidence); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (involuntary sterilization); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination). See also note 128
infra.
"1, Massachusetts S.P.C.A. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 339 Mass. 216, 158
N.E.2d 487 (1959).
125See, e.g., ILL. ANNOT. STAT. ch. 8, § 704 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 717.3 (1946);
MASS P-N. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 77 (Supp. 1976).
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property without due process of law, have been upheld as a legiti2
mate exercise of the police power to protect public morality. If
a state or the federal government may regulate animal research,
it surely may regulate fetal research to protect the potentiality of
human life; and it is inconceivable that the protection accorded
to the fetus, even when balanced against the interests of society
in the results of fetal experimentation, would not be greater than
those accorded to animal research subjects.
2.

Regulation of Research on the Fetus In Utero

Section 46.208 of the Department's regulations addresses
activities directed toward fetuses in utero as subjects.
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any
activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus
will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet
such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is
minimal and the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other
means.'1

One example of research addressed by this section of the
regulations is the development of a perfected fetoscope for the
diagnosis and amelioration of fetal diseases and defects. Other
examples include detection of fetal breathing through ultrasound,
fetal heartbeat through electrocardiogram, and fetal vision
through light shined transabdominally. The administration of
certain drugs to the mother in an effort to determine whether they
will cross the placenta and provide therapy to the fetus before
birth would also be covered by this section. Some of these procedures involve only minimal violation of bodily integrity and appear to pose little risk. With other procedures, however, the hazards of research are incalculable; and the decision to use the
'
Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENv. AF. 205, 207 (1975). Of course, as
might be expected, in a genuine collision of animal and human interests, the interests of
animals have been forced to give way. The Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-55
(1970), provides protection for most warm-blooded animals in terms of requirements such
as adequate housing, ample food and water, and decent sanitation. But the act in no way
authorizes "disruption or interference with scientific research or experimentation." Similarly, states assign animals quite limited rights in the area of research, barring only
"unnecessary" infliction of pain, but permitting the use of animals for "the testing of

drugs or medicines." See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws
1v 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1976).

ANN.

ch. 49A, § 2 (1968).
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research technique may depend on the anticipated benefit to the
fetus.
Despite its sound legal foundation, the regulation raises serious questions because of its (perhaps deliberate) imprecision of
language. This imprecision may lead to two situations where possibly unintended results could occur. One situation involves the
requirement of consent by both parents before physicians may
render even a life-saving, therapeutic, but experimental treatment to their unborn fetus. Apparently therapeutic care may be
withheld if either parent objects. Were this situation to arise with
respect to a child, however, it is entirely possible that upon petition a court would intervene, declare the child neglected, and
order the treatment under its parens patriae power. 2 " It is not
clear, however, that a court would, or could, intervene if it finds
the fetus is not a human person equivalent to a child. The regulation could have been drafted to provide an exception to parental
consent in cases of serious, possibly life-threatening illness or
injury, although the draftsmen may have believed that a judicially applied common law or statutory remedy would still be
available.
There is also reason for concern, in the case of nontherapeutic
research, with the requirement that the risk be "minimal." If a
procedure is truly experimental, the degree of risk is definitionally unascertainable. Moreover, the word "minimal" disguises
the measurement to be used; does it refer to the likelihood of
injury, the magnitude of injury, or both? Many would regard even
the possibility of minor injury as unacceptable and unnecessary
I In a case decided before Roe v. Wade, the New Jersey Supreme Court required that
a pregnant woman obtain blood transfusions necessary to save the life of her unborn fetus.
The woman had refused the transfusions on religious grounds. (She was a Jehovah's
Witness.) The court stated:
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and
that an appropriate order should be made to ensure blood transfusions to the
mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physicians
in charge at the time.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 422, 201 A.2d 537, 538,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). This holding is not necessarily foreclosed by Roe v.
Wade, since it involved compulsory prenatal medical care for a "viable" fetus. Since the
state may assert a "compelling interest" in the potential life of the fetus during the third
trimester of pregnancy, it may arguably require a pregnant woman to obtain certain types
of therapeutic care, despite the fact that this requirement might impinge on
"fundamental" privacy and religious rights.
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when the fetus will receive no benefit, even though others might
characterize the risk in such a case as minimal.
More importantly, particularly from a substantive point of
view, the notion of what constitutes minimal risk may vary depending on whether or not a fetus will be aborted.'1' Because the
regulations'30 are not clear on this point, the contention may be
raised that a previable fetus is incapable of being subject to risk,
because it will necessarily die following abortion. In addition, if
it is scheduled to die by techniques which will mutilate it in any
event,' 3' why be squeamish about conducting research which may
result in lesser degrees of harm?
There are several responses to this assertion. For example, it
may be argued that the decision to abort involves the taking of a
life. Even if, as a pragmatic matter, that taking is permissible
under the law, our instincts should be to preserve and protect life
whenever possible.' 32 Therefore, no undue influence should be
imposed upon a woman to abort. 133 Experimentation, if it involves
'" There are very valid reasons for conducting fetal research, and it makes good
research sense to use a fetus scheduled for abortion in a potentially hazardous but valuable
experiment, e.g., in studies concerning drug transfer across the placenta. See note 19 and
accompanying text supra.
'3 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.206(2), (4) (1976).
' During the first 12 weeks, or first trimester, of pregnancy, both dilation and currettage ("D and C") and vacuum currettage procedures are employed for abortion. The
former involves widening the mouth of the cervix and scraping and emptying the uterus
manually. The latter involves the use of a vacuum-powered device to scrape the fetus,
placenta, and amniotic sac from the uterine wall, homogenize them, and suck them out
of the uterus. Interview with James H. Staton, Executive Director of the Boston Hospital
for Women, in Boston, Feb. 19, 1975.
Abortions are generally not performed from the twelfth through the sixteenth week
of pregnancy, but between sixteen and twenty weeks, two methods are used: Injection of
saline solution into the uterus, or intravenous injection of the drug prostaglandin. In
almost all cases, a saline abortion kills the fetus, often deforming it hideously. Interview
with Dr. David Nathan, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, Children's
Hospital Medical Center, Boston, Mass., in Boston, Feb. 13,1975. Prostaglandin may not
kill the fetus, but at least 90% of the fetuses aborted by this method are born dead. If a
fetus shows some signs of life-a determination made by the delivering physician-it
generally dies within minutes, or at most a few hours. Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1975, at 3,
col. 1.
If these methods do not induce an abortion of the fetus, a hysterotomy, or little
Caesarian, is performed. This is a surgical procedure in which the fetus is removed intact
from the uterus, and it may be the procedure of choice for pregnancies between 20 and 24
weeks. This method poses the smallest health risk to the fetus and the greatest risk to
the pregnant woman. Id.
13' FETAL RESEARCH REPor, supra note 19, at 33,539.
' Statement by R. Wasserstrom, id. at 33,540.
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a potential hazard of deforming the fetus, will compromise the
mother's choice of whether to carry it to full term, since once the
decision has been made to have an abortion, subsequent experimentation may preclude the mother from reconsidering that decision.134
More important than the rather utilitarian argument on
withdrawal of consent is the contention that nontherapeutic experimentation on a fetus in utero involves an assault on the dignity of a potential human being. 135 Until abortion actually occurs,
the fetus scheduled for abortion should be treated no differently
than the fetus carried to full term. 36 Professor Louisell, in his
dissent to the Commission's recommendations, states: "The argument that the fetus-to-be-aborted 'will die anyway' proves too
much. All of us 'will die anyway." ' 37 We should not subject a
terminally ill cancer patient to potentially harmful nontherapeutic experimentation simply because the person lacks what most
of the rest of us have-an unascertainably long and full future
life. Arguably, we should do the same for a fetus, whether or not
it has full status as a person.
C.

Research on the Nonviable Fetus Ex Utero

The regulation governing research on fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses, provides that:
I"A similar withdrawal of consent problem exists in adoptions of newborn children.
Frequently a mother, who before giving birth has consented to surrender her child for
adoption, wishes to withdraw that consent upon or shortly after birth. To cope with this
problem,
[a] number of states have statutes which declare invalid any consent executed by a mother before the birth of the child . . . . [Tihe British Adoption Act of 1958. . .absolutely voids any consent unless the infant is at least
six weeks old on the date of the execution of the document.
C. FOOTE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 480 (1966).
lu Prior to the abortion of the fetus, its protection may be justified on two grounds:
First, its potentiality for human existence; and, second, because it should be afforded a
measure of human dignity. The term "dignity," as used here, encapsules those pragmatic,
theological, and metaphysical considerations which give worth and value to human existence; it relates to the notion that the fetus is entitled to respect simply because it is a
member of the human family.
I" Once abortion occurs, however, the potentiality of continued existence is terminated and can no longer serve as the basis for protection of fetal rights. The fetus should
then be treated, with respect to experimentation, like other nonviable fetuses and accorded a measure of dignity, and, hence, protection. See notes 138-84 and accompanying
text infra.
"I FErAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,549 (dissent by D. Louisell).
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(a) No fetus ex utero may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this subpart until it has been ascertained whether the
particular fetus is viable, unless: (1) There will be no added risk to
the fetus resulting from the activity, and (2) the purpose of the
activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge
which cannot be obtained by other means.
(b) No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an
activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) Vital functions of the
fetus will not be artificially maintained except where the purpose of
the activity is to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive
to the point of viability, (2) experimental activities which of themselves would terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will
not be employed, and (3) the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained
by other means.3

The regulation prohibits any research which may subject a fetus
ex utero to additional risks until it has been ascertained whether
that fetus is viable. If a fetus is found to be viable, it must be
treated as a premature infant.' If, however, the fetus ex utero is
found to be nonviable, it may be the subject of research to further
the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.'4 0
In 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976). HEW has received criticism of the concept of viability
as it applies to the fetus ex utero. The Department noted, in response, that both it and
the Commission were aware of the medical uncertainty inherent in the term "viability"
and that, therefore, the regulations defining a viable fetus used very conservative criteria
to insure against medical error in determining viability. Consequently, HEW proposed no
changes in the use of the terms "viability" or "fetus ex utero." 42 Fed. Reg. 2792 (1977).
1" 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1976). The regulation specifies that "[i]f a fetus is viable
after delivery, it is a premature infant." Once a fetus attains the status of a premature
infant, a legal duty of care arises for both the attending physician and the parents.
Generally this duty requires that life-saving therapeutic assistance be rendered so that the
premature infant will have the opportunity to survive. For a discussion of this legal duty
of care in related areas see Robertson, note 186 infra; Paulsen, supra note 4.
"' The permissible risk associated with such research is not clear. The regulations
contain a general provision requiring minimal risk in activities unrelated to fetal health
needs. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(2) (1976). This standard is imprecise and difficult to apply even
to fetal experimentation generally. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. In the
unique situation of the nonviable fetus which cannot be "harmed for life," however,
minimal risk may be a meaningless proposition. See text accompanying note 159 infra.
Perhaps for this reason, the regulations pertaining to the nonviable fetus omit any reference to risk, 45 C.F.R. § 46.209, in contrast to the provisions regulating research on the
fetus in utero where the concept of minimal risk is expressly included, id. § 46.208(a).
The difficulty of defining permissible risk for the fetus ex utero raises a potential
problem in the application of the Department's waiver provisions. The regulations provide
that the Secretary may modify or waive specific limitations on fetal research after considering:
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1. Rights of the Nonviable Fetus
Obviously, the critical distinction in the regulations is between those ex utero fetuses which are viable and those which are
not. The regulations define viability as "being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of
available medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and respiration."'' A lack of viability does not,
however, mean that the fetus is already dead.' The nonviable
fetus ex utero is similar to any other being which, having lost a
vital function, must necessarily die. But, while a nonviable fetus
is a fortiori dying and has no potentiality for continued life, it
may be regarded as a living person for the duration of its short
existence. Is there, then, any scientific or moral justification for
conferring fewer of the rights of humanity on the nonviable fetus
than are required for the viable fetus? Is the distinction made in
the regulations a tenable one?
a. Legal precedent
Legal source materials are of little help in answering this
question. While many courts and commentators have struggled
to define the status of the fetus in utero, there is a curious void
in considering the status of beings born prior to the stage of viability. In tort and homicide cases, for example, most courts will
confer human status on an infant who is born alive, without apparent regard to whether the infant is viable or nonviable. 4 3 The
whether the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit
to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant such modification or waiver and that such benefits cannot be gained
except through a modification or waiver.
Id. § 46.211. Approval by both an Institutional Review Board and an Ethical Advisory
Board is required. Despite this significant safeguard, if risk is, in fact, seen as a meaningless concept in the context of research on the fetus ex utero, the waiver provisions might
give rise to potentially degrading forms of research on such fetuses, a result which the
promulgation of the regulations was originally intended to prevent.
"' 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1976).
1
The regulations define a dead fetus as one "which exhibits neither heartbeat,
spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached)." Id. § 46.203(f). A nonviable fetus may
possess one or more of these attributes; but absent appropriate weight and age, these
attributes are not themselves sufficient to indicate viability. FErAL REsEARCH REPORT,
supra note 19, at 33,543.
" See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947); People v.
Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96
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courts will usually confer blanket human status in homicide cases
as long as the child has been completely expelled from the
mother's body and has a separate and independent existence.,
Proof of independent existence frequently depends on a showing
of "independent circulation and/or respiration";' but a fetus
may be patently nonviable and still be capable of having
"independent circulation and/or respiration.""' Presumably, the
nonviable fetus has a "separate and independent existence" for
the duration of its life and, therefore, qualifies as a human person
under the homicide statutes.
The point is not clear, however, because case law usually
deals with the murder of babies at full term.' 7 In People v.
Chavez,'" for example, it was held that a viable child, in the
process of being born, may be considered a live "human being"
within the meaning of the homicide statute. Likewise, in
Singleton v. State,'" the court, citing People v. Chavez with approval, stated that a baby should be regarded as a human being
if it is viable and, after separation from the mother, capable of
life if given normal and reasonable care. Neither court expressly
decided, however, whether a nonviable, live-born fetus would
similarly be regarded as a human being.
Like the judiciary, state legislatures have not addressed the
issue directly. Most fetal experimentation statutes prohibit research on live fetuses; and "life" is variously defined.'50 Their
S.W.2d 1014 (1936); State v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d 856 (1972). See also text
accompanying notes 70-100 supra.
'M See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947); Logue v. State,
198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); People v.
Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); State v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d
856 (1972); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 47, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
"I See, e.g., State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171,
90 N.E.2d 23 (1949).
'" See note 142 supra.
"4 See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536,35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Ryan,
9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949);
State v. Dickenson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d
634 (Wyo. 1963).
"' 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
' 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
" In Maine "life" is defined as "beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord
or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the umbilical cord has been
cut or the placenta is attached." ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 1576 (Supp. 1975). Note
that spontaneous respiration is omitted, even though respiratory activity is the sine qua

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

language is neither consistent nor sophisticated. One is left with
the impression that most legislatures proceeded on the unarticulated premise that personhood begins at conception. Blocked
from conferring this status on the fetus in utero by Roe v. Wade, 5'
they seized upon any reasonable sign of life as sufficient to confer
personhood once birth or abortion has occurred.
What of Roe v. Wade? Unhappily, those who might have
anticipated some illumination by the Supreme Court will be disappointed. At one point the majority opinion remarks that "the
law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life. . . begins
before live birth."'' 2 "Live birth" is not explained, however; and
in a subsequent opinion, Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,'5 3 the
Court does little to clarify the issue. The majority opinion in
Danforth appears to equate personhood with live birth and viability; but while both the majority and Justice White employ words
such as "live-born infant"'5 4 and "live babies' '1 55 when discussing
fetuses ex utero, no distinction is made between viable and nonviable fetuses and no definition is offered.
b.

Scientific justification

In view of the ambiguity in judicial opinions, it is not surprising that when we turn from law to science, to hoped-for certainty
in the growing body of knowledge concerning fetal growth and
development, we obtain little in the way of clarification. Instead
of firm demarcation lines, we find a continuum, a process in
which there is an uneven maturation of human characteristics.' 56
There is no point of discontinuity, no point at which we can
confidently say in biological terms that this fetus is a person and
that one is not.
[Tihe advance of embryology and medicine over the past century
and a half rendered untenable any notion that the fetus suddenly
non of viability. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1976).
-31410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"

Id. at 161.

96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
'

Id. at 2848.
Id. at 2855 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

See, e.g., L. ARmy, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY: A TEXTBOOK AND LABORATORY MANUAL OF EMBRYOLOGY (7th ed. 1965); G. FLANAGAN, THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF LIFE (1962);
W. HAMILTON & H. MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (1972); B. PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY
(rev. ed. 1976); G. Corner, An Embryologist's View, in ABORTION INA CHANGING SOCIETY
(1970).
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"came to life" in a physiological sense at a definable point during
pregnancy. Once the embryo's growth had been traced in a continuous line from a single unfertilized ovum through the unbroken processes of fertilization, cell division, segmentation (in the case of
identical twins), implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine wall,
and a gradual fetal development to the point of birth, those who
believed in the sanctity of the fetus from the "moment" of quickening, or from some other "moment", were deprived of the ability to
link their belief to any distinct physical or biological event other
than perhaps "conception", which was itself later revealed as a complex and continuous process."'

c.

An ethical view

Clearly, both scientific technology and legal precedent are
of little assistance in ascertaining whether the distinction between viable and nonviable fetuses is an appropriate one for determining the existence of human rights. In fact, the sole justification for this distinction may lie in a discussion of the ethical
issues involved in research on the fetus ex utero.
In its report to HEW, the National Commission began its
analysis with the view that the nonviable fetus "must be considered a dying subject."'' 8 The Commission then stated that this
status alters the situation of the fetus in two ways. "First, the
question of risk becomes less relevant, since the dying fetus cannot be 'harmed' in the sense of 'injured for life."" 5 Unlike the
previable fetus in utero, its potential for continued existence is
gone.
Second, however, while questions of risk become less relevant, considerations of respect for the dignity of the fetus continue to be of
paramount importance, and require that the fetus be treated with
the respect due to dying subjects. While dying subjects may not be
"harmed" in the sense of "injured for life," issues of violation of
integrity are nonetheless central.160

The Department echoes this sentiment, stating that for fetuses ex
utero "no procedures will be undertaken which fail to treat the
fetus with due care and dignity, or which affront community
sensibilities. "161
"'
15

Tribe, supra note 119, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
FETAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,546.

Id.
I5
160Id.
"I Id. at 33,528.
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After uttering these protestations, however, both bodies apparently conclude that the nonviable fetus' "dignity" does not
preclude all nontherapeutic research, but only such research
which alters the duration of fetal life.'62 Thus, where important
biomedical knowledge may be gained, the Commission, and the
Department by implication, apparently embrace the rationale
that they expressly reject: Nontherapeutic research on the nonviable fetus is permissible because the fetus cannot be "harmed"
or "injured" for life. In addition, the regulations provide that
researchers may artificially sustain the life signs of a nonviable
fetus-admittedly an alteration of the duration of life, but arguably therapeutic' 3-if the purpose of the research is the development of artificial life support systems.'
In arriving at what seems to be a clear compromise between
principle and practice, both organizations may have concluded
that there is no completely satisfactory way to balance the demands of medical research against the rights of a being whose
status as a legal "person" has not been definitely ascertained.
On the basis of biological facts, a categorical assertion that the
nonviable fetus either is or is not a "person" entitled to certain
rights is unwarranted. Given this uncertainty, however, caution
alone suggests that doubts should have been resolved in favor of
personhood and that the nonviable fetus should be regarded as a
full human being in the research context.
In advocating the permissibility of research on the nonviable
fetus, however, both the Commission and the Department may
have been influenced by the ethical approach advocated by Dr.
Sissela Bok. In reference to the problem of abortion, Dr. Bok has
suggested that "[w]e must abandon . . . a definition of humanity capable of showing us who has a right to live,"' 5 and examine,
instead, the reasons for protecting life. In a paper submitted to
the National Commission, Dr. Bok advanced a similar thesis with
respect to fetal experimentation. She proposed four reasons for
protecting humans from harm: "(1) [T~he victim's anguish, suf,6 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976); FrrAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,546.
"5

See text accompanying notes 178-83 infra.

" The issue of artificially sustaining the life signs of a nonviable fetus for the purpose

of developing an artificial placenta is a major area of conflict between the Commission
and the Department. See note 40 supra.
"I Bok, Ethical Problems of Abortion, 2 HASTINGS CEN.FR STUDIES 33, 41 (1974).
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fering and deprivation of continued experience of life; (2) the
brutalization of the agent; (3) the grief of those who care about
the victim; and (4) the establishment of a pattern that ultimately
will harm all of society."'' 6
Dr. Bok concluded that none of these reasons was applicable
to a fetus in the early stages of gestational life.' 67 But this approach poses a new dilemma. Instead of a biological continuum,
we are confronted by a continuum of reasons for protecting a fetus
ex utero the further along it is in the process of development. Here
it may be equally difficult to draw a line. 68 However, in terms of
Dr. Bok's ethical analysis, the Department's 20-week minimum
age criterion for viability "' is reasonable, albeit arbitrary. Undeniably, a 19-week-old, nonviable fetus looks human;1?o but according to most medical experts, it cannot feel pain 7' or experience
emotional anguish, and certainly cannot apprehend its circumstances. 7 2 These facts, if known, could avoid possible grief to the
parents resulting from experimentation; and the parental consent
requirement can effectively prevent research which would offend
the feelings of the mother and father.' 3 Nor would research on the
Iu FETAL RESEARCH REPoirr,
',

supra note 19, at 33,538.

Id.

'u This difficulty may ultimately require that all "human" dying subjects be protected, regardless of age, expectation of life, or circumstance. P. RAMEY, THE ETmics OF
FETAL RESEARCH 33-35 (1975).
"I As minimal criteria to identify viability, the Department requires "an estimated
gestational age of 20 weeks or more and a body weight of 500 grams or more." FETAL
REsEARCH REOirr, supra note 19, at 33,552. See also notes 41 and 55 supra. These requirements are conservative. The National Commission, on the basis of a study conducted by
Dr. Richard Behrman of Columbia University, concluded that a fetus must weigh 601
grams or more and have a gestational age over 24 weeks to sustain independent growth
and development. Id. at 33,542-44. The Commission could find no unambiguous documentation that a fetus with weight and age below these limits had ever survived; and the
chances of survival of an infant weighing less than 750 grams are extremely small. Id. at
33,543.
"I Note the reaction of the jury in the Edelin trial to pictures of a fetus only slightly
older. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975, at 2, col. 1. See note 31 supra.
" It is highly unlikely that the fetus has the capacity to experience pain prior to 28
weeks. See Scarf, supra note 2, at 93-94. No one actually knows, however, whether this
assertion is true. Interview with Dr. David Nathan, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard
Medical School, Children's Hospital Medical Center, Boston, Mass., in Boston, Feb. 13,
1975.
"I Statement of Commissioner Karen Lebacoz, FETAL RE SEARCH REPORT, supra note
19, at 33,550.
"7 The regulations specify that research may be conducted "only if the mother and
father are legally competent and have given their informed consent." 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(d)
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nonviable fetus be brutalizing for the researcher.
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that nontherapeutic research on the nonviable fetus will open the door to similar research on persons distinguished by race, religion, or status who
have been subjected involuntarily to research in the past.' Because there is almost no likelihood that it experiences pain or
discomfort, due to its undeveloped nervous system, the nonviable
fetus differs substantially from a more mature subject, even one
who is unconscious and dying. "5 Given these distinctions, it
seems unlikely that values we cherish in this society-respect for
the dignity and integrity of others-will be affronted by this type
of research. Subjecting the nonviable fetus to nontherapeutic
experimentation will not cause us to fear, as it might with research on retarded or incarcerated subjects, that such experimentation could be extended without logical, break to all others.'
To argue that nontherapeutic research is permissible, however, is not to argue that it should proceed without regulation.
Although the nonviable fetus occupies a unique status, as a person it is entitled to substantial protection. Even if its personhood
is denied, the dignity it is accorded, while not sufficient by itself
to countermand the needs of medical research, should be sufficient to compel elaborate safeguards and to eliminate offensive
and degrading forms of research. A number of safeguards are
77
discussed in section HI of this paper.
2. Research Which Artificially Sustains the Life of a Nonviable Fetus
One particular form of experimentation on the nonviable
fetus deserves special scrutiny: Research which artificially maintains vital functions in order "to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability."'' 7 A desire to
(1976). For a discussion of the informed consent provisions see text accompanying notes
190-230 infra.
''The "opening wedge" argument is usually employed by those who object to the
wedge, but cannot muster sufficient arguments against it; instead, they point to all the
dire possibilities that may result from the extension of a principle. The law is replete with
line drawing; and there are often dire possibilities on either side of the line.
Cf. In re Quinlan, 335 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
"' See Martin, supra note 3, at 565.
See notes 190-268 and accompanying text infra.
45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976). See text accompanying note 244 infra for standards which should govern this type of research.
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eliminate offensive and degrading forms of research seems inconsistent with this type of experimental activity. Past research projects, such as the one in which fetuses were submerged in hyperoxygenated saline solution because their lungs were insufficiently
developed to permit them to breathe,' 7 involve methods which
offend and shock a significant segment of society. In view of this
reaction, persuasive justification should be required for activities
which so substantially assault notions of "human" dignity and
bodily integrity.
One such justification might be the argument that research
using the nonviable fetus to develop an artificial placenta meets
fetal health needs. As a general limitation on fetal experimentation, the Department's regulations require that the risk'" to the
fetus should be minimal and the least possible for achieving the
objectives of the activity, "except where the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of. . . the particularfetus. "I" It
would seem to follow from the regulation that any risk, pain,
indignity, or discomfort to a fetus is acceptable, if its health or
life even possibly hangs in the balance. The law appears to sup18
port this societal objective.
No one would deny, however, that for most fetuses involved
in this type of research death is inevitable. Researchers will be
able to devise sophisticated techniques which will allow them to
sustain a fetus' life signs long after it would die naturally if left
undisturbed. There is no chance that the nonviable fetus will
benefit in any way as a result of these herculean efforts, other
than having its life prolonged. As the research techniques are
perfected and the technology comes closer to achieving its objective, the struggle for life may be sustained over a substantial
period of time. Can one reasonably analogize these projects to
See note 27 supra.
See note 142 and text accompanying notes 59-60 supra for a discussion of the
difficulty involved in defining risk.
45 C.F.R. § 46.206(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
' In a recent case, a Maine court declared that a mother and father had "neglected"
their defective newborn infant by refusing to obtain "ordinary" medical care. A guardian
was appointed for the child and surgery was performed. When the child subsequently died,
the parents expressed great anguish at having been brought into court and having the
decision to seek surgery taken out of their hands. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil
No. 74-145 (Supreme Court of Cumberland County, Feb. 14, 1974), reported in Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
'7
"
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therapeutic attempts to keep a patient alive through extraordinary means, when there is almost no chance for fetal survival, and
the primary purpose of the procedures is to accumulate scientific
data?
These conflicting considerations make a judgment about the
therapeutic or nontherapeutic character of the research extremely
difficult. If the possibility of life is the goal, and if any given fetus
may achieve this objective for even a limited period of time, then
the research may be characterized as therapeutic. On the other
hand, if the practical implications of the research are borne in
mind, it seems clear that most fetuses used in these experiments
will be research subjects with no hope of obtaining a real benefit.
By this characterization, clearly the research is nontherapeutic.
It may be argued, however, that this research is therapeutic
for the particular fetuses involved. Our values adjure us to preserve life regardless of its quality; and distinctions are not drawn
as to whether we should implement this value only if the preservation is for longer than an hour, a day, a week, or some other
period of time.5 3 Preserving life in all its contexts furthers an
important societal objective. It is difficult to argue, moreover,
that research designed to preserve life has an intrinsically brutalizing effect or that it opens the door to experimental actrocities
on other classes of defenseless subjects. Nevertheless, because of
the nature of this research, substantial prior animal testing
should be required in the development of an artificial placenta
before using human fetal subjects; and the participation of
human fetuses should be limited to situations where there is
some, even if remote, chance of ultimate survival." 4 These limita10 Because we should generally strive to preserve life, it does not follow that we should
be compelled to do so in all circumstances, e.g., "[when] the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976). Neither
should we be forbidden to do so. Parents of a nonviable fetus should be free to consent or
withhold consent to its participation in this form of experimentation.
I" Currently, the regulations provide that "vital functions of the fetus will not be
artificially maintained except where the purpose of the activity is to develop new methods
for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability." 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976).
See note 138 and accompanying text supra. In response to criticism of this provision by
the National Commission, see 42 Fed. Reg. 2792 (1977), HEW has proposed an amendment to "reflect the Department's actual intent ... to permit artificial maintenance of
vital functions only to enable the particular fetus 'to survive to the point of viability.'"
Id. The proposed regulation provides that, with respect to an ex utero fetus whose viability
has not been ascertained, the purpose of the research must be "to enhance the possibility
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tions would insure that nontherapeutic elements, such as the
opening of fetal chest walls to observe heartbeat, do not predominate in the research design.
3.

A Duty to Experiment?

One final issue is raised by the regulations permitting research which artificially sustains life. If this type of research is
characterized as therapeutic, may desperate parents, following
premature, spontaneous delivery of a nonviable or possibly viable
fetus, resort to legal action to compel experimentation in the hope
of obtaining a viable offspring? The answer to this question is
probably in the negative, since it is unclear on what theory parents could force physicians to reverse a decision not to experiment. A malpractice action would occur subsequent to the event5
and would be inapposite because of the customary practice rule.'8
Specific performance based on a theory of contract between parents and doctor would probably be no more successful; at best, a
doctor contracts to render reasonable, ordinary care. When a procedure has no realistic prospect of success, is extraordinary in
nature, and requires a willing application of skill in its performance, it is highly unlikely that it could or should be compelled., 6
In addition, it is unclear whether an obstetrician attending
a mother at an abortion prior to the third trimester must assume
the fetus is a patient once "birth" occurs and, in keeping with
good medical practice, act to preserve its life and health. The
Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,'87 assumed
that criminal statutes would operate to compel treatment for
"live-born infants."'' 8 The Court struck down, however, a statute
of survival of the particular fetus to the point of viability." Id. at 2793 (Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.209(a)(2)). Once the ex utero fetus is ascertained to be nonviable, however, "[vlital
functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained." Id. (Proposed 45 C.F.R. §
46.209(b)(1)).
Note that the proposed amendment does not prohibit highly invasive research procedures; moreover, it prescribes neither the magnitude of "the possibility of survival of the
particular fetus" nor the anticipated duration of survival. These issues are critical in
determining whether to characterize the research as therapeutic or nontherapeutic.
See text accompanying notes 255-56 infra.
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REv. 213, 235-36 (1975).
"7 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
Id. at 2848. Paradoxically, the Court refused to sever the provisions of the Missouri
statute before it for consideration, and thereby struck down as unconstitutional a requirement that physicians act to preserve the life of an aborted "child."
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which imposed criminal liability for failure "to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life
and health of the fetus which . . . would be required . . . to
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and
not aborted."''8 The Court's finding of unconstitutionality appears to have been based on a reading of the statute as applying
to all fetuses, even those before the stage of viability, whether in
utero or ex utero. Presumably, then, a physician may not be liable
for failure to undertake "therapeutic" measures for a nonviable
fetus ex utero.
Ill.

PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS

The Department's regulations, in addition to establishing
guidelines for experimentation, set forth two principal protective
devices for safeguarding fetal rights. One device is a requirement
that consent of the parents of the fetus be obtained before research can be conducted. The other device involves review and
monitoring by Ethical Advisory Boards at the national level and
by Institutional Review Boards at each research institution. This
section will examine the legal efficacy of these protective mechanisms and the extent to which they are adequate safeguards.
Additional protective mechanisms will then be discussed briefly
in conclusion.
A.

Controls Established by Federal Regulations
1.

Consent Provisions

The sections of the regulations relating to experimentation
0 and nonviable fetuses ex utero19' contain
with fetuses in utero'1
nearly identical provisions on consent: The regulation pertaining
to ex utero fetuses provides that research
may be conducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed consent, except that the father's
informed consent need not be secured if: (1) his identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably
available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape."2
ID Id. at 2847.

45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1976).
Id. § 46.209.
1 Id. § 46.209(d). The consent regulation pertaining to in utero fetuses fails to track

"u
"'

precisely the quoted language; the word "informed" is omitted from the phrase "father's
informed consent." Id. § 46.208(b).
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a.

Source

This requirement of parental consent for fetal experimentation appears to have been extrapolated from the requirement that
parental consent be obtained prior to utilization of either established or innovative medical procedures on children. Two principles govern this exercise of parental authority. First, as a general
proposition, parents in this culture have traditionally possessed
substantial independent control over their children. 193 Second,
parents in all jurisdictions have an affirmative obligation to provide necessary medical care for their children; and their failure
to do so may result in prosecution and the forfeiture of their rights
of parenthood.9 4 Thus, in a blend of these two principles, parents
are given wide latitude in the choice of medical treatment for a
child; but they must exercise their power to grant or withhold
consent on the basis of the child's best interest.'95 When a child's
condition is serious, as when death is imminent, parents may
consent to drastic therapeutic measures. Parents do not, however,
possess authority to consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures;'" and, a fortiori, they may not consent to nontherapeutic
The Department's regulations require both mother and father to be legally competent. Since males and females in their early teens are capable of conceiving children, this
competence limitation may preclude obtaining their consent to fetal research, even in
situations where the research is therapeutic. A preferable solution would be to permit
therapeutic research after consent has been obtained from other parties, such as the
incompetent parents' legal guardians, as well as from the parents themselves.
"3 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Note, The Sale of Human Body
Parts,72 MICH. L. Rav. 1182, 1194-95 (1974). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
"' See note 186 supra. Neglect "embraces wilful as well as unintentional disregard
of duty." People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952). The rights of a dying child to receive therapeutic medical care may
take precedence over the religious objections of his parents. Id. at 774. See also John F.
Kennedy Mem. Hoap. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
1,5
See note 186 supra.
Ie Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Supreme Court
refused to invalidate a state statute barring minors from selling newspapers and other
merchandise. The statute was applied to prohibit a child from selling religious literature.
The Court recognized that zealous attempts to distribute propaganda of any type might
create an emotional situation harmful to the child. The Court then observed:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves.
Id. at 170.
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experimentation, 97 since the risks engendered by research are
more difficult to assess than those associated with accepted medical procedures.
Nevertheless, courts have permitted nontherapeutic procedures on children, even procedures presenting a substantial hazard, in certain limited situations. The leading case on the subject,
Bonner v. Moran, 8 involved a 15-year-old boy who consented to
be the donor in a skin transplantation procedure that was necessary to save the life of his cousin. The court held that the consent
of the minor alone was not sufficient to compel judgment for the
defendant doctor in an action for assault and battery. Inferentially, the case may be read to stand for the proposition that
parental consent would have been sufficient to enable the physician to perform the procedure, even though the procedure entailed a substantial risk of injury.
In the late 1950's, the issue of parental consent for a nontherapeutic procedure performed on a minor was placed directly in
focus by three Massachusetts cases involving kidney transplantation.' In all three cases, the kidney of a healthy child was to
be transplanted to his ill sibling; both the minors and their parents had consented. In each of these cases the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decided that, since the donor child would
receive a psychological benefit, the parents could consent to the
operations.5°° In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
permitted the transplantation of a kidney from a mentally retarded 27-year-old man to his dying brother."0 ' The court based
its opinion on two conclusions: The incompetent would suffer
"' However, one commentator has suggested that, because of the drastic impediment
to medical research on childhood diseases which would occur if experimentation were
curtailed, children should be permitted to be subjects of such research "where they are
peculiarly suitable and there is no discernible hazard to them." Freund, Introduction to
EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HuMAN SuBJErs at xvi (P. Freund ed. 1970).
' 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
' Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq.
No. 68666 (Mass., Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass., June 12,

1957). See Baron, Botsford, & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants From Minor
Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U.L. Rav. 159 (1975); Curran, A Problem of Consent:
Kidney Transplantationin Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 891 (1959).
' See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WrrH HuMAN BEINGS 966 (1972).
2" Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1969).
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psychological damage from the loss of his brother; and the risk
to the incompetent donor was minimal.- 2
Other courts have rejected the psychological benefit theory,
but have permitted nontherapeutic procedures on other grounds.
For example, in a 1972 Connecticut case0 3 involving a kidney
transplant, the court discounted testimony relating to psychological benefit to the donor. Nevertheless, it permitted the operation
to proceed, holding that parents of identical twins could consent
to a transplant from one twin to the other when the operation is
necessary for the continued life of the donee, the risk is negligible,
and the parents' motives and reasoning have been reviewed by a
guardian ad litem, clergyman, and the court. 204 Another court
similarly rejected the concept of psychological benefit in the context of bone marrow transplantation.20 The court found that,
although "the evidence does not permit a finding that the procedure will be of any benefit"201 to the donor, it did "not believe that
a finding of benefit to the donor is essential ...
."207 The opinion
clearly stated that "parents have the right and responsibility to
make these decisions" 08 subject to judicial review to guard
against a conflict arising from their responsibility to care for both
children. The court must merely decide if the parents' decision
2 09
to allow their child to be a donor is "fair and reasonable.9
Several propositions can be drawn from the transplant cases.
First, a striking aspect of these decisions is the fact that the
courts never questioned the parents' right to consent to an experimental (but therapeutic) procedure on behalf of the donee-child.
Thus, parents may consent to placing their child at serious risk
if exigent circumstances justify drastic therapeutic measures and
the child might derive a benefit from them.2 11 Second, parents
may consent to a nontherapeutic procedure in which the child
202 Id.

at 149.
" Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368 (Super. Ct.), 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
2*1Id. at 390.
20 Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass., July 3, 1974), reprintedin 1974 INs. L.J.
411.
2, Id. at 412.
207Id. at 413.
20 Id.

at 414.

2W Id.

I' See note 186 supra. If the child will die without the therapeutic procedure, courts
will almost invariably grant the parents great latitude of choice.
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will be a donor if the risks to the donor are outweighed by the
benefits to the donee."' Third, there appears to be some movement away from rationalizing such parental consent to a nontherapeutic procedure on the basis of the contrived notion that the
incompetent donor receives a benefit. Finally, courts are deferential to parental authority and appear very reluctant to secondguess parents after they have made a decision concerning their
child, even though the parents have a serious conflict of interest
when both the donor and the donee children are their own.
In the context of therapeutic research on a fetus in utero, the
federal regulations embody the first proposition: As in the case
of a minor child, the parents of a fetus have broad discretion when
they act to further its health needs. In the context of nontherapeutic research on both in utero and nonviable ex utero fetuses,
however, the regulations grant authority to parents significantly
beyond that inhering in the other three propositions derived from
the transplant cases: Parents may consent to experimentation on
the fetus even though it will not provide a life-saving benefit to a
sibling."' No benefit, psychological or otherwise, need accrue to
the fetus. Moreover, courts do not even have the opportunity to
review the parental decision since no judicial approval is necessary under the regulations.
The latitude given to parental authority might be understandable were we to conclude that parents are as protective toward their fetuses as they are toward their minor children. But
common sense suggests that this assumption is not warranted;
and the number of abortions makes the point doubly clear. The
alternative conclusion is that fetuses are not as deserving of pro"' In the bone marrow and kidney transplant cases, notes 199-209 supra, the benefit
(the possibility of saving the donee's life) outweighed the risk of harm to the donor. Only
once was parental consent overridden, In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La. 1973), in a situation where the transplant was not an "absolute,
immediate necessity" to preserve life. Id. at 187. The court held that it was inconceivable
that a statute absolutely prohibiting donation of a minor's property by his parents afforded "less protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to
the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor." Id.
"I See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208(a)(2), .209(a) (1976). The regulations provide, however,
that the risk must be minimal to a fetus in utero, id. § 46.208(a)(2), and that research
activities directed toward a viable fetus ex utero must conform to regulations respecting
experimentation with human subjects, see id. § 46.209(c). The utility of this limitation is
open to some question, however, since the degree of risk may be impossible to gauge in
advance.
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tection as minor children, and that parental consent is a sufficient safeguard under the circumstances. In either event, whether
parental consent alone suffices to protect fetuses should be determined by analyzing the different contexts in which fetuses may
be subject to nontherapeutic research.
b.

Fetus in utero

Where both parents desire a child, they acquire a growing
emotional attachment to the fetus throughout pregnancy; and,
following birth, both parents are responsible for its maintenance
and support, including the provision of medical services. They are
clearly the parties most concerned about the welfare of their future child; therefore, it makes sense to assume that they will act
to safeguard the interests of the maturing fetus in utero, particu13
larly as these interests largely coincide with their own.
c.

Previablefetus scheduled for abortion

A distinctly different picture exists in the case of a previable
fetus scheduled for abortion. Here it can be argued that, where
abortion is not necessary to protect maternal life or health, the
parents have consigned the fetus to death. They are hardly the
parties who should then be charged with protecting its interests;
moreover, any research on it would, by definition, be nontherapeutic. Hans Tiefel has observed:
[Tihe pregnant woman cannot be assumed to be the parental
guardian of the fetus when non-therapeutic experiments are proposed in connection with a planned abortion. For when the woman
has decided for whatever reasons not to become a parent-and there
certainly are reasons which justify an abortion-then rights that
depend on the parent-analogy are obviously no longer appropriate.21 ,

On the other hand, it can be argued that few abortions are
motivated by malice toward the fetus. The absence of a father, a
lack of financial resources to support a child, the youth of the
parents, or a need to defer childrearing because of career demands
"' That this assumption is not invariably true, however, is demonstrated by Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964). See note 128 supra.
"I Written comments submitted (April 24, 1975) by Hans 0. Tiefel, Kennedy Fellow
in Medical Ethics at Harvard University, to the Subcommittee of the Massachusetts
Legislature on Human Experimentation and Clinical Investigation (in conjunction with
Hearingson Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 12J (1975) held on March 7, 1975) at 8.
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are examples of nonmalicious motives. In none of these cases
would the parents necessarily be insensitive to the rights of their
developing child; and this would be particularly true where an
abortion is necessitated by the health needs of the mother.
The issue, then, is not whether maternal consent should be
required prior to research on a fetus scheduled for abortion, but
whether it is sufficient, standing alone, as a protective device.
Approval by an independent review board could be required" 5 as
an additional measure to guard the interests of the fetus. Alternatively, a procedure similar to that used when a minor donates a
kidney might be appropriate: This procedure entails, in addition
to parental consent, appointment of a guardian ad litem to obtain
2
the imprimatur of the court. 1
d.

Nonviable fetus ex utero

Similar checks on the consent authority granted to parents
by the regulations seem desirable in the case of aborted nonviable
fetuses. Supplementing parental consent to research on such fetuses with other protective provisions is both more sensible and
more humane than the approach incorporated in several state
statutes" 7 which terminate parental rights over the fetus should
it survive, except when the abortion is performed to preserve the
mother's life or health.2 1 8 Under these statutes, parents would be
unable to consent even to performance of therapeutic procedures
on the aborted fetus.
215 Review procedures are, in fact, required prior to initiation of fetal research where

federal funding is involved. See notes 231-44 and accompanying text infra.
2" Bernstein & Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney Donor: The Right to Give, 131 Am.
J. PSYCHUTRY 1338 (1974).
2"I LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1569-70 (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.040 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1977). The Louisiana statute regards a fetus which survives an abortion
as a neglected or dependent child and gives jurisdiction over proceedings involving the
child to the juvenile court. Missouri regards the aborted child as an abandoned ward of
the state and places it under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; the mother and the
father, if he consented to the abortion, lose all parental rights or obligations vis-A-vis their
aborted offspring.
"I These statutes may be open to constitutional attack on due process grounds because parental rights are forfeited automatically without any showing of actual or pending
neglect. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The degree of protection of fetal rights
afforded by these statutes is also questionable in that the state-appointed guardian is
potentially indifferent.
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e. Dual consent
With limited exceptions, the regulations require consent by
both parents in order to conduct research on a fetus, whether in
utero or ex utero.211 As a means of protecting fetal interests, this
dual consent requirement constitutes an important additional
safeguard. But, for the fetus in utero, is dual consent justifiable
after Roe v. Wade"' and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth?2 '
Specifically, does the mother's privacy interest give her the sole
22
right to consent?1

In Roe, the Supreme Court confined its discussion of fundamental privacy to the pregnant woman planning an abortion.
Once conception has taken place, and the fetus is growing within
her, the choice to abort the fetus is her right alone. The Court
specifically eschewed any consideration of a father's rights,22 3 and

this primacy of the mother was reaffirmed in Danforth.12 Neither
Roe nor Danforth, however, granted a pregnant woman absolute
See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
The right of privacy is an amorphous concept whose constitutional source has
eluded precise identification. Justice Goldberg contended that the right of privacy is
protected by the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965)
(concurring opinion). Justice Blackmun concluded that the right is founded in the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Coherent definition of the right eluded even the imaginative Justice Douglas who discovered the right of privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut,
supra at 483-85.
Since Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court has slowly carved
out a zone of personal liberty which is immune to state intrusion, absent the nearly
unattainable showing of a compelling state interest. In general, this zone of privacy encompasses intimate matters associated with marriage, family, and sexual relations. The
Supreme Court has enunciated the right in cases dealing with sterilization, id., the use of
contraception by married persons, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, and by unmarried
persons, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and the choice of marriage partner,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty., 96 S. Ct.
1489, rehearing denied, 96 S. Ct. 2192 (1976), afl'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), in
which the Supreme Court seemingly narrowed the scope of the privacy right by affirming
(without comment) a lower court decision upholding a Virginia sodomy statute which
prohibited private consensual homosexual acts between adults. Since the statute patently
infringed on intimate sexual matters, the conclusion to be drawn is that the privacy right
is restricted to heterosexual relations.
410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
"' 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). The Court struck down a spousal consent requirement for
abortions, holding that a state cannot delegate to a father power which it does not itself
possess. Id. at 2841.
21

r
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bodily autonomy.2 2 5 Simply because a woman possesses a privacy
right in the first two trimesters to retain a fetus or to have it
expelled from her womb, it does not follow that she possesses
unfettered discretion to do with the fetus as she pleases in any
other respect. While her right to refuse an invasion of her body is
undoubtedly fundamental,21 it is less clear that she possesses a
fundamental privacy right to invade the body of her fetus for
experimental purposes. Or, if her maternal interest in the fetus
is a fundamental right included within the notion of privacy, it
would seem to follow that paternal rights should be on an equal
footing.2 27
The Court in Roe said:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions ....
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Accord, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S.
Ct. 2831, 2837 (1976). See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410,
1429 (1974).
2 See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), which upheld a minor's
right to refuse an abortion her mother bought for her.
r In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, concluded
that the State cannot "delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state
itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first
trimester of pregnancy."
Id. at 2841. By speaking in terms of delegation, the Court appeared to deny the existence
of a natural or fundamental right of fatherhood, although it stated that
[slince it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the
balance weighs in her favor. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153 ....
Id. at 2842. Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion in which Mr.*Justice Powell
joined, went somewhat farther, saying "that a man's right to father children and enjoy
the association of his offspring is a constitutionally protected freedom"; however, in choosing between these competing rights, he concurred that the balance weighs in the woman's
favor. Id. at 2850-51. Mr. Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed:
[T]he State is not . . . delegating to the husband the power to vindicate
the State's interest in the future life of the fetus. It is instead recognizing
that the husband has an interest of his own in the life of the fetus which
should not be extinguished by the unilateral decision of the wife. It by no
means follows, from the fact that the mother's interest in deciding "whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy" outweighs the State's interest in the
potential life of the fetus, that the husband's interest is also outweighed and
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Certainly a prospective father has a substantial interest in
the fate of his unborn child, an interest ranging from possible
emotional attachment to a state-compelled duty of maintenance
and support. A father may wish to shield the fetus in utero from
unnecessary potential harm or pain; and there is no logical reason
why his wishes in this regard should be outweighed by those of
the pregnant woman, as they are in the case of abortion.2 2 The
mother's freedom to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is not impaired if she is prevented from authorizing research." 9 Since experimentation is not designed to benefit her
physically, no predominant health interest can be claimed. The
father is simply asserting a legitimate interest in protecting the
fetus. Since he is a copartner in the conception, it cannot be said
that the woman alone should speak in this protective capacity.3 8
And if there are sound reasons to support maternal and paternal
consent to experimentation on a fetus in utero, these reasons
should be even more persuasive once a fetus has been expelled
from the womb.
may not be protected by the State. A father's interest in having a
child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any other interest in
his life. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 ....
Id. at 2852 (footnote omitted). As the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined in
the dissent, a total of five of the justices joined in either the concurring or dissenting
opinion; it thus seems that a majority of the Court recognizes the fundamental nature of
paternal rights.
r-' Where a pregnant woman's health may be endangered and experimental procedures are indicated, the regulations permit medical intervention with her consent alone.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(b)(1) (1976).
rn To the extent that a decision to withhold therapeutic research might impinge on
the woman's abortion decision, it would probably be unconstitutional under the reasoning
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831
(1976).
2Support for this position may be inferred from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), although the case can be distinguished as it did not address the issue of informed
consent. Stanley involved an Illinois statute which presumptively held a father unfit,
because of his unwed status, to be the guardian of his children following their mother's
death; yet custody by natural or adoptive married parents or by an unwed mother could
only be terminated through a neglect proceeding. Finding a denial of Stanley's due process
and equal protection rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the Court stated:
"The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at
651. This language evidences an expanding recognition of paternal rights and a desire to
eliminate sexual stereotypes; it strongly suggests that, in the context of consent to fetal
research, the father should stand on a co-equal footing with the mother.
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Review Procedures

In order to expose hidden biases and uncontemplated perils,
many commentators have suggested review by a committee prior
to commencing research activities on human subjects. 23' A review
committee is probably a useful safeguard, if for no other reason
than that it forces researchers to openly articulate their procedures and objectives. This experience alone may induce the experimenters to alter research design or to halt unethical research
altogether. The extra delay and bureaucratic formality imposed
by committee review is a relatively trivial burden to insure meticulous care in protecting incompetent subjects.
The federal regulations require committee review, in some
cases by two committees, for research proposals involving human
subjects. The process is complex. In the case of experimentation
on a fetus, every proposed research activity must be reviewed and
approved in the first instance by an Institutional Review Board.232
No proposal may be funded unless Board approval is certified to
the Department. m The Institutional Reyiew Board's scope of re3I Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24

L. REv. 1067, 1093 (1973). See also Robertson, supra note 186, at 264, 268. It
has been suggested that these review committees not be associated in any way with
institutions sponsoring research. Note, Experimentationon Human Beings, 20 STA. L.
REV. 99, 109 (1967). Also recommended is inclusion on the committees of physicians who
are not involved in research as well as those who are. Lewis, McCollum, Schwartz, &
Grunt, Informed Consent in PediatricResearch, 16 CHDwiRN 148 (1969). One commentator has recommended a panel, fifty percent of whose members would be drawn from the
community. See Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, supra at 1093. Community representation is suggested because the decision to proceed with research often involves normative judgments; but it has also been questioned
on the ground that outside "experts" and laymen may be no more capable than parents
or physicians at resolving complex social and ethical questions posed by a particular
project. Robertson, supra note 186, at 265. Even though normative, non-technical judgments are often required, these judgments frequently must be meshed with a thorough
understanding of the technical aspects of a project. Lay members of review committees
tend to rely on those with greater technical expertise. Not surprisingly, the success of these
committees has been cited as less than spectacular. Id.
- 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(a) (1976). The Department's regulations concerning fetal experimentation do not preempt state law: "Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as
indicating that compliance with the procedures set forth herein will in any way render
" Id. § 46.201(b). A number of state fetal
inapplicable pertinent State or local laws ...
experimentation statutes (see supra note 32) impose greater restraints than the federal
regulation; and researchers must conform with these local standards even after they obtain HEW approval.
= 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102, 46.205(3)(b) (1976).
SYRACUSE
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view is broad: It determines not only whether a proposed activity
conforms to the general standards for research on human subjects,2 3' but also whether the activity is permissible under the
applicable standards governing research on the fetus." 5 While it
is still too early to assess the precise functioning of these boards,
in all likelihood they will: (1) monitor the informed consent process;131 (2) periodically (at least once a year) monitor research
activities already approved to insure that there are no unexpected
problems or risks for research subjects; 237 (3) determine that prior
animal testing has been performed; 23 (4) insure that there is only
"minimal risk" to the fetus;2 39 and (5) insure that researchers take
no part in decisions as to timing, methods, and procedures used
to terminate pregnancies and are excluded from evaluating the
viability of fetuses used in research.4 0
Upon receiving certification of approval by an Institutional
Review Board, the Secretary of HEW has three options: He may
grant final approval, reject the proposal, or request further advice
from an Ethical Advisory Board. The Secretary will exercise this
latter option when, in his opinion, a research activity raises complex medical, legal, social, and ethical problems which require
close scrutiny and review. The regulations prescribe that two Ethical Advisory Boards be established and that they be composed
of individuals competent to deal with these kinds of problems in
the context of fetal experimentation. 2' 1 In addition:
A Board may establish, with the approval of the Secretary,
classes of applications or proposals which: (1) Must be submitted to
the Board, or (2) need not be submitted to the Board. Where the
Board so establishes a class of applications or proposals which must
be submitted, no application or proposal within the class may be
funded by the Department or any component thereof until the application or proposal has been reviewed by the Board and the Board
has rendered advice as to its acceptability from an ethical standpoint."'
2u
211

Id. § 46.101, -102.
Id. § 46.205(a)(1).

- Id. § 46.109, -110.
Id. § 46.107(f), (g).
2n Id. § 46.206(1).
"I Id. § 46.206(2).
2"

2,1
21
21

Id. § 46.206(3).

Id. § 46.204(a).
Id. § 46.204(d).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

This provision enables an Ethical Advisory Board, with the approval of the Secretary, to review every research proposal in a
given class. For example, since the fetus scheduled for abortion
and the nonviable ex utero fetus are particularly vulnerable,4 3 an
Ethical Advisory Board could require that all research proposals
involving such fetuses be submitted to it for careful review.2" ' This
procedure would constitute a desirable supplemental mechanism,
in addition to parental consent, for protection of fetal rights.
While the Secretary is not bound by a Board's recommendation,
a finding that a proposal fails to conform to acceptable ethical
standards will carry great weight.
B.

Mechanisms Not Prescribed by Federal Regulations
1.

Physician Advocates

Another possible protective device is a requirement that a
physician who is not one of the researchers be present in any
research situation to be responsible for the research subject as a
4 ' This physician
patient."
would communicate the progress of research faithfully to the parents or guardian, make sure that their
consent is truly informed, insure that every precaution is taken,
and withdraw the fetus from the research if the risk of harm is
unnecessary or too great.
Although this protective device has merit, it duplicates many
of the duties of the Institutional Review Boards. Having both a
review committee and a physician advocate would probably be an
unnecessary additional restriction on researchers in most situa243

See text accompanying notes 216-17 supra.

21"In particular, the Boards should closely scrutinize any research in which the pur-

pose "is to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability."
45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976). I recommend that the following standards be applied by
the Ethical Advisory Boards for this class of research:
(1) The general rule should be that researchers may not alter the duration of fetal life;
and the development of an artificial placenta should be a specific, narrowly limited exception to the general rule.
(2) There should be no reasonable alternative to the use of nonviable fetuses as research
subjects (e.g., could a possibly viable fetus who might benefit from this research be used
instead of a nonviable fetus?).
(3) The degree of bodily invasion of the proposed experiment should be considered a
relevant factor in determining its ethical propriety.
(4) There should be a showing that the proposed experiment will result in the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
214 Wall Street Journal, Apr. 14, 1971, at 17, col. 4.
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tions. Moreover, the presence of an additional, independent physician would constitute an unwarranted interference with the researcher's professional responsibility, especially in the context of
therapeutic experimentation.
2.

Litigation

Another significant method of quality control-indeed,
within the medical profession currently, perhaps the most efficacious method-is after-the-fact litigation, usually in the form of
suits for malpractice. Applied to fetal experimentation, litigation
would permit the gradual development and testing of legal doctrine in this very perplexing area. A common law approach would
avoid sweeping generalizations enunciated in regulations in favor
of an adjudication of liability and assessment of damages in specific cases. Over a period of time it would probably provide the
best guide to the behavior of physician-researchers. Unfortunately, the rate of development in medical research frustrates an
unhurried case-by-case analysis of concomitant legal problems.
In addition, although rules pieced out in judicial opinions may
ultimately be of critical importance in regulating the scope of
research activities, it will be necessary first to modify the legal
doctrines which can be used as a basis for assessing liability. The
present body of judicial opinions relating to research in general
is of limited quantity and usefulness; and most of these cases
embody criteria which apply imperfectly or not at all to the facts
of fetal experimentation.
a.

Contract

Suit based on a contract theory, for example, presupposes an
express or implied contract that the physician will perform professional services in return for reasonable compensation from the
patient."' An initial problem presented by an action in contract
is identification of the parties other than the doctor. In the context of therapeutic experimentation, presumably the parents or
guardian of an in utero fetus would constitute a party, the fetus
not being a "person" under the fourteenth amendment." 7 If ex
utero, however, the fetus may be regarded as an incompetent
j. WALTZ & F.
",

INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE

See note 117 and accompanying text supra.

40-41 (1971).
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minor child capable of bringing suit in its own name as a third
party beneficiary of the contract. On the other hand, when nontherapeutic research is performed on an ex utero fetus, questions
are raised respecting the third party beneficiary status of the
fetus-no benefit to the fetus being contemplated 4 -and the
adequacy of consideration from the researcher. Moreover, measurement of damages may be extremely difficult, depending on
the fetus' stage of development (nonviable or viable) and status
(in utero or ex utero).
b.

Tort

Difficulties similarly arise in the application of tort theories
to fetal research. For example, a physician has a duty to inform
the patient or the patient's representative of "all of the material
facts of the treatment proposed, including risks of death or serious bodily harm, the probability of success, the alternatives to
the treatment (including nontreatment), and their risks and
probabilities of success. 2 49 Where the patient or his representative consents but foreseeable collateral risks are not disclosed, a
negligence issue-failure to obtain informed consent-is presented.250
If, in light of the patient's condition, the probability of success, and the severity and likelihood of harm, good medical practice requires therapeutic research, ' 5' the physician is only obligated to disclose those risks which he knows or reasonably should
know.2 52 Where nontherapeutic research is involved, however, the
result is much less clear:2 3 Can nontherapeutic research ever con2'8 Nontherapeutic research on a fetus ex utero also raises the issue of whether the
contract agreement to perform nonbeneficial procedures on a "child" is void as against
public policy.
21 G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HosPiTAL PATIENTS 58 (1975).
25 An action for battery might also be instituted:
[Tiheories of assault and battery are to be employed only where the defendant doctor has operated on a part of the body as to which no consent was
obtained or where the doctor has simply acted viciously and committed a
true battery.
J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note 246, at 156.
25 If therapeutic research is not dictated by good medical practice, obtaining informed consent to the risks will not protect the physician from liability. Id. at 200-01.
252See generally id. at 191.
23 As yet, decisional law in the United States with respect to this type of research is
virtually nonexistent. Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human
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stitute good medical practice, given that the research subject is
not expected to receive any benefit? Must every conceivable risk
be mentioned? It could be maintained that the standard of care
is not good medical practice but good research practice, and that,
in the latter context, the major risk to be disclosed is the very fact
that not all risks may be foreseen in advance. 5
A natural corollary of this dilemma is posed by the common
law rule that "a physician has the obligation to his patient to
possess and employ such reasonable skill and care as are commonly had and exercised by reputable, average physicians in the
same general system or school of practice in the same or similar
'
localities."255
Physicians are required to adhere to generally accepted tenets of medicine, although majority and minority views
regarding certain therapeutic practices are tolerated when there
is no evidence that one school is clearly the most efficacious. By
definition, however, an experimental procedure is not generally
accepted practice; and a physician may be acting at his peril
when he utilizes an innovative therapy. 5 In a 1935 decision which
enunciated a more liberal view, 57 the Supreme Court of Michigan
recognized society's need for experimentation to further medical
progress; nevertheless, it held that therapeutic research proce-'
dures were permissible only if they did "not vary too radically
from the accepted method of procedure." 5 " In a few cases since
that time, however, courts have permitted relatively extreme
departures from accepted practice when the patient has consented and the physician has acted prudently under the circumstances.259
Subjects, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1943). See also J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note
246, at 181 n.l1.
'5' See G. ANNAS, supra note 249.
J5 WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note 246, at 42.
J.
'5, Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50
N.Y. 696 (1872). The court stated:
[W]hen the case is one as to which a system of treatment has been followed
for a long time, there should be no departure from it, unless the surgeon who
does it is prepared to take the risk of establishing, by his success, the propriety and safety of his experiment.
Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
211Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
21' Id. at 282, 261 N.W. at 765.
2" See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974);
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 577, 317 P.2d
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Quality control by way of malpractice actions presents other,
equally troublesome problems in the context of fetal research. To
bring a successful suit, plaintiffs must prove a causal relationship
between the researcher's conduct and the injury which occurs.
For the fetus in utero, this task may be formidable: Twenty percent of all pregnancies terminate in spontaneous abortions,
usually the result of gross fetal abnormalties; 26 0 and many children are born with greater or lesser degrees of impairment. In
view of these facts, it may be nearly impossible to link a relatively
innocuous experiment with a defect or to establish that an experiment enhanced an existing defect. It may also be an arduous
proposition to establish damages, even if liability can be proved.
c.

Strict liability

These multifarious difficulties suggest resort to the doctrine
of strict liability, particularly with respect to nontherapeutic research. There is appeal in the notion that an experimenter should
proceed at his peril, that he has exclusive control of the experimental situation and should be held liable without fault if an
injury occurs. Through resort to insurance, the costs-as well as
the advantages-of medical research would be distributed among
2
all recipients of medical services. 1
Despite its appeal, however, this approach presents difficult,
perhaps insurmountable, policy choices. The spectre of strict liability might seriously chill the initiation of valuable research.
Where other controls are present, such as consent and committee
review, immunity from liability for nonnegligent injury may be a
necessary price to pay for the substantial benefits to medical
knowledge which fetal research may yield. This consideration has
particular weight where the research is therapeutic and where
doctor and patient, or, in the case of fetal experimentation, doctor
and parents, are both in search of the best therapy. In this situa170, 179-80 (1957). In Karp, the Fifth Circuit upheld a directed verdict for a physician
where the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony that use of a previously untried
mechanical heart was negligent. Apparently, the court felt that an experimental, but
therapeutic, procedure is proper where the patient consents and conventional modes of
treatment offer little hope of survival.
2w Marx, Drugs During Pregnancy:Do They Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 SCIENCE
174 (1973).
2"1See Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv.
436, 439-40 (1968).
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tion, parents and fetus are in a sense joint venturers with the
physician. It seems harsh to hold a doctor solely responsible
under the circumstances, at least when a nonnegligent injury
262
occurs.
3.

Compensation Fund

If strict liability is an unacceptable approach in a society
dedicated to the advancement of knowledge through research,
some other mechanism for providing compensation, independent
of traditional notions of contract or tort, is desirable. When an
injury occurs to a fetus or its mother which involves expenses over
a lifetime, staggering sums may be involved. Compensation
through a suit for malpractice may be insufficient or unobtainable, e.g., if proof of causation is insufficient; yet parents should
not be required to shoulder the entire risk alone. Take, for example, the case of a fetus ex utero with no apparent chance of survival. The parents are told that a new experimental technique
may save the fetus, but that no one can predict the harm which
may occur through its use. Faced with this cruel choice, some
parents will consent in desperation to use of the technique. Others will understandably hesitate or refuse, in part fearing the
economic hardship which may result if they cannot obtain compensation for nonnegligent injury. In addition, a doctor confronted with the possibility of strict liability despite his exercise
of due care may equally be tempted to forego life-saving efforts
26
in marginal cases. 1
The present system offers essentially two choices if an injury
occurs: If the injury results from negligence which can be proved,
the negligent party must pay damages to the extent he is able; if
the injury results from causes unrelated to negligence, the victim
(or those responsible for the victim) must shoulder the entire cost.
This sytem is rigid and inequitable. It is important, on the one
hand, to make researchers or their sponsoring institutions bear
the costs of their mistakes as a way of insuring quality control;
"I Adams & Shea-Stonum, Toward a Theory of Control of Medical Experimentation
With Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CAsE W. Rzs. L. Rxv. 604, 611-12
(1975).
20 Note, however, that at least 18 state fetal experimentation statutes require physicians to take measures to preserve the life of a viable fetus following an abortion. 4 FA~mEY
PLANNING POPULATION REPORTER at 111-12 (1975).
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but the fear of personal liability may dry up some kinds of useful
research; and the actual recovery of money damages by a victim
may be insufficient. On the other hand, if a subject is participating in research for the benefit of medical science, his ability to
recover for injuries should not be limited to cases where fault can
be demonstrated. Injuries constitute a research cost which should
ultimately be borne by the research industry and society rather
than by the unfortunate subject.
Society should underwrite a portion of this cost through establishment of a compensation fund."' Victims should be reimbursed from the fund upon proof of injury and a showing that a
substantial purpose of the research was nontherapeutic, 211 i.e.,
designed to benefit society rather than the subject. Compensation
should be allowed for both negligent and nonnegligent causes of
injury. In both situations, payment of the total amount of compensation should be allocated among the researcher, the research
institution, and a national fund, a scheme similar in nature to
workmen's compensation. 2 The amount paid by each party
might constitute a percentage of the whole; however, the preferable scheme would make the researcher and the research institution jointly liable for damages up to a fixed amount, with the
national fund obligated to pay the remainder. The liability of the
researcher and research institution would be lower in the case of
nonnegligent injuries, e.g., $200,000, and higher where negligence
could be proved, e.g., $500,000.
The higher amount of recovery for negligence is intended to
apply pressure on a researcher and research institution to exercise
due care. Also, by imposing strict liability for nonnegligent injuries, this scheme discourages researchers from conducting experimentation until all risks are minimized. It provides a strong incentive for Institutional Review Boards to recommend against
2" The National Commission intends to consider the establishment of a compensation fund. See FETAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,547. See also Nathan v.
Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass. July 3, 1974), reprinted in 1974 INs. L.J. 411.
" Until the efficacy and cost of the fund is determined, compensation should be
limited to injuries arising from nontherapeutic research. Serious consideration should also
be given, however, to compensating injuries arising from therapeutic research. Does not
society benefit from therapeutic as well as nontherapeutic research?
211Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 262, at 637-48. See also, Havinghurst,
Compensating Persons Injured in Human Experimentation, 169 SCIENCE 153 (1970).
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undertaking research projects until every precaution has been
taken to avoid injury. As stated by Professor Calabresi:
[Aipproval by [a review committee] of a particular experiment
will require conscious consideration not only of the possible payoff
(either in market or scientific terms), but also of the risks, converted
to money, that the project entails. This may not deter many experiments, but it may cause those involved in the most risky or least
useful ones to consider carefully whether or not the experiment is
worth it, whether or not it is best done by those who propose to do
it, and whether there is an alternative, and safer, way of obtaining
approximately the same results.27

Establishing the federal compensation fund described above
would serve at least two important objectives. By relieving researchers and research institutions of liability for very substantial
awards of damages, it would not inhibit worthwhile research. At
the same time, by furnishing compensation only if damages exceed certain amounts,2 1 it would encourage a maximum amount
of care. Such a fund, established through appropriations from
general tax revenues, would adequately represent society's stake
in medical research.
CONCLUSION

For research on the fetus, two obvious issues are presented.
The first is a matter of definition: Is the fetus a person entitled
to protection? The answer to that question shapes the second
issue: What protections should be afforded a fetal research subject during the various stages of its development?
At least for the foreseeable future, Roe v. Wade has conclusively settled that a fetus in utero is not a person entitled to
constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. But
a mother's fundamental right to abortion does not imply a corresponding right to experimentation; as a potential human being,
the fetus in utero is entitled to substantial protection. If this
potentiality is lost (as in the case of a fetus to be aborted or a
nonviable fetus), other factors, including the "dignity" of the
fetus, require significant safeguards before research is undertaken. Although a nonviable, ex utero fetus is arguably in a differ21

(1969).

Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentationon Humans, 98
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2" A court, probably sitting without a jury unless there is an allegation of negligence,
would determine the total award; or a special tribunal could be set up for this purpose.
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ent, and less protected, status for research purposes than other
human beings, its "personhood" should be assumed if the necessary indices of life are present. A definition of humanness should
not depend solely on the present state of technological development; rather, defining the nonviable fetus as a person will spur
research efforts to expand the period of viability.
The regulations of the Department, by requiring consent by
both parents and by establishing a hierarchy of review committees, comprise significant safeguards. As a prospective control,
however, the role of the review committees is insufficiently defined with respect to both the in utero fetus to be aborted and the
nonviable fetus. Lastly, a compensation fund is not mandated by
the regulations; such a fund should be established as a means of
insuring maximum care in research efforts and as a device to
allocate more fairly the costs of research which benefits us all.

DEFERENCE TO STATE COURTS IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
By CHARLES M. ELLIOTT* and KENNETH BALCOMB**
INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine the
United States' claims to reserved water rights, including claims
asserted on behalf of Indian tribes, should yield to the adjudicatory process of a Colorado water court.' Akin v. United States
culminated nearly a decade of litigation as to the proper forum
for the adjudication of reserved right claims. This decision preserves the efficacy of the Colorado water adjudicatory system
and confirms the salutary purpose of the McCarran Amendment.'
* Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Colorado, 1974-76; A.B., 1971, Duke University; J.D., 1973, University of Denver.
** Partner, Delaney & Balcomb, Glenwood Springs, Colorado; LL.B., 1948, University of Colorado.
Both authors express their appreciation to Robert L. McCarty, McCarty & Noone,
Washington, D.C., and David W. Robbins, First Assistant Attorney General, State of
Colorado, who, along with the authors, were attorneys on the case, for their comments.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (this
case is more commonly known by the name of its companion case, Akin v. United States)
[hereinafter cited as Akin]. Although the federal claims were filed in a'single action, two
separate petitions for writ of certiorari were eventually filed. Both were granted and the
cases were consolidated for hearing. 421 U.S. 946 (1975).
2 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), commonly known as the "McCarran Amendment," authorizes the joinder of the United States in certain adjudications of water rights. In full text,
it provides:
(a) Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it
appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have
waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2)
shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided,
That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any
such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon
the Attorney General or his designated representative.
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Although the doctrine of abstention was expressly circumscribed
and held inapplicable, deference to the state water court was
nevertheless found to be proper upon considerations of "wise judicial administration. ' ' 3 Significantly, the claims asserted by the
United States on behalf of two Indian tribes were found to be no
basis for denying the power to adjudicate federal reserved water
rights to the Colorado court.
I. THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of implied reservation of water rights4 was recently outlined by the Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United
States:5
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States
acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the
date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce
Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable
streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in
navigable and nonnavigable streams.'

(c) Nothing in the Act shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of
the United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any
interstate stream.
The genesis of this limited waiver of sovereign immunity was first proposed by Senator
McCarran of Arizona in 1949. After considerable attention by the legislative and executive
branches of government, the "McCarran Amendment" was passed by Congress on July
4, 1952, as a rider to the Department of Justice Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1953. It
was signed by President Truman on July 10, 1952. See generally Comment, Adjudication
of Water Rights Claimed By the United States-Application of Common-Law Remedies
and the McCarran Amendment of 1952, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 94 (1960); Comment, The
McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1972); Comment, Adjudication of Federal Reserved Water
Rights, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 161 (1970).
424 U.S. at 817.
It is also frequently referred to as the reserved rights doctrine or the Winters doctrine. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
5 96 S. Ct. 2062 (1976).
1 Id. at 2069 (citations omitted). In Cappaert,the Court considered a Government
claim to reserved waters appurtenant to Devil's Hole, which was established in 1952 as a
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The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of reserved
rights in Winters v. United States7 in regard to the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation in Montana. For several decades after
Winters, it was a generally accepted notion that the judicially
created doctrine was "a special rule of Indian law." 8 With only
this limited exception, the states, not the Federal Government,
were believed to be the source of all rights to the use of water
within their boundaries.
detached unit of the Death Valley National Monument. Devil's Hole is a limestone cavern
which contains a pool inhabited by a unique species of fish, commonly known as Devil's
Hole pupfish, which were isolated from their ancestral stock when the prehistoric Death
Valley Lake System dried up. For survival, the pupfish depend upon a partially submerged rock shelf. The water in the pool, which covers the rock shelf, comes from a huge
aquifer which extends beneath approximately 4,500 square miles of land.
Acting pursuant to state law, the Cappaerts pumped groundwater from wells about
two and one-half miles from Devil's Hole for use on their ranch. During periods of their
pumping, the water level in Devil's Hole dropped, exposing a greater area of the rock shelf
and endangering the continued survival of the pupfish.
The Court avoided extending the doctrine of reserved rights to groundwater by finding
that the pool was surface water. Id. at 2071. There was, however, no hesitation in declaring
that reserved rights can be protected "whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater."
Id. at 2072. The Court upheld an injunction which required the Cappaerts to limit their
pumping so that a certain water level, necessary to preserve the pupfish, is maintained
in the pool. See generally Note, Federally Reserved Rights to Underground Water-A
Rising Question in the Arid West, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 43.
7 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Although the 1888 treaty which established the Indian reservation was silent as to water rights, the Court said:
The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. The
United States v. The Rio GrandeDam & Irrig. Co. 174 U.S. 690, 702; United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371. That the Government did reserve them we
have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued through
years.
Id. at 577. The reserved right to 1,000 miner's inches of water, not appropriated under
state law, was to be protected against diminishment by subsequent upstream appropriators who held valid Montana water rights. Without the water, the national policy of
changing the Indians to a pastoral people would have been frustrated. Additionally, the
Court noted the rule that any ambiguity in a treaty with Indians must be resolved in their
favor.
I F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 105 (1971) (Report NWCL71-014 prepared under contract with the National Water Commission). Reserved water
rights were found for Indian reservations in several instances. See, e.g., United States v.
Ahtanum Irrig. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957);
United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v.
Conrad Investment Co., 156 F. 123 (D. Mont. 1907), aff 'd, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). For
discussion of reserved waters for Indian reservations see generally E. CLYDE, INDIAN WATER
RIGHTS 377 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use, 16
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 669 (1971).
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The claim of the states to exclusive dominion over water
rights, excluding reserved rights for Indians, was thought to have
been recognized and strengthened by the Supreme Court in
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.9 In
construing the Acts of 1866 and 187010 and the Desert Land Act
of 1877," which because of their express recognition of and deference to state-decreed water rights were the keystones of the
states' position, the Court remarked:
What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici
juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states . . .
with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule
of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain.12

The optimism of the states, engendered by Beaver Portland,was
dashed two decades later in Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon.'1 There the Court made a clear distinction between
public lands, such as those involved in Beaver Portldnd, and
reserved lands such as the Indian reservation and power site reservation which were before the Court in Pelton Dam." The Acts
of 1866, 1870, and 1877 were held to be inapplicable to reserved
lands and waters appurtenant thereto. Thus, there appeared to
be federal rights, independent of state law, to the use of waters
appurtenant to reserved lands. 5
It was not until 1963 in Arizona v. California" that the full
scope and potential effects of the doctrine of reserved rights became apparent. After a massive evidentiary proceeding, a special
295 U.S. 142 (1935). (This case is generally referred to as Beaver Portland.)

Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, amending Act of July 26, 1866, ch.
262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253. These Acts are now the basis of 43 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1970).
1 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, §
1, 19 Stat. 377).
1 295 U.S. at 163-64. For discussion of these Acts see C. WHEATLEY, C. CORKER, T.
STETSON & D. REED, 1 STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER

153-70 (1969) (prepared under contract with Public Land
Law Review Commission).
A
" 349 U.S. 435 (1955). (This case is generally referred to as Pelton Dam.)
' Public lands are those federal lands subject to disposition under the public land
laws. Reserved lands are the federal lands set aside for public purposes and are not subject
to private entry or disposition. Id. at 448.
IId.
RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS

II

373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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master, appointed by the Supreme Court, concluded, inter alia,
that in addition to its power to reserve waters by implication for
Indian reservations, the United States could similarly reserve
waters for national parks, forests, monuments, recreation areas,
fish and wildlife refuges, and Bureau of Land Management
lands." However, the United States' claims were subjected to a
strict burden of proof and were found to be de minimus in most
instances. The Supreme Court expressly confirmed the extention
of the implied reservation doctrine to non-Indian reservations' 8
and generally adopted the special master's report.
Western waters users have been concerned about the implied
of its "uncorrelated mystery" and
reservation doctrine because
"ethereal" character,' 9 and because of the extensive public land
acreage in the West. In particular, reserved lands such as national
forests and parks are frequently the fountainheads of western
water supplies.2 " The unasserted reserved rights of such lands
cloud the character of state-decreed water rights because the existence, points of diversion (if any), places of use, priorities, and
amount of reserved rights remain largely unknown. State administration, planning, and adjudications are disrupted and frustrated by these uncertainties. Water resource development may
Id. at 592-94.
For further discussion of Arizona v. California see C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12, at
121-36; Haber, Arizona v. California-A Brief Review, 4 NATURAL RES. J. 17 (1964); Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
" The Colorado Supreme Court so described the doctrine in United States v. District
Court in and for the County of Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 579-80, 458 P.2d 760, 772 (1969), af 'd,
401 U.S. 520 (1971). For a complete discussion of the doctrine of reserved water rights see
E. MORREALE, FEDERAL-STATE RIGHTS AND RELATIONS, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark
ed. 1967); F. TRELEASE, supra note 8; C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12; Moses, Federal-State
Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970); Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it
Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REV.
639 (1975).
" Some 46% of the total land area in the West is public land. Approximately 88% of
the runoff from public lands in the eleven coterminous western states is derived from
national forests and about 59% of the total annual runoff in those states comes from
national forests. See PUBuc LAND LAW REvIEw COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND 141 (1970); C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12, at 386.
Although the amount of water to be claimed for most reserved rights is expected to
be minimal, substantial claims may be made for Indian and oil shale reservations. Holland, Mixing Oil and Water: The Effect of Prevailing Water Law Doctrines on Oil Shale
Developments, 52 DENVER L.J. 657 (1975); Note, A Proposal for the Quantification of
Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1974).
"
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be similarly impeded."t Owners of state water rights particularly
object to the tenet of the doctrine that no compensation is paid
for damage to water rights which become subordinate to reserved
2
rights.

II.

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE

Since the mid-1950's, Congress has entertained legislation to
define federal-state relations in water matters and, in particular,
to address the reserved rights doctrine. 3 None of these legislative
proposals had succeeded, however, when the jurisdictional battle
over reserved rights adjudication erupted in 1967 in Colorado.
Upon petition of the Colorado River Water Conservation District, the District Court in and for Eagle County, Colorado initiated an adjudication of water rights in the Eagle River and its
tributaries.2 ' Notice of this proceeding was served upon the Federal Government pursuant to the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment for joining the United States.2 5 The United States
moved that it be dismissed from the action for lack of jurisdiction
based upon the Government's sovereign immunity. The motion
was denied. The United States then applied to the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ in the nature of prohibition on the contention that its reserved water rights were not within the purview
of the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity
and, therefore, could not be adjudicated in state court. The state
supreme court denied the writ and declared:
" For further discussion of the problems engendered by the doctrine see F. TRELEASE,
supra note 8, at 117-30.
2 Id. at 147m.
23 For a complete discussion of these legislative proposals see Hanks, Peace West of
the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters, 23
RuTOEas L. REV. 33 (1968); Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A
Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuraERs L. REv. 423 (1966). The National Water Commission urged modification of the doctrine to provide for compensation
for any water users whose prior rights are impaired by exercise of reserved rights. NATIONAL
WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FutruR 467-69 (1973). See also Pumac LAND
LAw REVIEW COMMISSION,

supra note 20, at 146-49 (1970).

" The Colorado River Water Conservation District was established as a public agency
in 1937 by the state legislature to promote "the conservation, use and development of the
water resources of the Colorado River and its principal tributaries" and "to safeguard for
Colorado, all water to which the state of Colorado is equitably entitled under the Colorado
River Compact." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-46-101 (1973).
2' See note 2 supra.
" COLO. R. Civ. Pxoc. 106.
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For the reasons already expressed as to the promotion of orderly
procedure, we hold that it was the purpose and intent of the McCarran Amendment that it be used to obtain jurisdiction over the
United States with respect to its reserved water rights."

The Supreme Court of the United States granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari in order to consider the important jurisdictional question. 8 In 1971, in United States v. District Court in
and for the County of Eagle,2' the Government's argument that
the McCarran Amendment did not submit reserved right claims
to the jurisdiction of Colorado's courts was tersely repudiated by
a unanimous Court:
We reject that conclusion for we deal with an all-inclusive statute
concerning "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system" which in § 666(a)(1) has no exceptions and which, as we
read it, includes appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved
rights.3

In a companion decision, United States v. District Court in
and for Water Division No. 5,31 the Court, again unanimously,
'
United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 581,
458 P.2d 760, 773 (1969).
397 U.S. 1005 (1970).
401 U.S. 520 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Eagle County]. Eagle County concerned
state court jurisdiction over reserved water rights pursuant to Colorado's 1943 Adjudication Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-7 (1963), which has been replaced by the Watez
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92101 to -602 (1973).
" 401 U.S. at 524. The Colorado Supreme Court decree was affirmed. Mr. Justice
Douglas also stated:
It is clear from our cases that the United States often has reserved water
rights based on withdrawals from the public domain. As we said in Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the Federal Government had the authority both
before and after a State is admitted into the Union "to reserve waters for
the use and benefit of federally reserved lands." The federally reserved lands
include any federal enclave. In Arizona v. Californiawe were primarily concerned with Indian reservations. The reservation of waters may be only implied and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal enclave.
Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted). Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion but explicitly disclaimed "the intimation of any view as to the existence and scope of the so-called
'reserved water rights' of the United States." United States v. District Court in and for
Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 530 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concurring opinion
also applied to Eagle County).
3 401 U.S. 527 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Water Division No. 51. The
Colorado
Supreme Court had, without opinion, denied the United States relief in the nature of
prohibition in its efforts to defeat joinder in a state proceeding in a newly created water
division. United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, No. 24821 (July 9,
1970).
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held that the judicial proceedings established by the Colorado
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 19693
were sufficient to constitute a general adjudication within the
meaning of the McCarran Amendment. 33 Mr. Justice Douglas
again affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court judgment and
stated:
As we said in the Eagle County case, the words "general adjudication" were used in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 to indicate that
43 U.S.C. § 666 does not cover consent by the United States to be
sued in a private suit to determine its rights against a few claimants.
The present suit, like the one in the Eagle County case, reaches all
claims, perhaps month by month but inclusively in the totality;
and, as we said in the other case, if there is a collision between prior
adjudicated rights and reserved rights of the United States, the
federal question can be preserved in the state decision and brought
for review."

Following these decisions, the United States submitted its claims
in Colorado Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6 pursuant to the 1969
Adjudication Act and in various district courts under the 1943
Adjudication Act.35 A master-referee was appointed to consider
the federal claims in a single proceeding and on August 6, 1976,
36
a Partial Master-Referee Report was submitted.
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973). The 1969 Act represents a
streamlining of water adjudicatory procedures whereby a basin-wide court division concept was substituted for the previous small district concept and a court-appointed referee
frees the court from many preliminary matters. See Note, A Survey of Colorado Water
Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 296-304 (1970).
13

See note 2 supra.

11 401 U.S. at 529-30.
11 Water Div. No. 4, Cases W-425 through 438; Water Div. No. 5, Cases W-467
through 469; Water Div. No. 6, Cases W-85 and 86; District Court in and for Summit
County, Civil Action 2371; District Court in and for Eagle County, Civil Action 1529 and
1548; District Court in and for Grand County, Civil Action 1768.
36 Reserved water rights were found for national forests, parks and monuments, public
springs and water holes and mineral hot springs. The priority dates were antedated to
reflect the date the reservation and purpose of water use were established. For example,
no minimum stream flow rights were recognized until the June 12, 1960 enactment of the
Multiple Use Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528, which first declared fish and wildlife activities and
outdoor recreation to be national forest purposes. Additionally, reserved rights on national
forests were subordinated to state appropriations under the terms of the Organic Act of
1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473, 475-78, 479-82, 551 (1970), which grants the use of waters within
national forests for domestic, mining, milling, and irrigation purposes under state law.
The master-referee granted the Government that amount of water reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of each reservation but held that the United States must
follow certain quantification procedures. Under the doctrine of estoppel, two parties which
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III. Akin v. United States
On November 14, 1972, less than eight months after Eagle
County and Water Division No. 5 were decided, the Federal Government instituted an action in federal court for the adjudication
of its claims to the use of water in the San Juan River Basin in
southwestern Colorado.3 7 This action was brought by the United
States in its own right and as trustee for the Ute Mountain Ute
and Southern Ute Indian tribes. The complaint sought a determination and decree of federal water rights, both appropriative and
reserved, as against 968 known defendants plus all unknown
claimants of interest to water in the Mancos, La Plata, Animas,
Florida, Los Pinos (Pine), Piedra, Navajo, and San Juan Rivers
and water tributary thereto in the state of Colorado.38 The United

States also prayed for the appointment of a water master to administer the respective rights of all users as determined in the
adjudication. Reserved water rights were asserted in connection
with the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian
Reservations, Mesa Verde National Park, San Juan National Forest, Yucca House and Hovenweep National Monuments, public
waterhole and spring reservations, hot spring reservations, and
certain Bureau of Reclamation Projects in the San Juan River
Basin.
The initiation of the federal action was viewed by many Colorado water interests as an attempt to circumvent Colorado's
hard-fought victories in Eagle County and Water Division No. 5.
The United States Supreme Court had declared Colorado's water
courts to be experienced, competent forums for the adjudication
of federal reserved as well as appropriative rights. Did it not make
common sense to utilize the state water courts with their welldefined procedures instead of a removed, less equipped federal
court to conduct a massive water rights adjudication? The complaint's prayer for a water master to administer whatever rights
had acquired water rights and acted in reliance upon the actions of the Federal Government were held to be protected from the detrimental assertion of reserved rights. The
Master-Referee's Partial Report is being reviewed by the water court.
United States v. Akin, Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., filed Nov. 14, 1972).
These waters are within the San Juan Basin and are tributary to the Colorado River
Basin. They constitute a part of Colorado's Water Division No. 7 which also includes a
substantial portion of the Dolores River Basin. CoLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 37 -92 -201(1)(g)
(1973). A map of Water Division No. 7 is produced in the appendix to this article.
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were decreed was particularly bothersome. It gave rise to fears of
confusion and conflicts between the water master and the existing
state administrative scheme.39
Despite the commencement of the federal suit, the United
States was served on December 22, 197210 under the McCarran
Amendment to join Water Division No. 7 proceedings and to
assert all of its claims to water in the Division. The Government
responded in the state action by filing its claims, both reserved
and appropriative, in the Dolores River drainage, but omitting its
claims in the San Juan River drainage which had been filed ear4
lier in federal court. 1
In the federal action, several defendants and intervenors"
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and upon
considerations of abstention and comity. The United States had

"' The administration and distribution of the waters within Colorado rest with the
State Engineer. The State Engineer has appointed a division engineer in each of the seven
water divisions. Numerous water commissioners on the staff of each division engineer
perform the necessary field work. Water rights are administered and distributed in accordance with court decrees which set priorities by historic date of appropriation for certain
amounts of water for each right. For a further discussion of Colorado's administrative
structure and scheme see G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOSE, D. ALLARDICE, & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976 (1976); NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAws 155-73 (1973); Carlson, Report to
Governor John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DENVER L.J. 293
(1973).
'* The January 3, 1973 date cited by the Court in Akin referred to the date of service
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) upon the U.S. Attorney in Denver and
upon the Attorney General in Washington; service under the McCarran Amendment was
achieved on December 22, 1972. 424 U.S. at 806.
" On October 6, 1976, the reserved right claims in the Dolores River drainage were
rebuffed by the Colorado District Court in and for Water Division No. 7. Relying upon
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland, 295 U.S. 142 (1935), Stockman v. Leddy,
55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 222 (1912), United States v. District Court in and for the County of
Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760 (1969), the McCarran Amendment, and the history of
Colorado's entry into the Union, the court held that in Colorado there can be no water
rights reserved, at least subsequent to the admission of Colorado to the Union in 1876. In
re Application for Water Rights of the United States of America, Cases W-1120-73 through
W-1139-73 and W-1143-73 through W-1148-73, Oct. 6, 1976 (Findings of Law of Case and
Order).
2 The Colorado River Water Conservation District, the Board of Water Commissoners of the City and County of Denver, the Southwestern Water Conservation District, the
Mancos Water Conservancy District and the State of Colorado appeared in the action to
urge dismissal of the federal claims. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Ute Mountain
Ute Indian Tribe and the National Tribal Chairman's Association appeared as amici
curiae through the Native American Rights Fund to urge retention of federal jurisdiction.
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invoked the jurisdiction of the district court under the following
statute:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer
43
thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.

This jurisdictional claim was contested on the ground that the
McCarran Amendment was an Act of Congress which "otherwise
provided" for specific state court jurisdiction. Once service was
completed under the Amendment, it was argued that there could
be no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 to adjudicate federal
water rights.
Even if federal court jurisdicton existed, the court was urged
to decline to exercise it under the doctrine of abstention, which
vests the court with the discretionary authority to dismiss or to
stay an action even though the court is possessed of the requisite
jurisdiction." Abstention was first announced as a doctrine in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.45 and has been
approved by the Court on numerous occasions where the benefits
of deferring to a state court outweighed the harm of dismissing
or postponing a federal action." The defendants and intervenors
in Akin argued that under the guidelines of Burford v. Sun Oil
Co. 7 and Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co." abstention was proper to avoid disruption of a state
program and state policy." Specifically, although reserved water
rights may be created independent of state law, they must be
28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970).
The limited circumstances in which a court may invoke the doctrine of abstention
were delineated by the Supreme Court in Akin. See note 63 infra.
. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
"

"

For discussion of abstention cases and the abstention doctrine see, H.

HART

& H.

(2d ed. 1973); 1A MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.203, at 2101 (2d ed. 1976); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (2d
ed. 1970); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of JudicialPower,
27 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1974); Comment, Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights
in the Federal Courts, 46 COLO. L. Rlv. 555 (1975).
S319 U.S. 315 (1943).
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

" 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
, In Burford, abstention was deemed appropriate to avoid federal conflict with the
Texas oil well drilling regulatory program. Railroad activity which was subject to a regulatory scheme under the jurisdiction of a state public service commission was the state
interest deferred to in Alabama.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

administered in a priority system with water rights established
under state law. Also, as water rights in a priority system are
interrelated by virture of their common source of supply, reserved
rights would necessarily be entwined with appropriative rights in
an administrative scheme.50 Furthermore, abstention had been
recognized as proper where the subject matter of the lawsuit was
water-a unique resource of great concern to the state."
The doctrine of comity was also advanced as a basis upon
which the federal court should decline jurisdiction. Comity refers
to a judicial policy of avoiding federal-state conflicts over matters
within the normal sphere of state activity. 52 Federal jurisdiction
was attacked as an unnecessary and substantial interference with
Colorado's water right adjudication and administrative system
and inconsistent with the longstanding congressional policy of
deferring to state law and state proceedings in water right mat53
ters.
The United States argued in rebuttal that the McCarran
Amendment did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1345. The Amendment merely authorized joinder of the
Abstention has been held to be appropriate in similar circumstances. See Allegheny
Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
" Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Union Water Supply
Corp. v. Vaughn, 355 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1973);
cf. Reetz v. Bozanick, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
52 Mr. Justice Black, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), described comity as:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Comity is perhaps best viewed as part of the abstention
doctrine, though it alone can support a dismissal of a federal action where federal jurisdiction would disrupt state interests. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 361
U.S. 185 (1959); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d
237 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). See also Comment, FederalInjunctions Against State Action, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 744 (1967).
" See In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956). See also F.
TRELEASE, supra note 8; NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE,
supra note 24, at 459-71 (1973).
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United States but did not bar the Federal Government from utilizing federal courts for water adjudications. The United States
asserted it had initiated suit before its joinder in the state action
and, as sovereign, should have its choice of forums. Abstention
"is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it,""5 and
should not be invoked to dismiss their action; the doctrine has
generally been confined to instances where a federal constitutional question might be mooted or affected by an underlying
issue of state law. 5 The United States claimed Akin involved no
unresolved question of state law but rather posed questions of
federal law which a federal court normally should resolve. Similarly, comity was a restricted doctrine applicable only to situations involving state criminal or quasi-criminal suits and, if it was
to be applied at all in Akin, would require the state court to yield
to the federal court which had first obtained jurisdiction.
Additionally, as amici curiae Indian groups pointed out,
"[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and
control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history,""5 and, since
water rights for Indian reservations were before the federal court,
deference to a state forum would be inappropriate. In fact, the
United States and the Indian groups argued that federal courts
were the exclusive forum for the adjudication of reserved waters
claimed for the Indian reservations and the state court had no
jurisdiction over such claims. The McCarran Amendment did not
expressly include Indian water rights and, in light of the longstanding policy against state jurisdiction over Indian matters,
they urged that it not be interpreted to encompass Indian reserved rights. Support for this exclusion from the Amendment
was claimed to be found in Public Law 280 which, inter alia,
contains limitations on state civil jurisdiction over Indian lands
and water rights.57
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
Id. at 189; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
5' Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). See also McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
1' Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, tit. XVIII, 67 Stat. 588 (partially codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970), as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1970)). This
Act, commonly known as Public Law 280, provides, after granting civil jurisdiction over
Indian matters to five states, that nothing in the statute
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The federal district court decided to abstain in recognition
of the presence of applicable and workable state law and the state
proceeding. 51 In adopting a practical approach, the court cited a
desire to avoid a duplicative and piecemeal adjudication and
administration. The state forum was declared to be able to fully
and adequately adjudicate all issues including those concerning
the Indian reservations.
The United States prosecuted an appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals which reversed the order of dismissal. 5 The
court concentrated upon the effect of the McCarran Amendment
upon federal court jurisdiction. The district court had avoided
that issue by its determination to abstain from exercising any
jurisdiction it may have had. The circuit court held that the
McCarran Amendment leaves federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1345 unimpaired and that the Amendment "does not
express an intention that the United States shall utilize state
courts for the purpose of litigating its claims to water."60
After finding federal jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit turned
to the abstention question. In abrupt fashion, the court concluded
that the case before it did not fit within any of the extremely
narrow areas in which abstention was proper. The Federal Govshall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation
made pursuant thereto; or shall conferjurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (emphasis added). Colorado is not one of the five states enumerated in P.L. 280 and has not acted to assume P.L. 280 jurisdiction. Courts have recognized
Colorado's jurisdiction in certain matters involving Indians, their property and reservations. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe,
150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). See also Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958). But see Whyte v. District Court, 140
Colo. 344, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960). See generally THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS'

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON

INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG. IsT Sass., BACKGROUND REPORT ON PUBLIC LAw
280 (COMM. PRINT 1975).
I" Civil No. 4497 (D. Colo., July 30, 1973). The district court issued no written opinion.
, United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 118.
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ernment had won the race to the courthouse and the presence of
the United States as plaintiff seeking to establish national rights
militated strongly against the invocation of abstention. Therefore, the court of appeals directed the district court to proceed
with the adjudication."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the important questions of whether the McCarran
amendment terminated jurisdicition of federal courts to adjudicate
federal water rights and whether, if that jurisdiction was not terminated, the District Court's dismissal in this case was nevertheless
appropriate."2

On March 24, 1976, the Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the district court's dismissal of the action. However,
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for six members of the Court, rejected the district court's reliance on the doctrine of abstention
as the basis for declining federal jurisdicton.13 Deference to the
state forum was held proper because "in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions,"" exceptional circumstances like those present in Akin can warrant dismissal of a federal complaint. Thus, the Court reaffirmed Colorado's position that federal reserved rights should be adjudicated
in state court.
Although the petitioners did not raise the issue, the Court
first considered whether the McCarran Amendment repealed the
" For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion see, Note, Water Law: A Repudiation
of Abstention, 53 DEWER L.J. 225 (1976); Note, Water Law-ProceduralInconsistencies

and Substantive Issues in the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine, 10 LAND & WATER
L. Rsv. 477 (1975); Comment, Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights in the

Federal Courts, 46 CoLo. L. RVv. 555 (1975).
"2424 U.S. at 806. The order granting certiorari to the two petitions appears at 421
U.S. 946 (1975). The petitions were supported by a joint brief from the States of Arizona,
California, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
U Abstention was declared to be appropriate in only three general categories: First,
where a federal constitutional issue might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state court determination of a pertinent state law issue; second, where there are
difficult questions of state law "bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar" and federal jurisdiction would
be disruptive of state policy efforts; and third, where federal jurisdiction has been invoked
to restrain state criminal, quasi-criminal nuisance, or tax collection proceedings. The
Court held that Akin did not fall within any of these categories. 424 U.S. at 817.
" Id.
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jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.1 Upon
review of the language and legislative history of the Amendment
and citing the rule disfavoring an implied repeal, it was concluded that the McCarran Amendment did not bar federal district court jurisdiction under § 1345 and the district court had
jurisdiction to hear the case.16
The Court held, however, that the McCarran Amendment
grants the right to join the United States in a state proceeding to
determine reserved rights held on behalf of Indians. The Amendment's language, legislative history and fundamental purpose
were held to command an all-inclusive construction. The Court
failed to find any support for the argument that Indian reserved
rights were substantially different from other reserved rights.6 7
Further, the Court rejected the notion that state court jurisdic68
tion was inimical to Indian interests.
Even though abstention principles were inapposite, deferral
to the state proceeding was justified on consideration of "[w]ise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."69 As an
example of wise judicial administration, Mr. Justice Brennan
cited the rule that courts generally yield to the first court which
assumes jurisdiction over property. 0
"'

See text accompanying note 43 supra.

" 424 U.S. at 809.

17It has been argued that Indians themselves reserved water rights which they already owned prior to any land reservations established by the United States. Under this
reasoning, Indian water rights are paramount rights and their priority could pre-date the
land reservation. See Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights for the Use of Water,
16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INsT. 631 (1971). However, the Court held in Akin that the
reserved water rights of Indian reservations are owned by the United States just like those
of national parks and forests. 424 U.S. at 810.
" "Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court, however, would
no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the Government in district court
. " Id. at 812.
The Court also noted that P.L. 83-280, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b) (1970) does not limit the special consent to jurisdiction of the McCarran Amendment. Id. at 812-13 n.20.
A Motion for Leave to File Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing by amici
curiae Indian groups urged reconsideration of the dismissal of the claims asserted on
behalf of the Indian reservation. The motion was denied. 96 S. Ct. 2239 (1976).
" 424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S.
180, 183 (1952) and citing Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
70 This rule was not applied but its underlying rationale of avoiding piecemeal litiga-
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In Akin there were several factors which permitted dismissal
of the federal suit under this pragmatic principle. The policy
evinced by the McCarran Amendment itself speaks against piecemeal or concurrent adjudication of water rights in a river system.
Water rights are best determined in unified proceedings such as
those available under Colorado's comprehensive state system.
Additionally, the Court found the following factors to be significant: First, the absence of any substantial federal court proceedings prior to the joinder of the United States in the Water Division No. 7 adjudication; second, the extensive involvement of
state decreed water rights; third, the 300 mile distance from the
state court in Water Division No. 7 to the federal court in Denver;
fourth, the Government's adjudication of reserved rights in Colorado's water courts pursuant to Eagle County and Water Division
No. 5.7I Thus, in order to promote the wise use of judicial re-

court was required
sources, the jurisdiction of the federal district
72
to yield to that of the state water court.
Akin provides an avenue by which Colorado can deal with
the troublesome reserved rights doctrine in a familiar and convenient forum. Acting pursuant to the McCarran Amendment,
Colorado interests can require the United States to present all of
its water claims, including those for Indian reservations, in the
state's water courts. Thus, the "uncorrelated mystery" 7 of reserved rights can be dispelled.
The advantages of a water right adjudication in state rather
than federal court could be substantial. The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that under the McCarran Amendment, the United
States is bound by Idaho state law at least to the extent of requirtion and inconsistent disposition of property was cited in support of the federal dismissal.
Id. at 819. Petitioners argued to the Court that under the holding in Pacific Live Stock
Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916), the rule is confined to instances where the suits are
virtually identical. Here, it was urged that the state court had on-going jurisdiction over
the waters in Water Division No. 7 and would conduct an all-inclusive adjudication in
contrast to the limited proceeding in federal court. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11.
11424 U.S. at 820. It should be noted that prior to its joinder in the state action the
United States had only filed its complaint and completed service on a few defendant state
agencies. Except for the motions to intervene and to dismiss, there had been little substantive activity in the federal suit.
12 Two dissenting opinions rejected the majority view and found that there was no
justification at all for dismissal of the federal action. Id. at 821-27.
" See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
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ing quantification of reserved rights in a general adjudication.7 '
Similarly, each state forum will be able to conduct an integration
of reserved rights into its water rights system in the manner it
views to be most consistent with state law. Of course, should any
state adjudication be improperly antagonistic to the federal
claims, the United States Supreme Court has stated that all
questions concerning the adjudication of reserved rights, including the volume and scope of particular rights, may be reviewed
after final judgment in the state court.7"
Despite the Supreme Court's emphatic holdings in the Colorado trilogy of Eagle County, Water Division No. 5, and Akin,
other Western States may face resistance in attempting to join
the United States under the McCarran Amendment. The doctrine of prior appropriation is the bedrock of the Western States'
water law systems. However, divergent economic and political
policies and the particularities of the water situation in each state
have led to the enactment of differing adjudicatory and administrative systems. Many of these systems are now primarily administrative in constrast to Colorado's judicial adjudicatory scheme.76
Since the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity
has been limited to proceedings in the nature of a general adjudication,77 the United States may attempt to defeat joinder in an
action which differs from the historic concept of a judicial proceeding in which there is a complete ascertainment of all rights
in a water source.78 However, the Colorado trilogy demonstrates
that the McCarran Amendment must be construed in a practical
manner to effectuate the intent of Congress to allow the determination of all federal water claims in a state forum. The efforts of
the United States to narrowly construe the concept of a general
adjudication were totally rebuffed in Eagle County and Water
Division No. 5. Akin provides further ammunition for state inter" Avondale Irrig. Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 96 Idaho 1, 523 P.2d 818
(1974). The United States did not seek review to the United States Supreme Court.
" United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 52526 (1971); United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 52930 (1971).
76 See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 39.
" See United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
"' See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1916).
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ests by adding considerations of "the conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation"7" to any battle between state and federal forums. This latest pronouncement
should be of significant assistance to other states who wish to join
the United States in a state proceeding.
CONCLUSION

Akin is a milestone in the turbulent history of federal reserved
rights adjudication. In Colorado, Akin concludes a trilogy of
fiercely contested jurisdictional battles between the Federal Government and state water interests. All water rights, including
federal reserved rights and Indian claims, will be determined in
state court under state procedures and will be administered under
the state system. Hopefully, this marks the final attempt by the
United States to circumvent the common sense policy of the
McCarran Amendment allowing all federal water rights claims to
be litigated in state courts. Other Western States should find
support in Akin for joining the United States under the McCarran
Amendment to allow determination of reserved rights in their
local forums.
In a broader context, Akin represents a laudatory step in the
allocation of judicial power between the federal and state systems. Abstention, with its rather inflexible criteria, is no longer
the only doctrine under which federal courts may decline to determine a controversy within its jurisdiction. Quite remarkably, the
Court has declared that "the virtually unflagging obligation of
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them" 0 may be
waived where there are dominant practical considerations for utilizing a state forum. While the caution of the Court indicates that
the standard for dismissing a complaint from federal court on
considerations of judicial administration will not be easily met,
Akin welcomes attention to practical concerns when a federal
court is confronted with a federal-state jurisdictional conflict.
The Court's pragmatic focus enhances the legitimate role of state
courts in our dual judicial scheme.
1,424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S.
180, 183 (1952) and citing Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
"

424 U.S. at 817.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATION: ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES
By JOHN A. CARVER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Utility regulation is an arcane process which depends for its
effective functioning more upon a large measure of public confidence in process and personnel than upon its intrinsic merit. Unfortunately, as the ingredient of confidence erodes among consumers, investors, legislators, the academic community, the
media, and other segments of both the regulatory and regulated
community, mechanisms which trigger recurrent and seemingly
automatic rate increases come under special attack. Adjustment
clauses are in this category.
Adjustment clauses have been known since 19171 and are
currently in use in some form in most of the states They are a
regulatory device to adjust rates for cost changes without all of
the procedures used for traditional rate cases. In economic terms,
they are a form of "indexation" designed to counter the effects
of inflation.
The full range of adjustments which qualify for analysis and
discussion is large. Generally, this paper is concerned with rate
adjustments authorized to become effective pursuant to the
terms of an antecedent tariff. Some of these rate adjustments are
"automatic"; others are subject to or require hearings, notice,
audit, or other regulatory action which is definitionally short of
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Program, University of Denver,
College of Law.
I Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PENN. L. REv. 964
(1958). The Colorado Public Utilities Commission has stated that such clauses were approved as early as 1923. In re Public Serv. Co., 13 P.U.R.4th 1, 6 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1975).
' Since most of the attention of legislatures and utility regulatory agencies has been
directed to the workings of adjustment clauses for the electric and gas utilities, particularly the former, most of the data on the use of such clauses are on such utilities. Stateby-state analyses have been compiled in this area. NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH AssoCIATES, INC., THE FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE: A SURVEY OF CRITICISMS, JUSTIFICATIONS AND
ITS APPLICATION INTHE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS (1975), reprinted as STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE,
94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES,

App. 1 (Comm. Print 1975); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
ACTIONS IN THE ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY INDUSTRIES, 1973-74: A STATE-BY-STATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. S4963-67 (daily ed., Mar. 24, 1975).
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that required in a full rate proceeding. The adjustments are dependent upon variables such as fuel costs and taxes. Some adjustments are called "tracking" or "pass-through" adjustments because the variable component is itself controlled by regulation, as
where changes are tied to rates fixed by the same or another
regulatory body. Rate adjustments may be tied to various general
price indices,' to return on equity,' to taxes,5 and to the capital
costs associated only with particular facilities such as environmental facilities. 6
Terminology should be viewed with suspicion, particularly
the use of the term "automatic." Courts and commissions in the
past have sometimes called all adjustment clauses "escalator
clauses." The term "escalator clause" is more apt for incremental
price increases7 at regular or fixed intervals. A true adjustment
clause is designed to work both upward and downward as the base
factor to which it is tied moves up or down.
In the main, the discussion in this paper is confined to
adjustments in rates for the so-called fixed utilities, i.e., electric,
gas, water, and combinations thereof, and it covers both federal
and state action, wholesale and retail applications, and related
rate design implications. Outside the scope of this paper are
clauses which enable the downward adjustment of rates in order
to meet competition, 8 and fuel clauses negotiated by municipalities in states not having a regulatory commission.'
A number of measures at the federal level have been pursued,
3 The New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners allowed a telephone company an annual adjustment to the cost of salaries and wages determined by the national
guideline increase of 6.2% less productivity increase of 4.0% or 2.2%. In re Adjustment
Clause in Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973).
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
In re Consumers Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 188 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1970); In
re Alabama Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 321 (Ala. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1969).
' See In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 520 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974).
' Cf. Foy, Cost Adjustment in Utility Rate Schedules, 13 VAND. L. RLv. 663 (1960).
For a recent example, see In re Commonwealth Water Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 456 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1974), wherein the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners
rejected a proposed adjustment clause which provided for a 3.2% annual increase in rates
for water service.
Trigg, supra note 1, at 978 n.79. These were in limited use when gas utilities sought
to protect their business from unregulated competition.
I Id. at 987.
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and a legislative definition for "automatic adjustment clauses"
has been proposed. 0 The attention given to electric utility fuel
adjustment clauses by the House of Representatives Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations," highlights the fact that adjustment
clauses are being characterized by ratepayers, and by some legislators and regulatory commissions, as faulty policy and contrary
to the public interest, and as a means of permitting "overcharges" by utilities. Speaking specifically of fuel adjustment
clauses, the Moss Subcommittee's Report is flatly condemnatory:
Automatic fuel adjustment clauses, regardless of design, are inherently flawed and anti-consumer because of their tendency to seriously undermine the incentive of utilities to minimize fuel costs."

The subject has been considered by other committees of the Congress, including the Joint Economic Committee, 3 and the Senate
Committee on Government Operations under the continuing
leadership of Senator Metcalf.
In the states, the activity concerning such clauses is principally reflected in the rate cases decided by the state commissions, 4 but there has also been legislative reaction responsive to
criticisms of the workings of the adjustment clauses. 5 The Na0- H.R. 12461, § 203(b)(3)(A),
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), defines an adjustment
clause as:
[Tihat part, if any, of a rate schedule for the sale of electric energy which
provides for automatic adjustment of a rate to reflect a change in whole or
in part of the fuel component (including applicable taxes, tariffs, or similar
charges) per-kilowatt-hour of the cost of providing electric services.

STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE House COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIc FuEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moss COMM.
REPORT (because the subcommittee was under the chairmanship of Representative John

E. Moss, Democrat-California)]; Electric Utility Problems: Fuel Adjustment Clauses,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Seas., ser. 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Moss Comm. Hearings].
"Moss COMM. REPORT 3, Finding No. 4.
IS GasolineDistribution,Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Economics of
the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).

" See note 2 supra.
" This action has ranged from outright prohibition to procedural controls. See Moss
COMM. REPORT 45 (NERA study), reporting that West Virginia has required hearings on
each adjustment, and Moss COMM. REPORT 1 n.3, noting that North Carolina abolished

fuel clauses as of September 1, 1975.
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tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) has supported adjustment clauses tied to fuel costs,
but opposed any mandatory federal legislation which would limit
individual state determinations in one direction or the other.'" A
study by a NARUC committee recommended that NARUC prepare a model fuel clause. 7 Criticism of fuel adjustment clauses
has been intense in consumer circles'8 and consumer organizations presented much of the testimony considered by the Moss
Committee.'" There are inconsistencies in the remedies proposed
by critics of the regulation process. For example, the proposed
Energy Independence Act would have required state utility regulatory agencies to permit fuel adjustment clauses;10 other measures considered by the 94th Congress would limit or prohibit fuel
adjustment clauses.2 '
Another complication presented to those responsible for reconciling the competing pressures is the activity of the Federal
Power Commission, which is sometimes thought to "lead" the
state commissions. The Federal Power Commission has taken a
conservative position, adopting a rule on fuel cost adjustments for
electric utilities which calls for a single base cost for fuel, 22 and
also permits only the inclusion of the charge for energy and not
other charges associated with purchased fuel costs. It requires the
filing of fuel purchase contracts as tariffs subject to suspension,
unless the particular fuel is under general price regulation. However, taxes associated with fuel cost increases are permitted to be
included, and the Commission mandates that adjustments for
" Moss Comm. Hearings 3-32 (Testimony of Ralph H. Wickberg, President,
NARUC).
'" SUBCOMM. OF STAFF ExPERTs ON ECONOMICS, NARUC, ECONOMIC PAPER No. 1R,
reprinted in Moss COMM. REPORT, App. C.
" See, e.g., The Fuel Adjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REPORTS 837 (Nov. 1974).
" Among the identified organizations were Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Environmental Action Foundation, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), and East
Tennessee Research Corp. Moss Comm. Hearings, Index at iii-v.
2 H.R. 2633 and S. 534, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Title VII (1975).
" See particularly H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), known as the "Electric
Utility Rate Reform and Regulatory Improvement Act." Section 203 thereof would limit
the kinds of adjustment clauses which could be approved by state agencies; section 305
similarly would control the Federal Power Commission.
22 FPC Docket No. RM76-6 (Sept. 3, 1975), adopted with changes, 18 C.F.R. §
35.13(b)(4)(iii) (1976).
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fuel cost increases be spread among users on a consumption basis,
that is per kilowatt-hour of energy.
The Commission in its notice of proposed rulemaking expressed its philosophy:
We recognize the need for a fuel adjustment clause. Properly administered fuel clauses can accomplish legitimate public interest objectives. Fuel clauses serve as a cost of service type mechanism to pass
through changes in actual, reasonably and prudently incurred costs
of fuel (decreases as well as increases), ensure appropriate and
timely cash flow to electric utilities by eliminating "regulatory lag",
and reduce regulatory expense, administrative processing costs and
the number of formal rate proceedings. These features of the fuel
clause inure to the benefit not only of the public utility but also the
customer and taxpaying public. However, improperly administered
or inadequately regulated by governmental authority, fuel clauses
can be inequitable and unfair.n

The legal and economic literature is generally sympathetic to
adjustment clauses. John W. Kendrick, has concluded that communications utilities can properly utilize adjustment clauses:
The public utilities generally have productivity performance records
of which they can be proud. Hyperinflation threatens productivity
advance through profit erosion. Automatic cost adjustments seem to
be the answer, but only if combined with efficiency incentives which
will motivate utility managements to continue to achieve at least as
good a record of productivity advances in the future as in the past.2'

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Foy and Trigg 6 have documented regulatory commission
consideration of adjustment clauses from about 1917. Disapproval of requested clauses has usually been for the asserted reason that the adjustment clause technique is incompatible with
the spirit and purpose of regulatory law and confusing to the
27
consumer.
The most significant recent development is the decision by
the New Mexico Public Service Commission to allow an adjust5

' 40 Fed. Reg. 26702, 26705 (1975).
2 Kendrick, Efficiency Incentives and Cost Factorsin Public Utility Automatic Revenue Adjustment Clauses, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 299, 312 (1975).

* Supra note 7.
* Supra note 1.
* In re Union Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 254 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); In re Public
Serv. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 401 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972).
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ment in rates based upon the utility's return on equity falling
above or below a range of 13.5% to 14.5% in the preceding annual
period.2
In Texas, where utilities are not yet generally under statewide commission regulation, the city of Houston has agreed that
Houston Lighting & Power should have a "cost-of-service adjustment clause" that will lead to increases in rates whenever the
costs of labor (excluding executive salaries), depreciation and the
interest requirement of bonds go up faster than revenues.29
Illinois Bell submitted an adjustment clause which, although
it was rejected by the Illinois Commerce Commission, 0 reflects a
recognition of the interrelationship between cost increases and
productivity increases. As proposed, the clause would assign
weights to changes in both costs and productivity to keep the
company reasonably whole at the rate of return level authorized
by the commission.
A different twist in the recent developments concerning adjustment clauses is presented in the rejection by an FPC administrative law judge of a proposal by United Gas Pipe Line which
would allow its purchased gas tracking adjustment tariff to reflect
declining sales volumes.' There is now pending before the Federal Power Commission a proposed rule to deal with purchased
gas cost adjustments. It would limit the number of purchased gas
adjustments to two a year, prescribe the semi-annual adjustment
dates, and would cover both pipeline and producer supplier
32
costs.
Schiffel concludes that the use of automatic fuel rate adjustments "is a useful regulatory tool that has probably not been
abused," but, reflecting the more conservative of the views of
generally approving commentators, he thinks the "extension of
such clauses to costs over which the company has some control
and which are relatively stable would appear to be inappropriate
'33
as well as unnecessary.
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).

As reported in ELECTRICAL WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at 1.
In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 638 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1975).
3,FPC Docket No. RP74-21 (Initial Opinion of Aug. 19, 1974).
" FPC Docket No. R-406 (May 10, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 20177 (1976).
Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation:An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, 95
PuB. UTIL. FORT. 23 (June 19, 1975). See generally Browne, The Frustrationof a Fuel
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II.

THE LEGAL BASES OF ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES

One theory supporting adjustment clauses is that the rate
adjustment when made has already been subjected to appropriate procedural and substantive requisites. An adjustment clause
enables the utility to recover its costs more rapidly than under
orthodox rate proceedings but not to increase its rates above allowable costs. Adjustment clauses also save the regulatory agency
from becoming bogged down with rate cases. The legal standards
of regulation remain unchanged. The regulatory agency definitionally is without lawful power to turn its regulatory responsibility over to the company, so when a rate is increased "automatically," the theory is that the company is acting pursuant to a
tariff which has been fully considered.
A utility is constitutionally entitled to have the opportunity
to recover the costs of rendering service to the public, and such
costs include a fair rate of return on the rate base. The "prudence" of the costs incurred is subject to regulatory supervision.
Consequently, an adjustment clause usually takes the form of a
fixed rule, determined to be just and reasonable in the underlying
rate proceeding, accompanied, at least by implication, with the
finding that it does not become less so by reason of its provision
for subsequent changes in rates, upward or downward, based
upon the occurrence of future events. 34 In a word, adjustment
clauses are not per se illegal.3 Some state cases have involved the
issue of compliance with statutory requirements, but few of the
illegality contentions have been sustained.3 8
Clause, 92 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 30 (Aug. 16, 1973). See also Jones & Winston, Automatic
Adjustment Clauses-Saintsor Sinners?, ABA PuB. UTtL. LAW SECTION ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1975); Sarikas, What is New in Adjustment Clauses, 95 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 32 (June 19,
1975).
" North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 27 N.C. App. 171, 217 S.E.2d
201 (1975); City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140
(1955). The Virginia court's language has been frequently cited:
The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed rule
under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. It is
simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the
Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost
of gas to the Company fluctuates. Hence, the resulting rates under the escalator clause are as firmly fixed as if they were stated in terms of money.
197 Va. at 516, 90 S.E.2d at 148.
" See Maestas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 571, 514 P.2d 847 (1973).
31 E.g., Consumers Organization for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub.
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In some states, all adjustment clauses are prohibited.37 Thus
far no state seems to have mandated them. Between these extremes, the state laws on the subject vary in their requirements
on shortened proceedings before an adjustment clause-triggered
increase in rates may become effective. Notice, and the filing of
specified information, may be mandated.
Adjustment clauses which take effect without some hearing
procedure, however shortened, are not for that reason freed from
continuing regulatory supervision. Complaint procedures are
almost universally available to challenge the rates of a utility
which do not conform to the standard of being just and reasonable.39 In addition, the audit and inspection function of the regulatory agency may be directed particularly to the workings of adjustment clauses by explicit provisions in the order approving the
rule.
The more complex the factors prescribed to trigger rate adjustments, the more complex becomes the task of regulatory surveillance. But even the very simple fuel adjustment or "passthrough" situations can present legal questions. One recent example of this involved an adjustment in rates based upon an
increase in the price of Canadian gas carried by Pacific Gas
Transmission Co. (PGT) to its parent, Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E). The Federal Power Commission had approved a tariff
under which fluctuations of the price of Canadian gas, as fixed
by Canadian regulatory authority, would be reflected in the
monthly billing arrangement between the transmission company
and the customer utility, without prior Commission approval.'0
In a proceeding which arose out of a filing of a new contract
between PGT and a Canadian affiliate, the Federal Power Commission instituted proceedings to determine whether PGT's tariff
Util., 335 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1975). See note 33 supra. But note the pendency of State ex
rel. Florida Power Corp. v. Pfeiffer, Civil No. 46,384.
37 See note 2 supra.
" Moss Comm. Hearings 92; Schiffel, supra note 33, at 27.
" In Pacific Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 536 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the use of section 5(a) complaint authority to require that before increasing its wholesale rates as authorized by an
approved tariff, the company must file an application and seek approval under section 4,
the rate filing section.
0 Id.
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should be modified to redefine the elements includible on purchased gas costs in PGT's rates, and therafter required that prior
filings be made with the Federal Power Commission before any
increases in the cost of Canadian gas could be passed on to the
U.S. purchaser.
The Commission's position was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in an opinion written
by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark." Justice Clark
said that any other procedure would make the Federal Power
Commission a rubber stamp for Canadian authority, since such
action would subject gas consumers "to unjust and unreasonable
rates fixed by the Canadian authority ipse dixit."''
Since neither the Commission nor the Court of Appeals can
control Canadian governmental authority which sets gas rates at
the border, only the existence of cheaper domestic alternatives to
supply the particular market should justify denying entry of the
gas. Judge Bazelon, not always sympathetic to natural gas suppliers complaining about FPC regulation,' 3 suggested that the
FPC might have conditioned its original grant of import authority, rather than amending the particular tariff in a procedure he
called "peculiar." His comment on the majority's reasoning is
cogent:
The fatal flaw in this reasoning is that it falsely assumes the
tariff somehow disabled the Commission from responding to Canadian imposed price increases. In truth, the only measure the tariff
precluded the FPC from taking was that the FPC could not temporarily or permanently prohibit PGT from recovering costs incurred
because of the increases. The Commission has failed to explain why
imposing a prohibition on cost recovery ever would be an appropriate or even plausible response to Canadian price increases. After all,
PGT, not the Canadian government or Canadian producers, would
bear the brunt of such a prohibition; the FPC concedes that had
PGT been required to absorb even the initial 32 cent price increase
for a short period of time it would have been driven out of business,
and 2,000,000 consumers would have been deprived of 40% of their
gas supply. Yet PGT plainly has no responsibility for or control over
41

Id.

11Id. at 396.
Id. at 397 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon began his dissent in this case
41

by saying, "There is a certain attractiveness, I must admit, to the FPC's decision in this
case . . .
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price increases mandated by the national Canadian government.
PGT cannot even mitigate the impact of those increases by expanding production of non-Canadian gas since PGT's sole operations are
in Canada. Thus, the Commission could not possibly question the
reasonableness of PGT recovering costs imposed upon it by the Canadian government. This would be true even if those costs were
unreasonable-a question the Commission expressly declined to
consider. The Commission's actions in promptly approving all the
increases PGT has requested since its tariff was modified strongly
support this conclusion."

In another case involving the passthrough of Canadian gas
costs, the Montana Supreme Court sustained a 1972 Montana
Public Service Commission approval of a rate order containing a
purchased gas adjustment clause which authorized the company
to increase or decrease its charges, subject to commission review
on a periodic basis. The commission held a hearing limited to the
issue of the cost of Canadian gas in 1973 and allowed the passthrough. In 1974, however, the Montana Consumer Counsel
sought to have the hearing expanded to cover all items of the cost
of service. The Montana Supreme Court, reversing a district
court ruling requiring the expanded hearing, said:
Consumer Counsel contends that the Commission is without
power and jurisdiction to issue the 1974 rate order on the basis of a
so-called "mini hearing" . . . . The substance of his argument...
is that the Commission is without power to approve a utility rate
increase without conducting a full scale hearing and examination of
all factors that affect a fair rate of return for the Company.
Here the Company did not apply for an increased rate of
return .... Instead, the Company's application simply sought to
maintain this rate of return ... by "passing through" to its customers the tremendous increases in the costs of purchased gas and royalty expense. Under such circumstances, the rate of return and annual net earnings were not germane to the Company's application,
and a full scale hearing into factors affecting the rate of return and
general rate structure of the Company was beyond the scope of the
inquiry before the Commission.
In our view the underlying justification for the use of "automatic adjustment clauses" and procedures lies in the realities of the
market place. As the cost of purchased gas and royalty expense of
the utility rise or fall, a corresponding increase or decrease in the

Id. at 397-98 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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prices charged its customers must occur. Otherwise the utility will
either be driven out of business or it will reap windfall profits.
Today, in a period of rapid increases in costs of these items to the
utility, the former consideration is paramount; at another time, the
situation may be reversed and the latter may be the principal concern. Automatic adjustment clauses and procedures are simply a
means whereby rapid fluctuations in these costs to the utility can
be reflected in equally rapid and corresponding changes in prices
charged the utility's customers.'"

Matters other than the recovery of costs are properly considered by commissions and courts, even in adjustment clause situations. For example, the Federal Power Commission, while considering a proposed rate increase for resale customers, determined
that it lacked authority to take into account the fact that state
regulation of the resale customer prevented it from recovering its
added wholesale costs. This exposed the customer to a "price
squeeze" in having to pay more at wholesale than he could charge
his own retail customers. This holding was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed." While adjustment clauses were not
involved in that case, the situation could arise under their
application.4 7
After a regulatory commission has agreed that it is in the
public interest to adjust rates to track certain classes of costs
more rapidly than would be possible by full rate case procedures,
is it logical for the commission to limit the recovery of costs to a
specified percentage increment? The Michigan Public Service
Commission limited a fuel adjustment clause to no more than
90% of the experienced cost increase;' 8 an equivalent provision is
contained in the proposed "Electric Utility Rate Reform and Regulatory Improvement Act." 41 Such provisions postulate a duty on
the part of the investors to bear a percentage of the burden of
attrition.
It has been suggested that adjustment clauses are a part of
a natural progression in the move from rate hearings, to ratemak, Montana Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 541 P.2d 770, 773-75 (1975).
" FPC v. Conway Corp., 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a/i'd, 96 S. Ct. 1999 (1976).
,7Moss Comm. Hearings 644-47 (Testimony of Gordon W. Hoyt).
' In re Consumers Power Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 370 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
, See note 21 supra.
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ing through rulemaking procedures, to regulation by formula. 0
When the rate of return was deemed a stable item in the ratemaking formula, inflationary and deflationary pressures were sought
to be accommodated in the rate base valuation process. "Trending" of rate base valuations was never automatic, and generally
was not judicially validated, but the objectives sought to be accomplished were the same as those sought in adjustment clauses.
The ratemaking process long tended to be less rather than
more formulary. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Company" represented very nearly the outer limits of departure from formulas.
The ability of the regulatory commissions to frame their decisions
to avoid judicial interference with their policymaking prerogatives has been severely challenged by shortage allocation and
environmental issues. Hearings, particularly full-scale hearings,
have become tools capable of being manipulated by the competing forces with commissions being caught in the middle. The
poignant discussion by the New Mexico Commission of the "tyranny of the rate case" is illustrative:
The essential situation .

.

. is that traditional, adversary, formal

service rate proceedings, which are occurring with ever increasing
frequency and urgency, are simply proving both inadequate to the
task and too time and energy consuming. In short, this commission
and its staff are subject to the tyranny of continuous rate cases, and
our other regulatory responsibilities are neglected in the consequence ....

As mentioned earlier, service costs have become a

moving target which scarcely holds still long enough to be quantified, with the result that even the most painstaking determination
of an energy utility's test-year costs, annualized and adjusted to
current levels, and service rates fixed at levels to cover such costs,
often prove woefully inadequate by the time the rates become effective. All too often during the past several years, newly authorized
service rates have failed to cover the energy utility's rapidly increasing total costs of service, with the result that, while its operation,
maintenance, tax, depreciation and amortization costs may be covered, its capital costs are not, even though the service rates were
carefully designed to do so. When the earnings stability and reliabilSchiffel, supra note 33.

Before the virtually universal acceptance of original cost valuation, utility commissions struggled with the application of trending and indexation techniques. Cf. West v.
Chesapeake &Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935).
"

- 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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ity of an energy utility are reduced, the market responds by increas53
ing its costs of capital and the customer inevitably suffers.

Legislative consideration of such problems, undoubtedly influenced by the volume and intensity of consumer complaints
about rate increases, seems to be devoted much more to the hearing process and its length than to the substantive issue of attrition and how to meet it. The right of a utility to file for an increase
deemed necessary for its continuance of adequate service to the
public is an essential substantive due process aspect of utility
regulatory methodology.54 Thus, legislative proposals to forbid
"pancaked" rate filings, the filing of a second, third, or fourth
rate case while earlier ones are still not finally determined,'5 is
5
likely to present important issues for courts to resolve.

III. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The conventional wisdom that regulation results in lower
rates has been academically 7 and politically 8 challenged. So has
the conventional wisdom that low rates are preferable to high
rates in all circumstances. The comments of William W. Lindsay,
now Associate Chief of Economics at the Federal Power Commission, are apt on the latter point:
What has perhaps not been so widely recognized is the fact that
regulatory lag also interferes with the ability of rates to perform
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 120-21 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
Particularly is this true where, as is usually the situation, the regulatory commission can suspend a rate filing for no more than a specified number of months. Although
rates thereafter collected are subject to refund, the company has the cash flow necessary
to keep it in operation, if its contentions turn out to be wholly or partially correct.
35H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1976).
" Such provisions could revive the Ben Avon Doctrine, Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Bureau, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), that a claim of confiscation requires a fair opportunity
for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for independent determination of both law
and facts.
11 DeAlessi, An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation:
Theory and Evidence from the Electric Power Industry, 19 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1974); Stigler
& Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAw & ECON.
1(1962).
S COUNCIL OF ECONoMic ADVISERS, 1975 ECONoMic REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. Chapter

5 addresses "Government Regulation," and contains these comments:
This discussion of governmental regulation suggests that existing laws and
institutions are imposing significant costs on the economy. . . . Precise estimates of the total costs of regulation are not available, but existing evidence
suggests that this may range up to 1 percent of gross national product. ...
Id. at 159.
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another of their principal functions-that of demand control. Recent
proposals to revise traditional electric rate structures, whether or not
one happens to believe they are misguided, have served to emphasize the proposition that the amount of electricity taken is affected
by the price charged. Since the amount of resources allocated to the
production and distribution of electricity depends on the demand for
the service and the latter depends on the level and structure of rates,
resources will be misallocated to the extent that rates fail to reflect
costs. In this sense, among others, prices which do not reflect costs
are not in the public interest."

Much of the legal framework within which the economy of
the United States operates is predicated on the assumption of
reasonable price stability in the general price level,1o and reminds
us that "indexation" might well be a cure as well as a palliative
for inflation, citing Friedman's argument that by reducing the
windfall gains to government and other groups (in this case, presumably, ratepayers) and by more promptly transmitting disinflationary tendencies throughout the economy, these clauses may
serve a basic economic objective beyond that of either the ratepayers or the investors."'
5, Moss Comm. REPORT 122 (footnote omitted).
Kendrick, supra note 24, at 299. This may be an appropriate place to note that the
assumption of price stability was central to the thinking of Justices Brandeis and Holmes

in their concurrence in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923) and thus contributed mightily to the adoption of the original
cost methodology for valuation of rate base. Justice Brandeis said, dissenting from the
opinion but concurring in the judgment:
Engineers testifying in recent rate cases have assumed that there will
be a new plateau of prices ....
The course of prices for the last 112 years
indicates, on the contrary, that there may be a practically continuous decline
for nearly a generation; that the present price level may fall to that of 1914
within a decade; and that, later, it may fall much lower.
Id. at 303 n.16.
Query: Would we now be utilizing fair value rather than original cost methodology
to keep pace with inflationary pressures if Justice Brandeis had more clearly forseen the
future? Future query: Are we approaching the more prescient suggestion of Professor A.
J. G. Priest who said:
The Brandeis technique for determining a public utility's rate base can
remain simple even under conditions of inflation if an appropriate factor is
developed for expressing high-value dollars in terms of dollars which have
lost much of their purchasing power. Tailor-made price indices accurately
and honestly predicated on a utility's experience have provided such a solution in a number of instances. The use of general price indices in such
circumstances has been condemned, but specific indices which are generally
applicable to the property examined plainly are less subject to criticism.
Priest, Major Public Utility Decisions in Perspective, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 1327, 1334-35 (1960).
"1 Kendrick, supra note 24, at 300.
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Any study of adjustment clauses must begin with the question of their role in combatting or contributing to inflation. It was
the supposed contribution to inflation which most preoccupied
the Moss Subcommittee. One of its "findings" was that "automatic fuel adjustment clauses have accounted for nearly twothirds of the $8 billion increase in the price of electricity in
1974." This is a misleading statement. The differential, if any,
between the actually experienced increased costs of furnishing
electric service, and the rates charged to recover these costs, is a
valid inquiry, but using an adjustment clause does not itself establish the existence of a differential.
The New Mexico Public Service Commission's experiment
has intriguing economic, legal, and administrative consequences.
The commission's adjustment clause is tied to return on the equity of the common stockholders. 3 The commission did not agree
that this amounted to a guaranty of investor profit or that it
contributed to inflationary pressures. With an elliptical, but discernible reference to the Stiglerian hypothesis that regulation
does not really affect prices very much, the commission said:
The cost or rate of return a public utility must pay or be able to pay
in order to obtain common equity funds from the private capital
markets is set for the company by the market, not by this commission or the company.'

The commission was orthodox in its conclusion that the cost of
common equity capital is simply another cost of furnishing service not generically different from any of its other costs."5
Any adjustment clause case must begin by determining the
base rates against which the adjustments should apply. The New
Mexico Commission tempered the effect of its adjustment clause
by differentially scaling downward the base levels below the rates
being collected under bond,"6 so that the company was allowed to
raise the rates for its large use customers proportionately less
Moss COMM. REPORT 2.
* In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 124-25 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
"

It is noteworthy that a proposed rulemaking of the Federal Power Commission adopts the
same general range of "return on equity" as an appropriate method of determining rates.
FPC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking RM77-1 (Oct. 15, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 46618 (1976).
11In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 126 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).

,5 Id.
"

The schedule is as follows:
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than its smaller use and residential customers, presumably because the former could be expected to bear the heaviest burden
of the future effects of the adjustment clause, applied by a specified per kilowatt hour amount. The right to stay any requested
adjustment, pending a hearing and resolution of contested issues
was reserved; and reports of the company were required to be
available for public inspection7
One provision of the New Mexico Commission's order is conceptually inconsistent. An existing monthly fuel cost adjustment
procedure was continued in effect."' Perhaps this was to maintain
separate visibility in a customer's bill for this particular item of
cost. In theory, the cost of service indexing keyed to return on
common equity obviates all other adjustment clauses.
The relationship between adjustment clauses and another
regulatory mechanism put forward to combat the effects of inflation, inclusion of construction work in progress in rate base, was
also discussed by the New Mexico Commission. Construction
work in progress is financed with either debt or equity, so the
formula should not provide for the inclusion of an offsetting allowance for funds during construction as a revenue item. The
company was allowed to capitalize the allowance for funds used
during construction and add it to the plant account only with
respect to non-revenue-producing investment such as environ-

Service Category
Residential
Overhead
Underground
Small Power
General Power
Large Power
Industrial Power
Private Area Lights
Standby Service
Irrigation
Water and Sewage
Average Increase
Id. at 121.
'7 Id. at 123.
' Id. at 122.

Requested
Increase

Allowed
Increase

13.7c!
19.8
9.7
11.3
15.5
17.2
6.3

11.1%
17.3
9.7
11.3
10.3
8.7
6.3

15.3
6.7

15.3
6.7

11.5,

9.7%
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mental equipment, and transmission, distribution, and miscellaneous additions.6 9
On the other hand, the allowance for funds during construction which was related to investment in generating capability was
required to be included as a revenue item, and capitalized, thus
deferring recovery in rates of the cost of capital associated with
such investment until after the plant goes on line. The FPC has
changed its rules with a similar distinction being made. 0
The equivalent of the legal question of confiscation is presented in economic policy terms in the matter of dilution of stock
value, and in the matter of comparing the costs and benefits of
maintaining coverage ratios (earnings as a multiple of debt service costs) and, ultimately, in the matter of measuring the costs
of utility bankruptcy. The latter question was emphasized in testimony before the Moss Subcommittee, when a utility witness
said that in view of the increase in the delivered price of coal by
131% over a one year period, the company would have been unable to pay its bills when due, and would most likely have been
bankrupted, if it had not had an adjustment clause. 7 '
The New Mexico Commission discussed the costs of attempting to finance expansion for a company whose common stock
value is below book value:
[If a utility continually attempts to sell common stock at prices

below inevitably declining book values to raise that portion of its
new capital requirements dictated by the need to keep its debt capital ratio in reasonable balance, sophisticated investors and ultimately the entire market may soon be unwilling to buy at any
price.7"

The commission also reacted favorably to testimony which quantified the cost of losing a bond rating level:
Quite logically, these [rating] institutions perceive increases in
debt ratios and declines in coverage ratios as indicative of an increase in risk to the investor and downrate the securities of the
public utility accordingly, with the result that the cost of new debt
and preferred stock capital to it is increased by the capital market
"

70
71

Id. at 124.
FPC Docket No. RM75-13 (Nov. 8, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 51392 (1976).
Moss Comm. Hearings 716.

" In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 128 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
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proportionately . . . .[Tihe current difference between the cost of
AA and A rated utility bonds and preferred stocks is 0.89 per cent.
Estimating that approximately 85 per cent of the capital necessary
to finance PNM's five-year construction budget-i.e., $625,760,000,
must be generated externally or from the private capital markets,
that 65 per cent of this amount must be raised by the sale of bonds
and preferred stock, and that the new plant in which it will be
invested will have a 30-year life, . . . retention of PNM's AA rating
would result in 30-year savings in the amount of approximately $110
million."3

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
To obtain administrative approval, the advantages of adjustment clauses must be found to outweigh the disadvantages. The
regulatory agency must be persuaded that adjustment clauses are
adequately resistant to abuses which frustrate regulatory objectives. This presents various administrative problems.
The process of balancing competing interests in having or not
having a full rate case involved accepting trade offs. The expectation approaching certainty that costs will increase, not decrease,

during the period following a rate determination, has dominated
ratemaking for a number of years. Rate models which incorporate
ancitipated future changes, such as in financing, revenues, rate

base, taxes, depreciation, and operating expenses, are routine.
Rates are fixed upon a cost-of-service which may be based upon

a "forward test year.''74 The policy argument as to inclusion of

construction work in progress in the rate base is summarized in
a recent FPC order as follows:
The allowance of CWIP in the rate base involves a judgment that it
is equitable for present ratepayers to provide funds that would otherwise be provided by future ratepayers. At the present time, there
is only one area where the Commission has agreed for all companies
that this outcome would be equitable. This is in the area of facilities
which are required because of the current generation's commitment
to the control of pollution, or its consumption of existing stocks of
natural resources. Thus, we will allow the inclusion of CWIP in rate
base where the construction is of facilities to be used for pollution
control, or for the conversion to the burning of other fossil fuels of
plants which now burn oil or gas. In these cases, it is the profligacy
of the present generation which requires the new facilities, and we
Id. at 130-31 (footnote omitted).
1,American Pub. Power Ass'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
13
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consider that the equitable argument favoring this allocation of
costs is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the allowance of
CWIP on these facilities."'

In theory, at least, the nature of ratemaking precludes a
company's realized rate of return from matching that used for
ratemaking purposes except as a transient coincidence. The pressures of inflation have resulted in commissions candidly allowing
rates of return higher than otherwise might have been allowed in
order that the time period between rate cases can be extended.
It may be less than fair, therefore, to make too much of the
comparison of the workings of adjustment clauses against the
alternative of full rate cases. A well-designed adjustment clause
can permit a ratemaking agency to allow a lesser revenue level
than would be the case if it did not have the adjustment clause."6
Adjustment clauses may well be more certain and more favorable
to consumers than alternative regulatory devices. Nevertheless,
the administrative problems associated with adjustment clauses
are frequently presented as if the alternative of a full hearing
procedure was a model of certainty.
In any adjustment clause situation, as in ratemaking without
such clauses, the traditional objective is to maintain sufficient
incentives for management to reduce costs by making a wise
choice among alternative generation modes, by hard bargaining
with suppliers of labor, materials, and fuel, by shrewd selection
among financing alternatives, and by alert planning and
supervision.
The psychology of utility management is not the subject of
this paper. However, there is a massive difference between the
incentive of a professional's pride in doing a good job and the
incentive of staving off bankruptcy for an extra month or so. The
regulatory agency must furnish incentives to the management of
the regulated utility. Do adjustment clauses reduce incentive?
Requiring a full rate hearing for every increase is administratively
burdensome, and the disarray among the states' attitudes about
adjustment clauses reflects to a degree differences in their views
about the tradeoff between incentive and administrative conveni"

FPC Docket No. RM75-13 (Nov. 8, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 51392 (1976).
See In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 137 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
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ence, more than it does a difference in view about the recovery of
proved costs.
The Moss Committee hearings emphasized administrative
problems, including one it called "over-collection." In an adjustment clause context, this is basically not different from the circumstance that realized revenues sometimes exceed projected
revenues. This is not called over-collection. Experience usually
varies from projection and it can occur in an adjustment clause
context.
The California Public Utilities Commission split on treatment of such a variation in a situation where the mix of hydro
and fossil fuel generation changed. By a 3-2 rate decision, the
commission required PG&E and Southern California Edison to
"refund" $203 million because of the "over-collections." The dissenting commissioners said that "while we can concur in the revision of the fuel-cost-adjustment clause from a forecast basis to a
recorded basis, we dissent when the majority decides to exceed
the law to order refunds." The company announced that the decision would be appealed."
The skewing of rate design is a more substantive matter, but
critics of this effect generally fail to realize that it works in favor
of the low load factor residential users at the expense of the high
load factor industrial and commercial customers. The characterization of this differential as a "windfall profit" seems to be highly
inappropriate."7

Another administrative problem is one discussed in connection with Philadelphia Electric Company. The company's tariff
excludes nuclear fuels from the workings of its fuel adjustment
clause. Investment per kilowatt in nuclear generation so far exceeds conventional fossil generation, that inclusion of nuclear fuel
without recognition of this fact would heavily penalize the nuclear utility until it can include the new investment in its rate
base.79 Fuel clauses are administratively difficult to handle where
several companies are part of an integrated system. Derivation of
a base cost for a particular company's fuel, procured from long
" Wall Street Journal, Apr. 28, 1976, at 15, col. 2.
" Moss Comm. Hearings 361.

1' Id. at 354.
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term contracts, from captive mines, and from spot purchases, is
difficult8 0 The supervision or audit of fuel purchasing practices
is relatively easy on a post hoc basis, and critics of the workings
of fuel clauses can easily insist that the company should have
operated its system differently. Therefore, requiring purchase
contracts to be submitted for review is becoming more common.8 '
Accommodating efficiency factors into adjustment clauses
was extensively discussed by the West Virginia Public Service
Commission," in considering a situation where one regulated
company used a variable efficiency factor, and another used a
fixed efficiency factor. In the former, heat rating and line loss
factors are determined each month, whereas in the latter, a fixed
line loss and constant heating rating are determined.
The list of theoretical arguments against an adjustment
clause is long. It is to be expected that to the extent adjustment
clauses withstand the current legislative attack, the design of the
clauses themselves will be influenced by the same considerations
which are urged in connection with such current social objectives
as inhibiting demand, aiding conservation, and advancing environmental quality.m
Regulatory lag is always under attack, but the "lag factor"
is an affirmative tool of those opposed to rate increases. Competing forces might find an area of compromise by agreeing upon a
fixed delay period, or a fixed discount factor. The need to pass
costs along to the customers and the countervailing need to keep
utility management on its toes to save costs might be served in
this fashion. Some lag factor clauses are adopted on the legalistic
ground that a delay in the workings of a clause is necessary for
procedural fairness, to give those affected by the increase an opportunity to file complaints and trigger review procedures.
CONCLUSION

The process of ratemaking is legislative, but by tradition and
by statute it has always been required to be conducted in the fullId. at 730.
, Id. at 731.
A In re Investigation of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, 8 P.U.R.4th 607 (W.Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975).
0 See Avery, Social and Economic Factors in Rate Design, ABA PuB. UTIL. LAW
SECTION ANNUAL REPORT

48 (1975).
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hearing format of adjudication. Roger Crampton has contributed
considerable insight in his discussion of the rapid expansion of
the use of formal evidentiary hearings in administrative decisionmaking in some fields, while simultaneously such use is under
attack in other areas. His paper in the VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 4
relates primarily to the judicialization of the process of nuclear
power siting, but what he says about how we should think about
procedures is apt on the adjustment clause versus full rate hearing issues. Instead of using talismanic phrases like "fairness" and
"due process," we might follow his suggestions and compare procedural alternatives in terms of whether they further the accurate
selection and determination of relevant facts and issues, further
the efficient disposition of business, and meet a standard of "acceptability" to the public.
On the test of accuracy, it seems that a well-designed adjustment clause is superior to the full hearing, for the reasons articulated by the New Mexico Commission. The possibility of the
traditional full hearing being more accurate than the rates reflecting the workings of a fully litigated rule on adjustments is
about equivalent to the comparison of a stopped clock being more
accurate than a clock running fast or slow.
As to efficiency, the same can be said. The regulatory process
has bogged down to the point of scandal, and the recommendations of the Moss Committee and others as to how to handle the
growing crisis are ludicrous. The prescription of more money and
more personnel for the regulatory process, or for the use of rules
forbidding the "pancaking" of rate cases as if the tide of cost
increases could be held back by regulatory or legislative fiat is
simply unrealistic.
However, the matter of acceptability may be the shoal upon
which not just adjustment clauses, but utility regulation as we
have known it, will founder. It is undeniable that the current of
sentiment against energy producing and energy delivering companies in this country is running strong. It is unfortunate indeed
that the public is being misled into believing that somehow a cost
passed through to consumers through the workings of an adjust" Crampton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REv. 585 (1972).
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ment clause is not a real cost. The financial integrity of all utilities is presently shaky, and public confidence is at a very low ebb.
In many ways, the utilities are victims of their own past
successes, because their achievement of economies of scale and
their technological advances for a long time cancelled out the
upward pressures of inflation. It is no longer possible to look
forward to productivity gains cancelling out the increased costs
related to inflation.
The issues are not legal ones. The applicability of an adjustment clause is almost always determinable upon policy grounds
dependent upon legislative rather than adjudicative facts. Therefore, due process in a constitutional sense does not demand the
kind of adversary hearing which the critics of these clauses seem
to assume.
Neither are the issues economic. What should be said here
is that the discipline of economics is a fertile field for further
empiric research to assist the regulatory process, particularly in
the design phase where so many of the administrative problems
have been identified.
Adjustment clauses do not deserve the criticisms which have
been leveled against them, but decrying the criticisms will have
no effect. A positive case must be made, showing that they offer
a way to maintain the values and traditions of a regulatory system which has served the public for more than a hundred years.

NOTE
EQUAL PROTECTION:

MODES OF ANALYSIS IN THE

BURGER COURT
INTRODUCTION

The 1971-1976 Terms of the Supreme Court have produced
significant developments in equal protection. Among the more
important of these have been the modes of analysis employed in
this area of constitutional law. The Burger Court inherited from
its predecessor a rigid, two-tier model of equal protection.' In the
A two-tier or "new" equal protection evolved during the Warren Court era. No
mention was made of a bifurcated form of analysis in an important article appearing in
1949 which predicted the emergence of an active equal protection. Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341 (1949). The authors predicted,
however, that race would become a "forbidden classification." Id. at 352-59. In 1966,
Justice Harlan was still able to argue:
It is suggested that a different and broader equal protection standard
applies in cases where "fundamental liberties and rights are threatened"
• . . which would require a State to show a need greater than mere rational
policy to justify classifications in this area. No such dual-level test has ever
been articulated by this Court, and I do not believe that any such approach
is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause . ...
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660-61 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969).
More recently, Justice Stevens has indicated an unwillingness to accept the two-tier
analysis.
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not require the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever
criticism may be levelled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least
three such standards applies with the same force to a double standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. I also suspect that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that
standard than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms ...
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 464 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Indeed, nothing on the face of the fourteenth amendment compels two-tier analysis.
For most of its history, equal protection has had only one level of scrutiny, today's version
of minimum scrutiny. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). This low degree of scrutiny was
particularly appropriate for economic regulation, the area in which equal protection was
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Warren Court era, minimum scrutiny almost always resulted in
upholding the legislation under attack, while strict scrutiny had
the opposite effect. 2 Since the outcome of a two-tier analysis was
foreordained by the level of scrutiny applied, the real contest
centered on whether or not the classifications or interests at stake
called for minimum or strict scrutiny. The Burger Court has radically altered this game by closing the door on the recognition of
"new" suspect classifications and fundamental, constitutional
interests.3 Constitutional inquiry now focuses more meaningfully
on the means and ends of legislation to ascertain whether or not
it will pass muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny.4 Unlike
most often applied in the early part of the twentieth century. The fourteenth amendment,
however, was adopted in response to a more invidious form of discrimination-racial
discrimination. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Speculation as to
the need for a higher standard of review was expressed in 1938 when Justice Stone suggested that the presumption of constitutionality should be given a narrower scope in the
case of legislation which discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities." United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Several years later, the
Court announced "that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect" and would be subject "to the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). This stricter level of review has also been
applied to legislation impinging on fundamental rights, such as voting. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). For commentary see Note, The Mandatefor a New
Equal ProtectionModel, 24 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 558 (1975); Note, Developments in the Law,
Equal Protection, 82 HAsv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969); Note, A Question of Balance:
Statutory ClassificationsUnder the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1973).
1 Chief Justice Burger expressed his displeasure with these automatic results in Dunn
v. Blumstein:
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state
law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt
one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.
405 U.S. 331, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Professor Gunther expressed the
same observation in 1972:
The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations
evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny that was
"strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential "old"
equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HLv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
(footnote omitted). See also Shaman, The Rule of Reasonablenessin ConstitutionalAdjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a
Viable Theory of the Equal ProtectionClause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 159-60 (1975).
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Rodriguez].
In his analysis of the 1971 Term, Professor Gunther suggested that the Court would
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the Warren Court, the Burger Court has used minimum scrutiny
to strike down legislation- and has also upheld legislation against
strict scrutiny.'
Faced with a dramatic alteration in the modes of constitutional analysis, state and lower federal courts and commentators
have attempted to identify governing principles or patterns.7
Lower courts which cannot discern with reasonable clarity the
constitutional standards which should guide their decisions must
guess at the right answer, and must, sometimes, guess wrongly.8
Constitutional uncertainty also breeds an increased number of
appeals, resulting not only in congested dockets but also in
greatly increased expense for the litigants and the public. Legislators as well are caught in this web, since they must draft laws
conforming to prevailing constitutional standards. Part I of this
Note will examine developments in the area of strict scrutiny and
Part II will examine the alternatives to a rigid, two-tier equal
protection analysis.
I.

A.

STRICT SCRUTINY

Suspect Classifications
During the Warren Court era, the rigid, two-tier analysis left

focus on the "means" selected by a legislature, and that the Court would leave to the
discretion of legislatures, at least for equal protection purposes, the determination of
appropriate legislative "purposes" or "ends." Gunther, supra note 2. Thus, he postulated,
the Court would avoid inquiry which would be strongly suggestive of substantive due
process. While Gunther's model has won a following in the lower courts, e.g., Isakson v.
Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alas. 1976), it has not always carried the day in the Supreme Court.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1071-72 (1974); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Two Eligibility Criteria Created by the 1971 Amendment to the
Food Stamp Act Ruled Unjustifiably Discriminatory and Violative of Due Process, 78
DICK. L. REV. 788 (1974).
E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972).
* E.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 776 (1974).
One federal district court judge expressed his frustration in trying to find the answer
in this way: "A lower court faced with this line of cases has an uncomfortable feeling,
somewhat similar to a man playing a shell game who is not absolutely sure there is a pea."
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (footnote omitted),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977) (Rehnquist, J., not participating). An affirmance on certiorari by an
equally divided Court is entitled to no precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972).
9 E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'g 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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little doubt about the outcome, once it was clear whether strict
or minimum scrutiny would be applied. 9 Nevertheless, flexibility
was retained, inasmuch as the Warren Court was always somewhat foggy about which classifications or interests would turn a
case into one requiring strict scrutiny.10 Given the inclination to

' Gunther, supra note 2, at 8; see Note, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
Classifications which have been found suspect are: race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and nationality, Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Interests which have been found to be fundamental in
the constitutional sense are: voting, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969), but see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 416 U.S. 719
(1973); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), but see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975); and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Whenever a
suspect classification or fundamental constitutional interest is impinged on, the legislation must satisfy three criteria: The means selected must be necessary; the means must
serve a compelling need; the means must serve a legitimate state purpose. Note, The Less
Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, A Justification,and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 996-1006 (1974).
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680, cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977), presents the Court with the
question it ducked earlier in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). That question is
whether affirmative action programs in which race is an intentional component must be
tested against and can satisfy the compelling interest standard. In Bakke the California
Supreme Court held that a state medical school's affirmative action program violated
federal equal protection because it did not satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement of the compelling interest test. Broad language in a subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1977), offers hope that Bakke will either be overturned or, at a minimum, the
Court will set some standard by which affirmative action programs can be established to
conform to constitutional mandate. In United Jewish Organizations the Court upheld a
reapportionment plan which was admittedly drawn with racial considerations in order to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973 (1975). Although only the Chief Justice
dissented and Justice Marshall did not participate, there is no one thread which can be
pulled from the Court's decision. For himself and three others, Justice White observed
that the fourteenth amendment does not mandate "any per se rule against using racial
factors" in reapportionment. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4226. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
briefly discusses three objections to "benign discrimination." First, benign discrimination
may become a facade behind which disadvantageous treatment is perpetuated. If courts
are unable to distinguish the benign from the invidious programs, that would weigh
heavily against the use of affirmative action. Second, remedial programs might stimulate
racism and may stigmatize intended beneficiaries. Third, even a benign policy may seem
unjust to those adversely affected by it. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4229. Justice Brennan has elsewhere indicated that a carefully prepared affirmative action policy may satisfy the compelling interest standard. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
1* In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the Court was faced with a portion of
the Texas Constitution which impinged on both the right to vote and the right to travel.
With a choice between resting its decision on either one of these interests, the Warren
Court did not clearly rest its decision on one or the other as the ratio decidendi. This soft
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strike down a particular legislative scheme, the Court always
seemed to be able to reach out and find a classification or interest
calling for strict scrutiny."
The Burger Court's rebellion against this flexible approach
blossomed in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez. 2 In that case the Court was squarely asked to find
that a school financing scheme which discriminated against poor
method of decision-writing was carried over by the Warren Court into areas where neither
the interest nor the classification has been held, specifically, to require strict scrutiny.
Thus, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court applied strict scrutiny when
confronted with a legislative scheme which required criminal appellants to file a transcript
in order to obtain full appellate review and where the state would not provide free transcripts to indigent appellants, thereby limiting the right of appeal. In applying strict
scrutiny, the Court did not indicate whether it was doing so because of poverty or the
criminal appeal process, or whether both were necessary to invoke this degree of review.
It was this fortuity that the Burger Court seized upon in Rodriguez. No prior Supreme
Court case had held poverty to be a suspect classification and, as far as the Burger Court
could help it, no one ever would. Similarly, no prior case had held education to be a
fundamental interest. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and all of its progeny,
up until Rodriguez, had involved both race and education. It had never, therefore, been
necessary to hold expressly that education was a fundamental interest. It came as something of a shock to find out, in Rodriguez, that education was not, of itself, sufficient to
invoke the higher tier of scrutiny. Thus, by making hard-nosed distinctions, as in
Rodriguez, the Burger Court has been able to escape from the broadest reaches of the
Warren Court legacy.
" Although the Warren Court's process was open-ended, it had in fact produced only
a smattering of interests or classifications which would, either alone or in combination,
invoke strict scrutiny. See discussion in notes 9-10 supra.
"1 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The California Supreme Court reached a result diametrically
opposed to Rodriguez on state equal protection grounds. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano II).
As Serrano I makes clear . . .our state equal protection provisions, while
"substantially the equivalent of" the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analysis different from
that which would obtain if only the federal standard were applicable. We
have recently stated in a related context: "[un the area of fundamental civil
liberties-which includes . . . all protections of the California Declaration
of Rights-we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification
that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. . . .Accordingly, decisions of the
United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive
authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by
California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than
is guaranteed by California law.
Id. at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Justice Brennan's views on the use of independent state
grounds for decision are set forth in his article, Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Human Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

people created a suspect classification. Speaking through Justice
Powell, the Court declined the invitation. Prior cases involving
1 3 and Harper
poverty, such as Douglas v. California
v. Virginia
Board of Elections,1,were distinguished with the observation that
the factor which called strict scrutiny into play in those cases was
the "absolute deprivation" of a particular right, such as the right
to take a criminal appeal or access to the ballot, rather than a
classification based on poverty as such. Another factor which
Justice Powell indicated militated against recognition of poor
people as a suspect class was that the Texas financing plan did
not operate to discriminate solely against poor people nor against
all poor people. Justice Powell then articulated a standard to be
used in determining whether or not a particular classification
should be recognized as being suspect:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."

Since announcing this test the Court has not recognized any new
classification as suspect."6
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
,s411 U.S. at 28. This was a transparent warning that the Burger Court would not
listen favorably to pleas for recognition of "new" suspect classes. Advocates for the recognition of sex and illegitimacy as suspect classifications were undeterred. Framed as it was,
Justice Powell's test did not foreclose recognition of either as a suspect class. To the
contrary, the test seemed to have been drawn with gender-based discrimination in mind,
at the very least; it is an understatement, rather than an exaggeration, to say that both
classes, but most especially women, have been saddled with disabilities, have been subjected to purposeful unequal treatment, and have been and still are, for the most part,
politically powerless. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has said that women and illegitimates are special disfavorites of the law. Mathews v.Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) (illegitimates); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (women). Nonetheless,
the Court has so far refused to hold, by a majority vote, that either classification is
suspect. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (sex); Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755 (1976)
(illegitimacy).
" In addition to sex and illegitimacy, the Court has declined to recognize age as a
suspect classification. Massachusetts Bd.of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
Although the Court has traditionally applied strict scrutiny to state programs discriminating against aliens, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court backed away
from this degree of scrutiny in a recent decision upholding a federal Medicare program
denying benefits to resident aliens who had been in the United States for less than five
"
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Justice Marshall sharply dissented from the Court's holding
and reasoning with respect to suspect classifications generally
and poverty in particular." In neither Griffin v. Illinois' nor
Douglas v. California," Marshall emphasized, did the offensive
scheme work an absolute deprivation of the right to take an appeal. In the one case, poor people were deprived of a transcript,
and in the other they were deprived of an attorney, but in both
cases poor people could still take an appeal. In Harperv. Virginia
Board of Elections,0 the poll tax discriminated not merely
years. Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976). The denial of benefits was upheld as a
reasonable fiscal measure based on the plenary power of Congress to regulate aliens.
There continues to be disquiet within the Court over the treatment to be accorded
gender-based classifications. Of the four-member plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), composed of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White, which
would have designated sex as a suspect class, Justice Douglas no longer is on the Court.
Of the three members who expressed a desire in that case to await the fate of the Equal
Rights Amendment, Justices Blackmun and Powell would evaluate gender-based classifications by a "middle-tier" approach. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 463-64 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring); 97 S. Ct. at 466 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his majority opinion in
Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976), Justice Blackmun held that illegitimates should
not be treated as a suspect class because illegitimacy does not carry the same obvious
badges as do race and sex, nor has discrimination against illegitimates ever approached
the severity or pervasiveness of legal and political discrimination against women or blacks.
96 S. Ct. at 2762. Given the parallels between race and sex which Justice Blackmun drew
in Mathews v.Lucas, it may be that he would now vote to find sex a suspect class. Even
if he were so inclined, there would still be no more than four votes to that effect. Justice
Stevens has dissociated himself from two-tier analysis altogether, Craig v. Boren, 97 S.
Ct. 451, 464-65 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), and would not, presumably, add the fifth
vote which would be necessary for a majority of the Court to hold sex to be a suspect
classification. The Chief Justice, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart have held
fast to their position that sex is not a suspect class. Each of the four wrote an opinion in
Craig v. Boren, supra. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren is also
interesting in that it suggests a more than minimal, but less than strict, scrutiny of a
gender-based classification. It may be postulated that the "middle-tier" test for genderbased discrimination set out for the majority by Brennan in this case is not the "retreat"
from the plurality position of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), over which
Justice Rehnquist rejoices in Craig. If the Equal Rights Amendment is passed, it is difficult to see how the Court could avoid holding sex to be suspect. On the other hand, in
view of the difficulties which the ERA is encountering, members of the Court seem to feel
that by adopting a "middle-tier" test for gender-based discrimination now, and even
assuming the ERA then fails, sex classifications would not be relegated to the same
superficial minimal scrutiny analysis which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist advocate in their separate dissents in Craig v. Boren. Further signs of internal Court disagreement over the definition of sex discrimination are evident in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
'
411 U.S. at 117-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956), limited by United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976).
" 372 U.S. 353 (1963), limited by Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
2 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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against poor people who were unable to pay but it also operated
to prevent from voting those who simply failed to pay, although
able to do so. The Court struck down both aspects of the poll tax.
Justice Marshall pointed out that these cases, upon which Justice
Powell relied, did not support a holding that a classification is
suspect only if it works -an absolute deprivation of some right.
Indeed, Justice Marshall said, an analysis of past decisions
proved that the Court had focused on the relevance of the classification to the right denied. 2 In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall would
have looked at the relevance of the taxable wealth of a school
district to the interests of school children in the education they
would receive. Since the discrimination effected by such a classification was a function of group wealth, rather than personal
wealth, and in no way reflected the individual's abilities or needs,
it was, Justice Marshall believed, invidious. Moreover, even
within the terms of Justice Powell's test, poor people were politically powerless to effect a more equitable financing scheme
against certain opposition from a political majority opposing
higher taxation. For these reasons Justice Marshall would have
found the wealth-related classification affecting education in
22
Rodriguez suspect.
Basic to understanding strict scrutiny in the Burger Court is
a thorough understanding of Rodriguez. Its significance is less in
its holding, though important, and even less in the test of suspectness that it enunciates and which Justice Marshall deflates; the
true significance is the tone it sets-an inhospitable climate in
which strict scrutiny stops growing and begins to shrink. In this
atmosphere pleas for the recognition of sex2 3 and illegitimacy 4 as
The highly suspect character of classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage is well established. The reasons why such classifications
call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups
have frequently been recognized as "discrete and insular minorities" who are
relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. Moreover, race, nationality, or alienage is 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to
any constitutionally acceptable purpose." Instead, lines drawn on such bases
are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative
rationality.
411 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). See also
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
411 U.S. at 120-24.
21 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). At least two state courts have held
sex to be suspect-California and Washington. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
29
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suspect classifications have not moved a majority of the Court.
Spurious as Justice Powell's three-pronged test for suspectness
may be, its message is clear: No more suspect classes!
B.

FundamentalInterests

The Warren Court's catalogue of fundamental interests was
neither large nor well-defined. '5 Again, it was this weakness which
the Burger Court attacked through Justice Powell in Rodriguez.
In his opinion, Justice Powell moved quickly to defuse arguments
that education is a constitutionally protected fundamental interest. He did not directly attack the importance of education. Instead, he undercut the supports on which this claim to extraordinary constitutional protection rested. Since the close of the era
of substantive due process, the Court has been loath to find substantive rights in the fourteenth amendment, 6 an onus shared by
equal protection.27 Emphasizing this backdrop, Justice Powell
announced another test:
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973).
See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The ERA: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Ginsburg,
Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. Ev. 1 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 235 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court- 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617 (1974); Lombard, Sex: A
Classificationin Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1355 (1975); Note, Geduldig
v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationsand the Definition of Sex'Discrimination,75 COLUM.
L. Ev. 441 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court 1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications:
Avoiding a Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 375 (1975).
24 Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974). For commentary on the status of illegitimates see Gray & Rudovsky, The Court
Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. Ev. 1 (1969); Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. Ev. 477 (1967); Lee, The Changing American Law Relating to Illegitimate
Children, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 415 (1975); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 479 (1974).
2 See notes 9-10 supra.
" Among the most noted substantive due process cases are Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The doctrine fell into
constitutional disrepute in the mid-1930's, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and has since been buried many times over, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963). To this day, however, black-robed justices denounce the reappearance of this
doctrine, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection:A Polemical Approach,
58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
" "Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers
no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties." San Antonio Independent
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Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance
of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be
found by weighing whether education is as important as the right
to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.?

Applying this test, Justice Powell concluded that education is not
a fundamental, constitutional right. It is not expressly guaranteed and he could find no basis for implying its guarantee. In
particular, he rejected the "nexus theory" that education was
impliedly guaranteed because of its central importance to the
meaningful exercise of other guaranteed rights, such as freedom
of expression and voting. Moreover, he added, even assuming
education is essential to the exercise of these rights, this is not to
say that the Constitution guarantees to each the most "effective
speech or the most informed legislative choice. 2 To the extent
there was any bare, minimum quantity of education necessary to
exercise other constitutional rights, the Texas financing scheme,
he held, did at least that much. By anyone's reading, Justice
Powell's opinion is a studied effort to communicate the Court's
unwillingness to expand fundamental interests beyond voting,
travel, and procreation.
Justice Marshall's dissent is logically less compelling on this
point than his critique of the Court's treatment of suspect classifications. The difference between Justice Marshall and the majority is that Justice Marshall accepts the "nexus theory"-the more
closely the interest is tied to other fundamental rights, the more
searching the scrutiny it must withstand. 0 While this argument
has appeal and may serve to explain Warren Court strict scrutiny
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Giving full force to this logic would go a long way toward undermining the fundamental
right status of interests such as procreation and travel. Goodpaster, The Constitutionand
FundamentalRights, 15 Aiz. L. REv. 479, 502 (1973).
2 411 U.S. at 33-34. The California Supreme Court rejected this analysis and found
education to be a fundamental right based on the state's equal protection guarantees in
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976).
411 U.S. at 36.
3 Id. at 110-17. Justice Marshall did not contend that the Warren Court had ever held
public education to be constitutionally required. He argued that education has a special
status in light of itsclose relationship to individual development and the exercise of
constitutional rights. Id. at 111.
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decisions, such as Griffin v. Illinois,31it is more a matter of philosophical orientation than settled constitutional doctrine.2 Justice
Marshall's flexible approach to the identification of fundamental
interests is in sharp contrast to the narrow standard adopted by
the Burger Court majority. This narrow standard allows the
Burger Court to confine the holdings of Warren Court decisions
to their facts without the discomfort of overruling precedent. At
the same time, a begrudging, narrow standard for the identification of fundamental interests has the benefit of relative certainty
in application. Moreover, an articulated standard lends itself
more readily to the semblance of intellectual and constitutional
integrity than an ad hoc balancing test which may appear to be,
if it is not in fact, arbitrarily manipulated to fit the facts of the
case.
C. Ignoring Precedent
While no fundamental interest or suspect classification bequeathed to the Burger Court has been specifically abandoned,
the legacy has not always been faithfully applied. From time to
time the Court has clearly "distinguished" controlling precedent
on specious or wholly unarticulated grounds. Two decisions,
Sosna v. Iowas and Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District,34 illustrate this approach.
Sosna involved a challenge to Iowa's one-year residency requirement for divorce. It was argued that the scheme penalized
the right to travel in violation of equal protections' and hence
should be tested against the compelling interest standard.3 Al351 U.S. 12 (1956).
= Justice Marshall's dissent is actually an elaborate development of what has been
described as a "sliding-scale" balancing test in equal protection in counterpoint to the
rigid, two-tier equal protection. See text accompanying notes 103-14, 142-46 infra. Justice
Stewart labeled Justice Marshall's dissent as "imaginative." 411 U.S. at 59.
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
410 U.S. 719 (1973).
3 Legislation which impinges on the right of persons to engage in interstate movement should be measured by the strict scrutiny standard. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
u It was also urged that the legislation created an irrebuttable, conclusive presumption violating due process. 419 U.S. at 409. For an examination of this doctrine see text
accompanying notes 49-85 infra. Justice Rehnquist rejected this claim, observing that
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), should not be construed as prohibiting bona fide
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though the logic of prior cases considering durational residency
requirements would seem to require strict scrutiny here, 37 Justice
Rehnquist dismissed those cases as not controlling, because, in
his estimation, the residency requirements in those cases were
only justified by administrative convenience and fiscal considerations. He urged that Iowa's interest in maintaining the integrity
of its dissolution decrees against collateral attack in sister states
was a different and, therefore, satisfactory ground of justification.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is analysis by misdirection, artfully inviting analysis of the legislation by the wrong
standard and then concluding that the legislation satisfies that
standard. He achieved this result by giving an obscure answer to
the question of whether strict scrutiny had been satisfied or even
applied.
We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those
who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the
State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack, requires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in Shapiro, supra,Dunn,

supra, and Maricopa County, supra. 8

The statement that this case "requires a different resolution of
the constitutional issue" can be interpreted in either of two diametrically opposed ways. Does he mean here, that unlike
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County, the scheme satisfies strict
scrutiny? While the opinion does not say so directly, the answer
must be no. The compelling interest standard is satisfied only if
the state has chosen "means that do not unnecessarily burden
constitutionally protected interests. ' 3 9 Justice Rehnquist made
residency requirements, citing Stares v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), which upheld a one year residency requirement for students
qualifying for in-state tuition rates. Notwithstanding the state's monopoly on the divorce
apparatus as the only legal means of dissolving a marriage relationship, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and the severe hardship which a one year delay may impose,
Justice Rehnquist found it unnecessary to require the state to make an individualized
determination of residency for persons seeking divorce. 419 U.S. at 410.
31"Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes
a compelling state interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 (1969). For commentary on durational residence requirements for divorce see Wurfel, Jet Age Domicil: The
Semi-Demise of DurationalResidence Requirements, 11 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 349, 40712 (1975).
419 U.S. at 409.
" Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 263. See also Dunn v. Blumstein,
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no effort to show that the Iowa statute met this burden, as well
he could not, since the state could determine the fact of residence
by other means, i.e., by individualized determinations.'0 The
Iowa scheme, therefore, would fail the compelling interest test.
Therefore, it must be assumed that when Justice Rehnquist
spoke of a different resolution of the constitutional issue, he was
referring to the use of minimum scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. His argument that Iowa's statute was justified by reasons
of full faith and credit and comity, rather than administrative
and budgetary considerations," goes to the question of whether
the proferred justifications satisfy the appropriate level of scrutiny, not to the more basic question of which level of scrutiny is
appropriate.'" Notwithstanding prior cases implicating the right
to travel-which had held that strict scrutiny must be appliedJustice Rehnquist applied minimum scrutiny without articulating standards for not applying strict scrutiny. It seems apparent
that strict scrutiny was ignored, not because it was inappropriate
in light of the constitutional interest involved, but because the
Justices did not like the results its application would bring.
The Burger Court has also retreated from the use of strict
scrutiny in the case of voting. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
405 U.S. at 343; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. at 627. For a general
discussion see Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification,and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. Rav. 971 (1974).
10419 U.S. at 424 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' See text accompanying note 37 supra.
,2 The dissent was sharply critical of the majority's approach.
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these terms [strict
scrutiny] suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis we have applied
in this corner of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court has employed
what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test . . . . I am concerned not only
about the disposition of this case, but also about the implications of the
majority's analysis for other divorce statutes and for durational residency
requirement cases in general.
419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior to Sosna, a number of state and lower
federal courts had considered challenges to other divorce statutes with durational residency requirements. When the question was presented to the Alaska Supreme Court, it
held all residency requirements to be prima facie invalid as infringing on the fundamental
constitutional right of travel. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alas. 1974). For commentary
see McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or
"Newcomers" as a Suspect Class, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1014-16 (1975); Comment, Sosna
v. Iowa: A New Equal ProtectionApproach to DurationalResidency Requirements?, 22
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1313 (1975).
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43 the Court applied
Basin Water Storage District,
minimum scrutiny to uphold a voting system which restricted the right to vote
in water district elections to resident landowners." Four years
earlier, in Kramer v. Union Free School District," the Warren
Court had applied strict scrutiny to a plan which deprived nonproperty owners and those who were not parents or guardians of
public school children from voting on school district affairs. Because the right to vote is preservative of other rights, Kramer
held, exclusions from the franchise must serve a compelling state
interest. Salyer avoids this rule by creating a special purpose
district exception. When this exception applies, the limitation on
the franchise need only satisfy minimum scrutiny.
The grounds by which the Court in Salyer distinguished
Kramer's requirement for strict scrutiny are not sound. Justice
Rehnquist said that the water district in Salyer was so specialized
that it affected only the interests of a few people within its geographical boundaries. Moreover, the district's purposes were limited to flood control and irrigation, and the economic burdens of
the district did not fall on all district residents. He also noted that
the district did not have general governmental powers. Because
of these considerations, he found that the restrictions on the right
to vote were "rationally based."" But, why he applied minimum
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is not satisfactorily explained.
The differences in the types of districts at issue in Salyer and
Kramer, the fact the Court relied upon in justifying different
standards, are insignificant in constitutional terms-a fact the
Court made abundantly clear in another of its decisions,
Rodriguez. In the latter case, the Court held education was not a
constitutionally protected interest and did not require anything
more than minimum scrutiny. The different standards of review
in Salyer and Kramer thus cannot be justified on the ground that
the educational interest involved in Kramer is entitled to
special protection. Stripped of collateral issues, the constitutionally significant interest in both Salyer and Kramer is the right
,3410 U.S. 719 (1973). Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973), was a companion case.
" Among those excluded from the franchise were resident lessees of farmland and all
landowners who were not farmers.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
410 U.S. at 734-35.
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to vote. There is no constitutional basis for protecting the right
to vote in one kind of district more than in another. In the absence
of a constitutional basis for applying different standards, the different results in Salyer and Kramer can only be explained as a
conscious decision to ignore precedent. Ironically, it is this same
ad hoc approach to determining the appropriate level of review
which the Burger Court majority denounced in Rodriguez.47
Both Sosna and Salyer reflect disturbing trends. Each case
concerned fundamental constitutional rights, recognized as such
in Rodriguez. Precedent called for the application of strict scrutiny. Yet, in neither case did the majority articulate sound reasons for ignoring precedent. This approach to constitutional adjudication is unprincipled and likely to cause unnecessary uncertainty in future cases. 8 Moreover. at a time when members of the
,1 Justice Rehnquist's opinion stresses the "special district" aspect of a flood control
and irrigation project. Two calamities in the western United States during 1976 involving
flood control projects illustrate the interests of all residents in the affairs of such "special
districts." The collapse of the Teton Dam in Idaho destroyed millions of dollars of property, farmland and non-farmland, in the flood plain below the dam. In Colorado, a flash
flood in Big Thompson Canyon took over 100 lives and destroyed millions of dollars of
property. Residents of these and similar districts can be expected to be less than enamored
by proposals which restrict the franchise that determines the development of similar
enterprises. Justice Rehnquist's minimum scrutiny standard would sacrifice these concerns too readily. It is precisely this danger that the Court sought to avoid by its holding
in Kramer, a danger which has been let in the back door by Salyer's "special district"
exception. The Salyer decision is to be admired neither for its specific holding nor for its
unarticulated grounds for refusing to apply strict scrutiny to legislation which disenfranchises affected citizens.
11 The remarks of Professor Wechsler speak well to this problem, although made in
the context of the shared powers of the three coordinate branches of government:
The Courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before
them to review the actions of other branches in the light of constitutional
provisions, even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing so, however, they are bound to function otherwise than
as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for facing
how determinations of this kind can be asserted to have any legal quality.
The answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are-or are obliged to
be-entirely principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind,
is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959).
Neither Sosna nor Salyer meets this standard. Another commentator put it this way:
"According to common understanding, the general rule is that an appellate court is
obliged to follow, or else somehow distinguish, its own earlier decisions, or at the least
those elements of the case known as the ratio decidendi. " Wise, The Doctrine of Store
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Court have expressed concern over the Court's growing docket,
this approach to decisionmaking can only encourage more appeals in areas of law that heretofore appeared settled.

II.

ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL Two-TIER ANALYSIS

The Burger Court's rejection of a rigid, two-tier equal protection analysis has been most evident in those cases where strict
scrutiny has not been applied. For a time the Court experimented
with the conclusive presumption doctrine of due process. Apparently, because this doctrine became little more than a surrogate
for strict scrutiny and threatened to invalidate just about any law
to which it was applied, this experiment seems to have been
abandoned. Meanwhile, the Court has used minimum scrutiny
with a vigor which, at times, clearly exceeds its deferential reputation. The problem lies in understanding what gives rise to the
Court's varying degrees of analysis.
A.

Conclusive Presumptions

An irrebuttable presumption exists if proof of one fact is
conclusive evidence of the existence of a second fact. Constitutionally, the doctrine has its roots in the due process clause.
Except for the Burger Court's brief fling in the area, the conclusive presumption doctrine has had an obscure career.4"
Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1043, 1045 (1975). It is true, of course, that constitutional
holdings are more open to reexamination than those based on nonconstitutional issues.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957). Nonetheless, in Sosna
and Salyer we find Justice Rehnquist engaging in the kind of decisionmaking by "brute
force" to which he objected in Weber. 406 U.S. at 177. See also Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1976).
,1 The oldest and "best" known of the first generation of conclusive presumption
cases is Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). That case held unconstitutional a
statute which made any gift within six years of death taxable as though it had been made
in anticipation of death. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), struck down a similar
statute as applied to a young man who had made a gift and was then struck dead by a
bolt of lightning. Among other conclusive presumption cases are: Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring); United States
v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), struck down a portion of the Texas Constitution, relying
on equal protection instead of the conclusive presumption doctrine. Texas denied members of the armed forces the right to vote in Texas as long as they were in the military, if
they had not been Texas residents before joining the military. The more recent conclusive
presumption, due process cases can be, and probably should have been, analyzed in terms
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Stanley v. Illinois ° is the first of the truly important conclusive presumption cases decided by the Burger Court.' The Illinois
statute in question made an unwed father unfit to retain the
custody of his children after the death of the mother. Although
he might be able to regain custody of his children as their guardian or by adoption, legally he was a stranger to them. No evidence
was admissible to prove fitness to retain custody. Justice White's
majority opinion, which alternated between equal protection and
due process analyses, held that this administrative shortcut to
determining parental unfitness deprived both the father and his
children of due process. 5 Chief Justice Burger would have
reached an opposite result because he could find the word
"presumption" nowhere in the statute. 3
With Vlandis v. Kline" this new doctrine began to take
of equal protection. See Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or
Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
o 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of Putative Father's ConstitutionalRights, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1581 (1972).
, Stanley was preceded by Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). No one dissented from
Bell, but Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun concurred in the result.
Bell invalidated a portion of the Georgia motor vehicle responsibility statute which automatically suspended the license of an uninsured motorist who had been involved in an
accident and who was unable to or did not post a security. No hearing was held on the
question of fault before the license was suspended and any offer of evidence regarding fault
was not accepted. Thus postured, the case had heavy overtones of the procedural due
process seen in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). As eventually developed by the Burger Court, the conclusive presumption doctrine
leaned more toward substantive due process. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (1973).
5 Among the decisions subsequent to Stanley which have arrived at similar results
are Willmott v. Decker, 56 Hawaii 462, 541 P.2d 13 (1975), and Phillips v. Horlander, 535
S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1975). California has extended Stanley to uphold the right of a putative
father to prove that he is the natural father, of a child born of a woman married to another
man, in order to rebut the strong presumption that a child born to a married woman is a
legitimate child of that marriage. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr.
475 (1975). See Comment, In re Lisa R.-Limiting the Scope of the Conclusive Presumption Doctrine, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 377 (1976). New York has refused to grant the unwed
natural father a right to prevent the mother from putting the child up for adoption for
the reason that the father could use this veto power to harm both the mother and the child.
In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection-Rightsof the
Unwed Father-Consentto Adoption, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312 (1976). But see Adoption
of Walker, 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976).
53Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not
participate.
"4412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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shape. This case held unconstitutional the residencynonresidency classifications employed by many states to determine who would be required to pay higher tuition at state colleges
and universities. Connecticut classified students as state residents or as nonresidents at the time of their applications for admission. Once designated as a nonresident, students were required to pay nonresident tuition rates for as long as they attended the state institution. Justice Stewart rejected the proferred justifications of administrative convenience and fiscal conservation. Due process, he said, would not permit a permanent
classification of nonresidency when such classification
is not necessarily or universally true in fact . . . when the State has
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.
Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such
an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he
55
is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.

It was not the existence of two classifications which offended due
process but the absence of any means to rebut the classification
which imposed a heavier financial burden on those initially classified as nonresidents. While the state could maintain the basic
classifications, it had to provide some means for determining
which students had, subsequent to their admission, become bona
5
fide state residents. 6
Dissatisfaction within the Court with this mode of constitutional analysis is evident in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice White's concurrence was based on his finding that
the legislation invidiously discriminated against several classes of
bona fide state residents. He objected to the Court's use of due
process, finding it a surrogate form of analysis for a problem
rooted in equal protection. 7 Chief Justice Burger's dissent also
Id. at 452. The plaintiff in this case had married a life-long Connecticut resident,
had acquired a Connecticut driver's license and car registration, and had registered to vote

in Connecticut.
" The Court noted that it had previously upheld a Minnesota statute which allowed
students to prove they had become bona fide residents and were therefore qualified for
in-state tuition rates. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.
Minn. 1970). Presence in Minnesota for one year was required before evidence of bona fide
residency would be accepted.
11 Justice White also concluded that the Court was using a spectrum of standards in

equal protection cases rather than a two-tier model:
[lit must now be obvious, or has been all along, that, as the Court's assess-
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argued that the Court was applying equal protection and had
"sub silentio" adopted strict scrutiny without stating what constitutionally protected interest had been impinged. In addition,
he argued that the Court's reasoning threatened thousands of
statutes employing presumptions similar to the one held unconstitutional in this case. This concern was amplified in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. For him the majority opinion was a return
to substantive due process."
Disagreement over the use of the conclusive presumption
doctrine intensified in Cleveland Board of Educationv. LaFleur."
This case upheld the challenge by pregnant teachers to school
policies which compelled them to go on leave several months
before the time they were to give birth. By way of defense, the
schools argued that these arbitrary dates approximated periods
during which pregnant teachers would be incapacitated and unfit
to teach. In addition, the schools claimed that these policies facilitated classroom continuity and the school board's search for suitable replacement teachers.A0 The majority of the Court found that
ment of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less
likely it is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings
or investigations will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to
be irrational discriminations.
412 U.S. at 459.
" See note 26 supra.
5' 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Subsequent to Vlandis but prior to LaFleur,the Court decided
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Murry struck down an
amendment to the Food Stamp Act which denied benefits to any household in which there
resided another person who was ineligible for food stamps. The Court reasoned that a
presumption which conclusively made all individuals in such a household ineligible for
food stamps "is often contrary to fact," and therefore violated due process. Murry is
significant, less for this holding than because it is practically indistinguishable from a
companion case, United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), which
struck down another provision in the Food Stamp Act amendment, applying equal protection rather than due process. When read together, these cases show the conclusive presumption doctrine to be a transparent substitute for equal protection. Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1173, 1190 (1974); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Two Eligibility Criteria Created
by the 1971 Amendment to the Food Stamp Act Ruled Unjustifiably Discriminatoryand
Violative of Due Process, 78 DICK. L. REv. 788 (1974).
o At the district court level, the schools urged other reasons in support of this policy,
such as a desire to save children from seeing an obviously pregnant woman. 414 U.S. at
641 n.9. These arguments were not pursued in the Supreme Court. Although the case came
to the Court solely on constitutional grounds, the Court noted that the policies in question
presumptively violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
II, 1972), and regulations issued pursuant thereto by the Equal Employment Opportunity
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these policies impinged on liberties regarding marriage and family life, liberties within the ambit of due process. Again, with
Justice Stewart at the helm, the Court said that the presumptions of incapacity and unfitness were neither necessarily nor
universally true, and, therefore, impermissibly burdened the decision to beget children. Administrative convenience "alone"
could not justify what was otherwise a violation of due process.
The concurring and dissenting opinions clearly rejected the
conclusive presumption doctrine in theory and as applied. Justice
Powell concurred, relying on equal protection.
If the Court nevertheless uses "irrebuttable presumption" reasoning selectively, the concept at root often will be something else masquerading as a due process doctrine. That something else, of course,
is the Equal Protection Clause.8 '

It is in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, however, that the future of
this doctrine is told. He outlines two irreconcilable goals in American law and its English antecedents. At the one extreme is individualized decisionmaking in the administration of governmental
programs in order to meet the equities of each individual case. At
the other extreme is lawmaking by broad classifications, without
consideration of individual equities, which avoids decisionmaking by politically unaccountable, faceless bureaucrats capable of
imposing, even if only subjectively, their own preferences and
discriminations. More simply, the difference between individualized determinations and legislation by classification is the classic
conflict between the rule of individuals and the rule of law. Justice Rehnquist finds in the conclusive presumption doctrine an
attack on the essence of lawmaking itself. Legislating, by definition, involves drawing lines between those who shall be included
and those who shall be excluded from a governmental program.
To deny this power to legislatures is a return to the era of substantive due process.2 Moreover, the idea of individually tailored governmental decisions is a Trojan horse. Hidden within are millions
Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975).
414 U.S. at 638-40 n.8. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that the EEOC regulation referred to in LaFleur and Geduldig, in so far as it
applied to pregnancy disabilities, is an inaccurate construction of Title VII.
"
62

OKLA.

414 U.S. at 652.
Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions And/Or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27

L. REv. 151, 160-61 (1974).
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of bureaucrats. Given the choice between demanding that legislatures draft laws discretely and requiring that governmental decisions be determined on the facts of each case, Justice Rehnquist's
3
arguments carry the day.
In addition to this doctrinal debate, the conclusive presumption doctrine posed two other problems. First, what degree of
scrutiny is appropriate in cases applying this doctrine? Second,
when should this doctrine, rather than equal protection, be
applied?
Notable for its absence in Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleur is
any discussion of the degree of scrutiny required by the conclusive
presumption doctrine. While two-tier analysis is commonly associated with equal protection, this form of analysis has a due process analogue. 4 To members of the Court65 and commentators6
alike, irrebuttable presumption analysis looked suspiciously like
strict scrutiny in disguise. Indeed, in the principal cases in which
the doctrine evolved, the objectives of administrative convenience and budgetary conservation were quickly dismissed as totally inadequate justifications. 7
Faced with the emergence of a new due process doctrine,
which seemed to apply strict scrutiny, and always keeping in
mind the limitation placed on strict scrutiny in the equal protection context by Rodriguez, lower courts 8 and commentators9
13 Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 217, 229-30 (1975).
11E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See generally McCoy, Recent Equal
ProtectionDecisions-FundamentalRight to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?,
28 VANo. L. REv. 987, 988-95 (1975).
11 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 460.
9, Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classificationsin Social Legislation:
Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1, 25; Note, IrrebuttablePresumptions as
an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173 (1974);
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1534, 1534-36 (1974).
11For further discussions of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine see Bezanson,
Some Thoughts on the Emerging IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine, 7 INo. L. REv. 644
(1974); Chase, The PrematureDemise of Irrebuttable Presumptions,47 U. CoLO. L. REv.
653 (1976); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449
(1975); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-The Conclusive PresumptionDoctrine, 54 N.C.L.
REv. 460 (1976).
" Totally bedeviled, some lower courts took up the practice of basing their holdings
on alternative constitutional grounds, equal protection and conclusive presumptions, thus
proving again that the conclusive presumption doctrine is in reality little more than a
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searched for the alchemic secret which seemed to turn an otherwise pedestrian case of equal protection minimum scrutiny into
one of conclusive presumptions. Proof that conclusive presumption analysis would not reveal a principled ground of difference
from equal protection analysis came in two cases striking down
amendments to the Food Stamp Act.7" The amendments were
aimed at eliminating abuses in the Food Stamp program, but
Congress sought to achieve this objective by means which were
more clearly aimed at harming politically unpopular
groups-college students and "hippies." Factually, the problems
presented by the challenges to these amendments were nearly
identical. In one case, Congress sought to deny food stamps to any
household which contained a person over 18 years of age who had
been claimed as a federal income tax dependent by a person
ineligible for food stamps in the two previous years. The statute
was aimed at college children of wealthy parents. The scheme,
however, excluded many who were otherwise eligible for food
stamps and who were disqualified only because they lived in the
same household with someone who had been claimed as a tax
dependent. In the second case, Congress had sought to exclude
from the program any person who lived in a household containing
one or more unrelated persons. This scheme was aimed at
"hippies" but included many more. In the first case, the Court
struck down the legislation as an impermissible conclusive presumption while in the second case, decided on the basis of equal
protection, the Court held that a Congressional desire to harm a
discrete group was wholly irrational. In both cases the amendments were held to be overinclusive of those who were denied
benefits in light of the abuses which Congress sought to eradicate.
surrogate for equal protection. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 96 S. Ct. 1752 (1976); Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167
(S. & E.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 421
U.S. 338 (1975).
11 "Since the weapon of irrebuttable presumption analysis is always available and is
inevitably lethal if applied to the full extent of its rhetoric, the question becomes one of
deterniining when and for what generally inarticulated reasons the Court will trot it out."
Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1, 25 (1975).
"' United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (conclusive presumption) and United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (equal
protection). For commentary see authorities cited in note 59 supra.
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Yet the two cases were decided on different constitutional
grounds. Search as one will, there is no reason to be found why
two identical problems should be decided on different constitutional grounds, unless the two forms of analysis are really the
same.
Thus, by the time of LaFleur, three fundamental problems
inhered in the conclusive presumption doctrine: Doctrinal disagreement over its legitimacy; uncertainty over the degree of scrutiny it required; and, difficulty in discerning when it, rather than
equal protection, should be applied. By 1975 a majority of the
Court was prepared to lay to rest this constitutional Dr. JekyllMr. Hyde routine, and in Weinberger v. Salfi,7' the Court, per
Justice Rehnquist, set out to limit the doctrine.7 2 In Weinberger,
the district court had ruled that a Social Security program which
provided benefits only to widows who had been married to the
deceased insured for more than nine months was unconstitutional
as creating a conclusive presumption that all marriages of shorter
duration had been fraudulently entered into for the purpose of
obtaining Social Security benefits. In reversing that decision, the
Supreme Court effectively dealt with the three problems inherent
in conclusive presumptions. First, the Court dealt with the legitimacy of the doctrine by holding it was to have no wider scope
than the holdings of prior cases in which it had been applied.
We think the District Court's extension of the holdings of
Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleurto the eligibility requirement in issue
here would turn the doctrine of these cases into a virtual engine of
destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.73
71 422 U.S. 749 (1975), limited in sex discrimination cases by Califano v. Goldfarb,
45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1977). See note 139 infra.

72 Interestingly, Justice Stewart joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. It may be that
Justice Stewart, the author of the Court's opinions in Vlandis and LaFleurand the Justice
who seemed the strongest advocate of the new doctrine, has been convinced by the dissents
of prior cases.
11 422 U.S. at 772. It should be observed that prior cases were limited to their facts
but not overruled. They can, therefore, be relied upon in cases dealing with forms of
discrimination falling within their holdings. LaFleur was cited, subsequent to Salfi, as
authority in Turner v. Department of Employment Security & Bd. of Review, 423 U.S.
44 (1975). Turner overturned a Utah unemployment compensation statute which made
women ineligible for benefits over an 18-week period covering the 12 weeks prior to the
expected birth and for 6 weeks thereafter. Accord, Sylvara v. Industrial Comm'n, 550 P.2d
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Second, having limited the doctrine's scope, Justice Rehnquist
went on to announce what level of scrutiny would be applied to
these cases in the future. Henceforth , due process would be violated "'only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.' "" Individualized determinations are no longer necessary "when Congress can
rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties of
individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments
. . . they might be expected to produce."75 Third, having defined
the appropriate degree of review as minimum scrutiny, the Court
makes it unnecessary to determine when this doctrine, rather
than equal protection, should be applied, as both doctrines apply
the same degree of review and should produce identical results."
Any doubts that the Court had, for all practical purposes,
buried conclusive presumptions were put to rest during the
Court's 1975 Term. The Court ignored a perfect invitation to
apply this doctrine in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,"7 passing the opportunity by in favor of equal protection.
At issue was the forced retirement of a police officer who had
passed a rigorous physical only four months earlier." The retirement schedule was justified by the need for assuring public protection through the "physical preparedness of . . . uniformed
officers." However, since the officer had recently been found
physically fit, the statutory presumption of unfitness at age 50
was obviously not universally true. The case was an appealing one
for the application of the conclusive presumption doctrine, since
the state already had a routine physical examination program as
a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the critical fact
868 (Colo. 1976) (Sylvara is a rare example of a state's attorney general confessing error
on appeal and urging the state supreme court to rule a statute unconstitutional).
7, 422 U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). Federal
district court judges have found this statement a thinly veiled adoption of the "rational
basis" approach to equal protection. Alcala v. Bums, 410 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (S.D. Iowa
1976), on remand from 420 U.S. 575 (1975); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982,
989-93 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
11422 U.S. at 785.
1 Rebuttable presumptions do not raise constitutional problems unless the presumption itself is arbitrary. Lavine v. Milne, 96 S. Ct. 1010 (1976).
77 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
11Up to age 40 officers were examined every two years. Between 40 and 50, the officers
had to pass an even more rigorous physical every year.
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of fitness. The Court was careful to emphasize its respect for older
persons and the importance of employment.79 Nonetheless, applying equal protection, the Court upheld the statute. 0 Although
clearly applicable, at least in its pre-Salfi formulation, the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine was not even mentioned.
In another decision, Mathews v. Lucas,"' the Court sustained
a Social Security survivors' benefit scheme which disqualified
illegitimates if they could not show that the insured natural parent was living with or supporting them at the time of that parent's death. Legitimate children did not need to prove either fact.
Even though the program was overinclusive of those illegitimates
who were not dependent in fact, the Court upheld the classification on the ground of administrative convenience," clearly identifying the "applicable level of scrutiny" 3 as minimum scrutiny. 4
The Court's experiment with the conclusive presumption
doctrine was short lived. It was obvious almost from the beginning that the doctrine was a substitute for equal protection. In
its dissatisfaction with equal protection, the Court seemed to be
looking for an alternative ground of decision. As an alternative
ground, the conclusive presumption doctrine seemed promising.
In time, this new doctrine became more rigid than the doctrine
79 Comparing this case with LaFleur it isobvious that classifications based on sex are
especially disfavored by the Court. In LaFleur,the interference with employment was only
temporary. In Murgia, employment was permanently terminated. Although the impact
of the sex-based discrimination in LaFleurwas not as severe as the age-based discrimination in Murgia, the Court found an equal protection violation only in the case of sex
discrimination.
In dissent, Justice Marshall urged that the Court should have applied a slidingscale equal protection analysis rather than a two-tier analysis. He did not advocate conclusive presumption analysis. 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568.
"
96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
Z Prior to Salfi, administrative convenience was an especially unpopular justification
in conclusive presumption cases.
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnote omitted). In LaFleur the Court
added, "[Aidministrative convenience alone is insufficient to make valid what otherwise
is a violation of due process." 414 U.S. at 647.
96 S. Ct. at 2764, citing Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
" The dissenters would have sustained the attack on this legislation, relying on Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), which was decided on equal protection grounds.
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it was intended to supplement, and the Court decided to abandon
this new doctrine before it could gain wide application. Practically, as an evolving doctrine of constitutional law, the conclusive
presumption doctrine does not appear to have a future."5
B.

Minimum Scrutiny

While strict scrutiny has hardly been a paragon of stability,
and conclusive presumptions for a time engendered confusion,
they pale before the fate of "traditional," deferential, minimum
scrutiny in the Burger Court. Today, minimum scrutiny could be
likened to a patient who has undergone plastic surgery. Whether
the changes which have been wrought are merely cosmetic or are
more substantial is a question to which there may not yet be a
certain answer.
1. Economic Regulation
Most traditional discussions of minimum scrutiny somewhere make the observation that with one exception, Morey v.
Doud,86 the Warren Court never used this level of scrutiny to
invalidate legislation. Morey invalidated an Illinois statute regulating money orders which gave preferential treatment to American Express because of that corporation's acknowledged fiscal
integrity. Late in the 1975 Term, Morey was overruled in City of
New Orleans v. Dukes. 7 In the area of economic regulation,
Dukes held, only "invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary
act" will violate equal protection. The Court's language implies
that an especially wide berth will be afforded legislation regulating economics, apparently wider than will be allowed in matters
of social legislation. 9
In overruling Morey, the Court adopted the views set forth
in the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter in
Morey. In both Morey and Dukes the constitutional challenge
focused on legislative classifications which were reasonably based
See note 73 supra.
354 U.S. 457 (1957). But see Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
97 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976).
Id. at 2517, citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), which upheld a statute
limiting the practice of debt adjustment to attorneys. Dukes involved a city ordinance
limiting the number of pushcart vendors who could operate in an area of New Orleans to
those who had been so engaged for a specified number of years.
11 E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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on present facts and the legislative failure to provide for classification modifications in the event those facts changed in the future so as to make the present classification unreasonable. In
Morey the majority seized upon this legislative failure to provide
for modifications in the event of future changes as the ground for
holding the legislation was arbitrary. Justice Frankfurter objected to this speculative ground for ruling that the statute violated equal protection. Should that contingency ever arise, he
argued, there would be time enough to strike down the legislation.
Many times before, he urged, the Court had at one time found a
statute constitutional only to reach a different result when presented with changed circumstances. 0 As indicated by its adoption of this dissent in Dukes, the Court will, in future economic
regulation cases, look to the actual effects of legislation in determining its constitutionality, rather than speculating on abstractions and possibilities."
While prior decisions had indicated that the Court would not
strike down economic legislation unless it was "wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective," 9 there is a strong
suggestion in Dukes that in this area there will be an even more
deferential approach than is typical of low-tier scrutiny. 3 Two
implications suggest themselves from this case. First, if the
Burger Court adheres to the rhetoric of two-tier equal protection
1' 354

U.S. at 474.

91Justice Marshall did not join the Court's opinion in Dukes, but concurred in the
judgment without opinion. This is interesting because he has elsewhere indicated a strong
preference for upholding legislative judgments in the area of economic regulation.
I find it hard to understand why a statute which sends a man to prison and
deprives him of the opportunity even to be considered for treatment for his
disease of narcotics addiction, while providing treatment and suspension of
prison sentence to others similarly situated, should be treated under the
same minimal standards of rationality we apply to statutes regulating who
can sell eyeglasses or who can own pharmacies. This case does not involve
discrimination against business interests more than powerful enough to protect themselves in the legislative halls . ...
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's unwillingness to go along with a hard-and-fast rule in
this area may be understandable in view of his opposition to any form of rigid analysis
and his preference for a sliding-scale approach. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
92 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
" See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
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in its traditional formulation, then social legislation may also
come under this new, lowered level of scrutiny. Although there
may be spill-over to this effect, especially in cases where it is
difficult to determine whether the legislation is economic or social
in nature, this possibility does not seem to be what the Court had
in mind. A second interpretation might be that the Court has
abandoned or is setting the stage for an abandonment of two-tier
analysis. At the one extreme the Court could retain strict scrutiny
for suspect classifications and fundamental, constitutional interests. At the other extreme it would apply a highly deferential
minimum scrutiny in the field of economic regulation. Of course,
that leaves social legislation in the middle-but just where cannot be said. It may be that social legislation will still be reviewed
on the reasonable basis test of Dandridge v. Williams.94 Justice
Stewart's opinion in that case, however, begins with the premise
that there is no reason for judging social and economic legislation
by different standards under the equal protection clause." That
argument has been undercut by Dukes. In any case, the logic of
Justice Stewart's argument rings hollow, as the fourteenth
amendment was adopted in response to interferences with the
exercise of social rights. Business advocates obtained the benefits
of this amendment only by way of judicial afterthought. Regardless, government in a republic has as its raison d'etre the service
of its natural citizens, economics being only subsidiary means to
that end. Every reason exists, therefore, for subjecting social legislation to more exacting scrutiny than economic regulation. The
Court's decision in Dukes may pave the way for articulation of
an intensified standard of scrutiny in the area of social legislation.
While the Court seems to have in fact adopted such an approach
in some cases,9" it has done so while adhering to the rhetoric of a
rigid two-tier equal protection. The decision in Dukes makes it
easier, should the Court wish to seize the opportunity, to articulate or formalize a standard for reviewing social legislation which
conforms to what the Court has done in practice. Four of the
7 a 1976
concurring and dissenting opinions in Craig v. Boren,"
Id. at 487.
, Id. at 485-86.
E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Justice Blackmun
"
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Term case involving sex discrimination, state that the thrust of
the majority's opinion is the establishment of a "middle-tier"
analysis for gender-based discrimination. It is of course entirely
possible, if not more likely, that Dukes represents a narrow exception to what will otherwise remain a two-tier form of equal protection." Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing.
2.
Scale

Gunther's Means-Oriented Test and Marshall's Sliding

Two models of a "newer" equal protection have emerged.
Professor Gunther's review of the 1971 Term led him to conclude
the Court had adopted a "means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of decision."" He described the model as being
interventionist without applying strict scrutiny. 00 He predicted
that the Court would examine the means chosen to further a
particular legislative purpose, forsaking a review of legislative
purpose, the latter inquiry being too close to substantive due
process.'"' With respect to the intensity of review, the model
"would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends."'' 0 The
found a state statute setting different ages of majority for men and women unconstitutional "under any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between." Id. at 17. See also Note, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model, 24
CATH. U.L. REv. 558, 559 n.10 (1975).
" For other developments in corporate equal protection see Blackmun, The Implications of Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.: Weakening or Eliminating Equal
Protection for Corporations as a Class, 16 ARIz. L. REv. 41 (1974).
Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
" Id. at 18-20, 33-37.
,' Id. at 21, 26-30. The model has been betrayed in at least one decision. In United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court held that a congressional desire to harm "hippies" as a group could not be a permissible purpose under the
equal protection requirement of the fifth amendment's due process clause. For commentary on this aspect of Gunther's model see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications,62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1071-72 (1974); Note, The Mandate for a New Equal
Protection Model, 24 CATm. U.L. REv. 558, 561-63 (1975); Comment, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno-The "Red Herring" of Social Welfare, 23 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1485 (1974).
02 Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it
would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on
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sliding-scale approach which Justice Marshall has advocated is
the second model for a "newer" equal protection." 3 This model
would focus "upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and
the state interests asserted in support of the classification."' 4 The
more invidious the classification, the more important the interest
affected, and the less important the governmental interest, the
more rigorous should be the Court's analysis.'
The Supreme Court has never formally adopted either
model. Indeed, the Court has never brought these two theories
together in a head-to-head clash, but the Second Circuit did in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.0 In examining an exclusionary
the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to
rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Id. at 21. See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
I'll Justice Marshall's most recent exposition of this model came in his dissent in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568 (1976). His most elaborate statement of this model was in dissent in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973). From time to time other Justices have flirted with the
idea of a sliding scale. Justice Powell articulated a sliding scale in Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 409 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972). Such an approach was noticeably absent in his
more elaborate opinion for the Court in Rodriguez. However, Justice Blackmun adopted
the sliding scale proposed by Justice Poweil in Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2761
(1976). Justice Blackmun may have also been alluding to a sliding scale in Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975). In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973), Justice
White proclaimed that the Court has all along used a spectrum of standards in equal
protection. Finally, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,
464-65 (1976), implicitly seems to adopt a sliding-scale method of analysis. Although his
opinion specifically rejects two-tier and three-tier analysis, and conversely, specifically
adopts a single standard, that single standard is strongly suggestive of a sliding scale.
'"I Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2569. Other cases in
which Justice Marshall has articulated this approach are: City of Charlotte v. Local 660,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 96 S. Ct. 2036 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
1'0This is really little more than a sophisticated balancing test. Note, The Mandate
for a New Equal Protection Model, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 558, 585-87 (1975).
'o 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). For an excellent discussion
of the conflicting majority and dissenting opinions in the court of appeals, see Note,
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 508
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zoning ordinance Judges Mansfield and Oakes applied "a flexible
and equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given
to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it."' ' The intensity of review
under this test would depend on the relative value of the rights
affected.10 To pass muster, the majority judges in Boraas observed, legislative classifications must "in fact" have a substantial relationship to a legitimate purpose. 0 The dissenting judge,
Timbers, declined the invitation to apply this test. Although he
admitted that Supreme Court decisions indicated a departure
from traditional two-tier analysis, he did not feel the Court had
gone so far as to adopt the sliding-scale approach. He applied
Gunther's model, but he did so less by way of conviction than by
way of argument."10 In four sentences, however, he was able to
capture the nature of the conflict between these two models.
A "sliding scale" approach may be appropriate in some contexts,
but it seems to me inappropriate here. A court should not be required to attempt the impossible task of first assessing the precise
value of the right or interest and then increasing or decreasing the
intensity of its scrutiny accordingly. This approach would confer
upon a judge wide discretion to overturn state and local legislation
based largely on his own estimate of the value of competing interests-a highly abstract and individualistic determination.
The recent Supreme Court decisions, in my view, require a
judge to make only the narrow value judgments needed in evaluating means."'
(1974). The sliding scale was also applied by Justice Roberts in dissent in Mcllvaine v.
Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
Note, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.

REv. 748, 749-52 (1975).
"7 476 F.2d at 814. Compare Justice Marshall's model in text accompanying note 104
supra.
'

476 F.2d at 821 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 815 n.8.

"' Id. at 822. Judge Timbers was unconvinced that Supreme Court cases relied upon
by the majority judges offered sound bases for formulating a general invigorated theory
of minimum scrutiny. For example, he found Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), to reflect
"an unexpressed special suspicion of sex classifications." 476 F.2d at 820. He also argued
that Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), was so closely related to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as to justify intense scrutiny on that basis alone. 476 F.2d

at 820-21.
"1 476 F.2d at 821 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Judge Timbers indicated the

Supreme Court may have adopted this "means-focused test" as a "technique to avoid the
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What Timbers was rebelling against here is the same thing that
bothered the Supreme Court in Rodriguez. The sliding scale does
not articulate fixed standards for determining which interests
and classifications should weigh more heavily than others-the
critical element in deciding what degrees of scrutiny to apply. In
this respect the sliding scale is a near mirror-image of the Warren
Court's ill-defined process for identifying suspect classifications
and fundamental constitutional interests-an approach the Supreme Court rather resoundingly rejected in Rodriguez."2 But to
this objection, Justice Marshall gave an answer of sorts in
Rodriguez, and whether or not he had in mind Judge Timbers'
objections, his answer is at least responsive to the question Judge
Timbers raised.
The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests that the
process of determining which interests are fundamental is a difficult
one. But I do not think the problem is insurmountable. And I certainly do not accept the view that the process need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective "picking-and-choosing"
between various interests or that it must involve this Court in creating "substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws,"

. . .

. Although not all fundamental

interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of
which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text
of the Constitution. The task in every case should be to determine
the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when
the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly. .

.

. Only if we closely protect the related interests

from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure the integrity of
the constitutional guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must
be taken from our previous decisions involving interests deemed to
be fundamental.'

However much Justice Marshall feels this gives certainty to the
process of determining the relative degree of scrutiny which
should be applied, the similarity of this approach to that of the
troublesome value judgments required to identify new and fundamental interests." Id. at
821 n.3. At the time this was written Rodriguez had not yet been decided. Id. at 827 n.1
(Timbers, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc).
"'2

"

See text accompanying notes 9-32 supra.
411 U.S. at 102-03 (footnote omitted).
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Warren Court and the strong rejection of that approach by the
Burger Court in Rodriguez would seem to destine Marshall's sliding scale to heroic dissents and oblique references in occasional,
marginally important decisions." 4
In contrast to the apparent rejection of Marshall's sliding
scale, Gunther's model has never been clearly rejected by the
Court and has been often cited. Yet, it remains in limbo. In the
first place, insofar as it predicted that the Court would look to the
means rather than the ends of legislative choices, it has not been
entirely accurate." 5 More significant, its emphasis on a meansoriented rather than "purposes" analysis has the appearance of
a semantic argument akin to the debate over whether the chicken
or the egg came first. For example, in United States Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno"6 the Court spoke of the denial of food
stamps to "hippies" as being an impermissible legislative
purpose. In that Moreno finds the purpose, rather than the
means, a violation of equal protection, it violates a cardinal principle of the Gunther model. It is, however, possible to reconcile
this case with the model, because, although the Court may have
been particularly upset with a vicious classification, it may be
argued that the classification did not rationally further the legislative goal of preventing welfare fraud. So construed, Moreno is
a "means-focused" opinion and consistent with Gunther's model.
An examination of some of the other cases on which Gunther
relies would, conversely, show that they could be construed as
inconsistent with the model. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company"7 is an example. Here the Court examined a workmen's
compensation system which disadvantaged illegitimate children
seeking recovery upon the death of the insured. The scheme was
rationalized by the state as protecting and furthering legitimate
family ties. Striking the statute down could be interpreted as
consistent with Gunther's model, since the means chosen did not
substantially further this interest. On the other hand, a close
"I A watered-down version of the sliding scale is visible in Marshall's opinion for the
Court in City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 96 S. Ct. 2036 (1976).
Arguably, this case is an example of how a balancing of the respective rights and interests
can result in a relatively less intense degree of scrutiny under the sliding-scale approach.
"'
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
Id.
"'

406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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reading of the case suggests that the Court was most offended by
the apparent statutory purpose of visiting punishment for the
parent's sins on the heads of the illegitimate children.'", Thus
construed, Weber is, like Moreno, inconsistent with the Gunther
model. Likewise, some of the Court's decisions dealing with
gender-based discriminations can be analyzed as consistent or
inconsistent with Gunther's model, depending on whether one
prefers means or purpose-focused analysis. The Court's decisions
in the area of sex would seem to be better explained, moreover,
as resulting from a rebuttable judicial presumption, that genderbased discriminations do not serve a constitutionally permissible
purpose." 9 The fact that these cases are at least as susceptible to
purpose-focused as means-focused analysis undermines the credibility of the Gunther model. It would be a mistake for litigants
who are urging that a statute be found unconstitutional to couch
their arguments solely in terms of whether the means substantially further a legitimate state purpose, and to assume that the
purpose is legitimate. Litigants should also argue, in an appropriate case, that the purpose behind the legislation, whether facially
apparent or to be inferred from a history of similar discriminations, is one that is not within the state's power to pursue. However the courts write their opinions, the legitimacy of the underlying purpose will continue to play an important role. To some this
will be a return to substantive due process, but such complaints
20
are the usual last resort of constitutional dissents.
Gunther's model also seems inadequate in describing the
degree or intensity of review which the Court would apply.
Gunther's only statement with regard to the intensity of review
under this "interventionist" model was that it would require
Accord, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In his
concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, supra, Justice Stevens found the statute which set
a higher minimum age for men than women in the purchase of 3.2 beer "a mere remnant
of the now almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this
age bracket." 97 S. Ct. at 465 (footnote omitted). See also the majority and dissenting
opinions in Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Judge Timbers said, in his dissent
in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, that the Supreme Court's opinions reflect "an unexpressed special suspicion of sex classifications." 476 F.2d at 820.
I"' Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
's

"'
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"legislative means to substantially further legislative ends."' 2 '
This tells us very little about the actual intensity of review or how
it differs from old minimum scrutiny. More significantly, to the
extent that Gunther's model predicted intensified review on a
general rather than selective basis, it is erroneous.' 22 Beyond the
areas of sex and illegitimacy, intensified scrutiny has enjoyed
little application. 23 As a caveat, intensified review in Eisenstadt
v. Baird'24 can be attributed to its resemblance to Griswold v.
Connecticut'2M and the unusual penalty, pregnancy, which the
statute would inflict for premarital and extramarital sex.' 25
,2,
Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
'2 Among the cases where intensified review is glaringly absent are: Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) (employment of "aged" persons); City
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976) (economic regulation); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (exclusionary zoning); Marshall v. United States, 414
U.S. 417 (1974) (criminal law); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (education and poverty); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (voting).
'2 See note 110 supra. Occasionally intensified scrutiny is applied in the area of
criminal law. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972). Thus, while the Court seems unwilling to follow Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), or Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in applying strict scrutiny to these
areas of criminal law, United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976) and Ross v.
Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court will reserve intensified review for the most noxious
of schemes, James v. Strange, supra, and Jackson v. Indiana, supra. In James, Kansas
had a system for recouping attorney's fees from indigent criminal defendants. In order to
facilitate collection of this debt, the state deprived the debtor of the usual exemptions
afforded to other debtors, such as the homestead exemption. The Supreme Court found
this measure deprived the indigent debtor of the equal protection of the laws afforded to
other debtors, because it deprived this narrow class of debtors of the means to keep their
families together and made it more difficult for this class of persons to get on their feet
again financially. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, is less a hallmark of intensified review than
of revulsion to a proceeding that bore not the slightest trappings of fairness, and for that
reason could have been decided on due process grounds alone. A 27-year-old, mentallydeficient, deaf-mute, who could neither read nor write and who was only able to communicate by sign-language at the level of a pre-school child, was committed to custody until
he became capable of understanding the criminal charges which were filed against him.
As his attorney pointed out, the defendant's mental condition was permanent and he
would never gain the ability to understand the charges against him so as to be able to
stand trial. In effect, the defendant had been committed to confinement for life, a term
much longer than that provided for the acts with which he was charged. In addition, it is
much more difficult to obtain the defendant's release from custody of this nature than
from civil custody which is imposed because of the defendant's inability to care for
himself. Altogether, this was too much for the Supreme Court.
MZ,405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' The reach of either Griswold or Eisenstadt as a general constitutional attack on
statutes criminalizing nonmarital sex was apparently restricted in Doe v. Common-
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Even in respect to gender-based classifications, 7 and those
relating to illegitimacy,' the Court's application of intensified
review has been erratic. Among the Court's decisions relating to
gender-based discriminations, Kahn v. Shevin 2 1 and Geduldig v.
Aiello'30 take a condescending approach rather than what might
be described as an intensified form of review. 3' Kahn upheld a
wealth's Atty., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), aff'g without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975). For a discussion of this case see Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney:
Closing the Door to a FundamentalRight of Sexual Privacy, 53 DENVER L.J. 553 (1976).
I" Among the most significant Burger Court cases considering gender-based discrimination are: Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). Weinberger, Schlesinger, and Frontiero arose under federal law and
therefore applied fifth amendment equal protection. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
I" Burger Court decisions implicating the rights of illegitimate children include:
Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971). Two decisions from the Warren Court should also be kept in mind when
considering the rights of illegitimates: Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968) and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
' 416 U.S. 351 (1974). For commentary see Erickson, Kahn, Ballard and Wiesenfeld:
A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L.
Rav. 1 (1975); Note, PreferentialEconomic Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional
and PracticalImplications of Kahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1975).
IN 417 U.S. 484 (1974). For a 1976 Term case closely following Geduldig but doing so
under Title VII see, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). For commentary
on Geduldig see Larson, Sex Discriminationas to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805;
Schair, Sex Discrimination:The Pregnancy-RelatedDisabilitiesException, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 684 (1975); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employee Benefits, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 109 (1975); Comment, PregnancyDisabilityBenefits Under State-AdministeredInsurance Programs, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 263 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definitions of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441
(1975).
'3' Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), can also be criticized for taking a
paternalistic approach to gender-based discrimination. This case upheld a mandatory
retirement program for naval officers which had the effect of forcing earlier retirement for
male officers than female officers. A majority of the Court upheld this plan as being based
on a realistic assessment that promotional opportunities were more readily available in
the Navy to men than women. Since mandatory retirement for male officers was related
to promotions, the majority felt this scheme was fair. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White dissented. Justice Brennan would have measured all gender-based discrimination by the compelling interest standard, as he regards sex as a suspect classification. He went on to say that a benign racial or gender-based classification might pass that
test, if in fact the differential treatment was both intentional and designed to achieve
equality for all groups who were not equally situated. He did not find these factors present
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tax exemption for widows, but similarly situated widowers were
not granted the exemption. Florida justifiedthe special treatment
of widows as compensating them for the extensive economic discrimination against women generally and as a method of alleviating loss of income by reason of the death of the marital party who
was more likely providing marital income. Since sex is not recognized as a suspect classification, the majority found that this
ameliorative purpose rationally justified the legislation.' 2 Brennan's dissent lashed out at this reasoning as exemplary of stereotyping which has characterized women as helpless and weak. Although he would agree that women had been discriminated
against as a class, and that legislation for the purpose of assisting
economically disadvantaged women would serve a compelling
interest, the Florida statute failed to satisfy the standard of strict
scrutiny which he believed was appropriate because it was not
narrowly drawn for the benefit of needy widows only.' 33 Statutes
such as those in Kahn, which provide a benefit to widows generally, and not merely to those who have been victims of discrimination, discriminate against widowers in violation of equal protection. In any event, the majority's position in Kahn, affording
preferential treatment to widows generally, not merely those who

are victims of discrimination, and at the same time allowing similarly situated widowers to be denied this benefit, would seem to
fall short of anything like intensified review.
The majority position in Geduldig v. Aiello is even more
irreconcilable with an intensified form of review. There, a California disability insurance program provided substitute income to
those unable to work because of a disability not covered by workmen's compensation. With some very narrow exemptions all disabilities were covered, except for pregnancy. The majority upheld
this discrimination on the transparently specious reasoning that
in Ballard and he criticized the majority for going too far in imagining justifiable purposes
which "may" underlie the congressional scheme, as the legislative history did not support
a congressional intent to benefit women naval officers as a disadvantaged class. For
commentary see Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test
in "Reverse" DiscriminationCases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rlv. 1 (1975).
,31 In reaching this holding, the Court relied upon Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
419-20 (1908) wherein it was observed that the physical condition of women justified
special protective legislation for women as a class. 416 U.S. at 356 n.10. Muller is a model
of paternalism.
"' See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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the program did not deny benefits on the basis of sex, but did
deny benefits on the basis of an "objectively identifiable physical
condition with unique characteristics."'' 4 To this the Court gratuitously added that there was no risk for which men were covered
and women were not and vice versa.' 35 Justice Brennan's dissent
again urged that classifications based on sex be subject to strict
13
scrutiny.
Gunther predicted the Court would employ a form of intensified scrutiny which would require legislative means to substantially further legislative ends. He did not suggest the Court would
apply varying degrees of review. Court decisions would indicate,
however, that it has not been applying one, intensified degree of
3 7 the Court seemed
review. In Kahn and Schlesinger v. Ballard'
134417

U.S. at 496 n.20.
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true
that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
those in Reed, supra, and Frontiero,supra...
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.
Id. at 496-97 n.20. To illustrate the hypocrisy of this crafty definition of the relevant
classes, the following hypothetical is posed. A similar insurance program includes all
disabilities except sickle cell anemia. As a practical matter, only Blacks acquire this
disease. Paraphrasing footnote 20: "The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-diseased Blacks and nondiseased persons. While the first group is exclusively
black, the second includes Blacks and non-Blacks." This logic is sophistic. The system
described is racially discriminatory. For the same reasons, the system in Geduldig discriminated on the basis of sex. For a similar critique see Justice Brennan's dissent in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 416 n.5 (1976).
'" 417 U.S. at 496-97. In the field of race, the Court has held that mere equal application of the laws is not an end to constitutional inquiry under the equal protection clause.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966).
"1 417 U.S. at 503. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusion that the
increased costs to the program for extending coverage to pregnancy disabilities could
justify this exclusion. 417 U.S. at 501 n.5. Geduldig came before the Court postured solely
on the constitutional issues. Guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in 1972 would forbid such practices under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1970). EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975). In a 1976 Term case the Supreme Court held that the Commission's regulation was an inaccurate interpretation of Title VII. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
1- 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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to apply a reduced level of intensity when reviewing legislation
which treated women more favorably than men, while it applied
a more intense review in Frontiero v. Richardson3 8 when the only
question involved was discrimination adversely affecting women.
In Craig v. Boren, a case involving discrimination against men,
Justice Brennan said that "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,"'' 9 a test which four
1- 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1'
97 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1976). In Califano v. Goldfarb, 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1977), a plurality of four Justices applied this more intense form of review in affirming a
lower court decision which found unconstitutional sex discrimination in social security
survivors benefits under the Federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-31 (1970). Under the plan, widows of insured husbands were entitled to
benefits as a matter of law on the death of the husband. Widowers of insured wives were
eligible only if they could show that at the time of the wife's death, she was providing
more than one-half of the husband's support. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion for
affirmance was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and White. Justice Stevens filed a
separate opinion for affirmance. Justice Brennan found in this program discrimination
against the women who had contributed social security taxes. Their spouses would not
receive the same protection as the spouses of male insureds, since male survivors who
could not prove dependency would not receive benefits at all, whereas survivors of male
insureds received the benefits in all cases, even if they were not in fact dependent. Relying
on Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), Justice Brennan concluded that a program which presumes all women are
dependent on their spouses is a product of traditional "role-typing" which has been found
to violate equal protection. In contrast to Justice Stevens and the dissenters, Justice
Brennan refused to analyze this scheme in terms of discrimination against the surviving
husband, which would have brought the case closer to Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). More importantly, he distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975),
which had held that social welfare programs would violate the constitution only if the
discriminations they created were 'utterly lacking in rational justification."' 422 U.S. at
768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). Where, as in Califano v.
Goldfarb, the discrimination is based on gender-based classifications, Craig v. Boren
requires the classification to satisfy the more rigorous intermediate standard: It must serve
"important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." 97 S. Ct. at 457.
Justice Stevens agreed with the four dissenters that the program should be measured
against the justification of administrative convenience espoused in Mathews v. Lucas, 96
S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Alternatively, he would have upheld the program had it been motivated
by a congressional desire to cushion the widow's loss of the income-producing spouse, as
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Unlike the dissenters, however, Justice Stevens
found that this scheme satisfied neither of these justifications. In so doing, he relied on
data in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion which showed that about 10% of all widows
were not in fact dependent. Payments to nondependent widows thus cost the government
approximately $1 billion dollars annually. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4243 n.5. Considering the rather
staggering costs imposed for the purpose of "administrative convenience," Justice Stevens
could not accept this as justifying the different treatment of widows and widowers. Since
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other Justices found to be the equivalent of "middle-tier"
analysis. But then, in Geduldig, the Court seemed to have retreated all the way back to traditional, deferential minimum
scrutiny. In this setting it would be unrealistic to argue that the
Court has applied one degree of intensified review in cases dealing
with sex. Indeed, the levels of review in this area seem paternalistic, depending on what the Justices believe is best on a case-bycase approach.'4

Thus, Professor Gunther's model, while it has never been
repudiated by the Supreme Court, fails to explain the Court's
modes of analysis. Rather than one intensified level of review,
there seem to be many. Economic regulation, receiving the least
scrutiny, is the bottom line. Strict scrutiny is the upper limit. In
between there are varying degrees of review. Decisions in the area
of sex have not been favored with a consistent intermediate intensity of review, and the same is true of decisions affecting illegitimates.'4 '
Oddly enough, just where Gunther's model fails, Marshall's
sliding scale seems to succeed, though maybe not as he would
wish. Insofar as the Court's scrutiny bears the marks of consistency at all, it seems to depend on the majority's view of the
nature of the classification,4 2 the importance of the interest afthere was no evidence that Congress had in fact intended this differential treatment to
compensate widows as the victims of historic sex discrimination, he was also unwilling to
uphold discrimination against widowers on the bald assertion that it was so intended by
Congress.
"I Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in
"Reverse" Sex DiscriminationCases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 53 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 456-62 (1975). The Court's attitude can best be summarized in the
words of one of its members, Justice Stewart: "[Tihe female of the species has the best
of both worlds. She can attack laws that unreasonably discriminate against her while
preserving those that favor her." HARv. L. SCH. Rac. 15 (March 23, 1973), quoted in
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution,44 U. CiN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1975). The inferior legal
and economic status of women is the product of this chivalrous mode of thought. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (plurality opinion).
"I Compare Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) with Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974). Compare Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) with
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
,2 Classifications relating to sex have been regarded more suspiciously than any other
classification excepting those actually ranked as suspect classifications. E.g., Craig v.
Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Illegitimacy is regarded
less suspiciously than sex. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Almost every other
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fected, 43 and the importance of the governmental interest promoted by the legislative program."' The difference between Justice Marshall's sliding scale and that of other Justices who apply
it or recognize it' is probably less in the mechanics of the-test
than it is in the more subjective evaluation of what importance
should be attached to the various elements that are weighed in
the balance. While Justice Marshall has articulated a "nexus
classification is given even less scrutiny than sex and illegitimacy: E.g., age, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); poverty, San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
1,3The only interests which have consistently demanded much in the way of intensified review are those relating to the conduct of family life and the decision of whether or
not to beget children. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). Other traditionally important interests, such as employment,
education, housing, and welfare, have not seemed to merit the Court's intensified review.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
"I Administrative convenience and fiscal conservation are the two governmental interests most frequently advanced. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The number and variety of governmental interests that can
be advanced is as endless as the advocate's imagination.
"' Justice Blackmun, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975), Justice Powell,
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972), and Justice White, Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (concurring opinion), have variously advocated or
recognized a sliding-scale approach to equal protection. Justice Stevens may have done
so inferentially in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Burger criticized this approach in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 461 (1973)
(dissenting opinion), as did Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 59.
At least three members of the Court, the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, have clung to the view that the only legislation which will violate equal protection is that which is totally lacking in rationality, in the spirit of McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The
Chief Justice expressed his preference for this standard in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,
467 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stewart concurred in Rodriguez because the
legislative scheme was not wholly arbitrary and capricious, although he would admit that
it was "chaotic and unjust." 411 U.S. at 59. Justice Rehnquist has carried this absurd
standard one step further. He has said that equal protection "requires neither that state
enactments be 'logical' nor does it require that they be 'just' in the common meaning of
those terms. It requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts that may justify
the classification involved." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 183 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). At least in application, if not in articulation, Justice Stewart's threshold
for an equal protection violation measured by what is "totally irrational" is lower than
that of the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Compare the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart with the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist in
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). Justice Powell rejected that standard for measuring
an equal protection violation, condemning the discrimination against illegitimates in
Weber as "illogical and unjust." 406 U.S. at 175.
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theory" for weighing these interests,'4 6 that theory was rejected by
the majority in Rodriguez. But the "nexus theory" may have been
rejected by the majority in Rodriguez less because of the theory
per se, than because of Marshall's interpretation of it. Marshall
is, of course, associated with that wing of the Court which has
emphasized the importance of individual liberties and civil rights
in the constitutional setting. By contrast, the majority Justices
in Rodriguez have leaned in the other direction, strengthening
governmental powers. The "nexus theory" to which the
Rodriguez majority objected was one which valued highly the
rights of citizens generally. This majority has, nonetheless, applied a "nexus theory" of its own, more selective and narrow, and
possibly more subjective than Marshall's. Justice Marshall's
standard for intensifying review would depend upon the connexity between the right denied and rights enshrined in the Constitution. By contrast, the Burger Court has intensified review in only
a few areas, and then inconsistently. It seems evident, however,
that the degree of review is a function of which interests are
deemed more important and which classifications are suspicious,
if not suspect, in the minds of a majority of the Burger Court.
CONCLUSION

In 1968 Richard Nixon promised to appoint more conservative Justices to the Supreme Court. His four appointees have
combined to form the core of the present conservative majority.
This majority's reaction against the broader implications of the
''new" equal protection is reflected in its reformulation of equal
protection analysis.
The most dramatic change has occurred in the area of strict
scrutiny. Although strict scrutiny is of relatively recent vintage,
the new majority was unable or unwilling to throw it out completely. Instead, by narrowly reading precedent, the Court limited the range of cases to which it would apply the compelling
interest standard. Willing to make hard-nosed distinctions from
some of the Warren Court's less tightly reasoned opinions, this
new majority was able to restrict strict scrutiny without actually
overruling prior decisions.
Seemingly at the expense of strict scrutiny, traditional or
-,See text accompanying notes 28-32, 113 supra.
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minimal scrutiny found itself armed with new strength, sometimes. While the Court has attempted to clothe its restriction of
strict scrutiny with the appearance of objectivity, developments
with respect to minimum scrutiny have been highly subjective
and selective. For the most part, the invigorated and varying
degrees of review have been carried out under the guise of a single
standard-the traditional, deferential rational basis test. It is
clear, however, that the traditional rational basis test has not
always been applied. Depending upon the classification or interests involved, the Court may apply more stringent levels of review, very much in the nature of Justice Marshall's sliding scale.
The principal differences between Justice Marshall and the majority on this point are two. First, Justice Marshall weighs more
heavily civil rights and civil liberties than does the Burger Court
majority, which more frequently gives great weight to the interests of the government. Second, Justice Marshall admits that he
applies a sliding scale.
From the model bequeathed to it by the Warren Court, the
Burger Court has fashioned an equal protection more to its liking
and manipulation. On the one hand, it has narrowly interpreted
precedent in the area of strict scrutiny, thereby forcing more decisions to be decided by lower tier scrutiny. On the other hand, by
selectively and subjectively escalating the intensity of review to
be applied in the lower tier, the Court has been able to achieve
the same results as by strict scrutiny, without being locked into
a holding that the classification is suspect or that the interest is
fundamental in the constitutional sense. Consequently, the Court
has given itself the freedom to arrive at diametrically opposed
results in future cases involving the same classification or interest.
Michael P. O'Connell

COMMENT
SECTION 14(b) AND Communication Workers v.
Western Electric Co.: AN END RUN AROUND
PREEMPTION
INTRODUCTION

It is a widely accepted principle of federalism that Congress
has almost entirely preempted' the field of labor law. Preemption
developed rapidly in this area after Congress adopted the TaftHartley Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act' in
1947. One of the most significant of these amendments is section
14(b) 3-a partial exception to the general rule of preemptionwhich expressly permits individual states to enact legislation
prohibiting union-security agreements. 4 In those states which
I The preemption doctrine, based on the supremacy clause in art. VI, § 2 of the
United States Constitution, results in federal law superseding and displacing incompatible state law. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). For a series of articles examining the development of the preemption doctrine in
the labor field see Cox, Federalismin the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HIAv. L. REV. 1297
(1954); Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L.
REv. 1057 (1958); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 469 (1972).
2 49 Stat. 449, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519 and 88 Stat. 395, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 et seq. (1970).
2 Section 14(b) provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
The term "union-security" describes a variety of arrangements,
usually contractual, whereby union membership [or the payment of the
equivalent of union dues] is made a condition of employment. The traditional types of clauses include: (1) the closed shop, which permits the hiring
only of members of the appropriate union [this type of clause is now illegal
in the United States]; (2) the full union shop, under which all employees
must join the union within a certain period, typically within 30 days of
hiring; (3) the modified union shop, which allows new members to withdraw
from membership at stated periods, or exempts old employees who are not
members; (4) maintenance of membership, which imposes no membership
requirement, but does require employees who join the union to continue their
membership; and (5) the agency shop, which requires non-union employees
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have not prohibited such agreements, union-security contracts
are permitted by section 8(a)(3) of the federal act.'
The question was recently raised before the Colorado Supreme Court of whether this authority ceded to the states by
section 14(b) is limited to flatly prohibiting union-security agreements or whether the section allows states to regulate such agreements in other ways. In Communication Workers v. Western
Electric Co.,' the Colorado Supreme Court construed section
14(b) in conjunction with the Colorado Labor Peace Act (CLPA).7
The court held that the State of Colorado could regulate (as well
as forbid) union-security clauses by requiring a referendum in
which three-fourths of those employees voting must approve negotiation of such a security agreement before it is legal. More
significantly, the court upheld that portion of the Colorado statute which, in the process of regulating such agreements, affects
the procedure by which recognized bargaining units are determined: The statute specifies that, in order for members of a bargaining unit to be eligible to vote in a union-security authorization referendum, the bargaining unit itself must have been deterto pay to the union a sum equal to fees and dues paid by members.
Henderson, The Confrontation of Federal Preemption and State Right-to-Work Laws,
1967 DUKE L.J. 1079, 1082 n.13.
Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such
agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made; and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e)
of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement,
the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees
eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such
labor organization to make such an agreement . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). The Colorado Supreme Court incorrectly stated in
Communication Workers that this section, which now in effect prohibits the closed shop,
"disclaimed a national policy hostile to the closed shop .... " 551 P.2d at 1078.
1 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976), appeals dismissed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977).
1 CoLD. REv. STAT. §§ 8-3-101 et seq. (1973). In Communication Workers, the Colorado Supreme Court cited to the 1963 Colorado Revised Statutes. This comment, however,
will cite only to the 1973 codification. For a history of the CLPA see H. SELIGSON & G.
BADwm , LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS INCOLORADO 139-52 (1961).
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mined by means of an election.' The court's decision appears to
raise serious questions of federal-state conflict because the National Labor Relations Board, which has been granted sole authority to determine units for general collective bargaining purposes,' does not necessarily require or even always allow an election to be held for determining the appropriate unit.
Following the decision by the Colorado Supreme Court,
Communication Workers was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want
of a substantial federal question."0 This comment will discuss two
issues raised by Communication Workers which could have been
confronted by the Supreme Court on appeal:" (1) Is Colorado's
authority under section 14(b) limited to prohibiting unionsecurity clauses; or does it include the power to regulate such
clauses by requiring employees to authorize negotiation of the
clause by a three-quarters affirmative vote? (2) May Colorado
regulate the determination of appropriate units for general collective bargaining purposes; if not, does section 14(b) authorize Colorado to regulate unit determination for the specific purpose of
defining the group of employees who will vote in the unionsecurity authorization referenda?
I. Communication Workers v. Western Electric Co.
The provision of the Colorado Labor Peace Act requiring a
This unit election is to be conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor, COLO. REv.
§ 8-3-107(2) (1973), though COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(10) (1973) provides that an
election conducted by "any tribunal having competent jurisdiction" will also be
recognized. Presumably the NLRB has competent jurisdiction within the meaning of the
section.
I La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
" This type of dismissal is a decision on the merits. The precedential weight of this
decision is not entirely clear, although a recent case appears to bind lower courts until
the Supreme Court indicates otherwise. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
Elsewhere, in an extensive dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan has pointed out the danger of
placing such weight on a summary disposition. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v.
Rizzo, 96 S. Ct. 3228 (1976) (dissenting from the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari).
' Other issues in Communication Workers which will not be discussed here include:
(1) the definition of an "all-union agreement," COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973); (2)
whether the agreements in issue are "all-union agreements"; and (3) whether the referendum and collective bargaining unit requirements were intended by the state legislature
to cover only those employers whose business affects intrastate commerce or also those
employers, such as the appellee-defendants, who are engaged in interstate commerce.
STAT.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

referendum to authorize a union-security agreement has not been
widely followed since its adoption in 1943.12 Given traditional
management opposition to union-security agreements, it is surprising that the first court challenge to agreements executed in
the absence of such a referendum did not come until recently.
There was no factual controversy in Communication
Workers. It was stipulated that the National Labor Relations
Board had recognized the Communication Workers as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of the appellee-employers
in several states. Secret ballot elections to determine the appropriate bargaining units' 3 or their representatives 4 had not been
held by either the NLRB or the Colorado Division of Labor. In
5
addition, the union-security referenda required under the CLPA'
had not been conducted. Nevertheless, the employers voluntarily
entered into several collective bargaining agreements with the
Communication Workers. Each of these agreements contained
either a modified agency shop or a modified maintenance-ofmembership clause, 6 which required, as a condition of continued
employment, the payment of union dues. The agreements provided an escape period, however, during which current employees
could divest themselves of the obligation to pay dues. Those who
did not so act during the escape period were obligated to continue
paying dues; if they subsequently failed to pay dues, the union
2 See note 89 infra.

Under the authority granted to the NLRB by 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970), the Board
has discretion to determine the appropriate unit by elections or other means. In
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div., 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966), the Board set forth
the guidelines it would follow in determining whether or not to hold an election. See note
50 infra. For a discussion of unit determination post-Mallinckrodt see J. ABODEELY, THE
NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 94-112 (1971); Cohen, Two Years Under
Mallinckrodt: A Review of the Board's Latest Craft Unit Policy, 20 LAB. L.J. 195 (1969).
For a discussion of pre.Mallinckrodtpolicy see Note, Labor Law-Determinationof Appropriate BargainingUnit, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 683. See also Samoff, Law School Education
in NLRB Representation Cases, 21 LAB. L.J. 691 (1970).
" In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Court upheld the authority
of the NLRB to issue bargaining orders to an employer who had committed unfair labor
practices "which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact
undermined a union's majority and caused an election to be set aside." Id. at 610. Thus,
an employer may have to recognize the union as the representative of its employees even
without a representation election. See generally R. WILLIAMS, P. JAMES, & K. HUNN, NLRB
REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974).
SCOLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(c) (1973).
IS See note 4 supra.
"
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could, under the terms of the agreements, compel the employer
to discharge them. The dispute arose when the employers refused
to dismiss employees who ceased payment of their dues after the
escape period. The employers contended that the union-security
clauses 7 were invalid for lack of compliance with the CLPA.
The CLPA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to
[ejncourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
... by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, or other terms or
conditions of employment; except that an employer shall not be
prohibited from entering into an all-union agreement with the representatives of his employees in a collective bargaining unit where
three-quarters or more of his employees have voted affirmatively by
secret ballot in favor of such all-union agreement in a referendum
conducted by the director [of the Colorado Division of Labor]."
'7 The term "all-union agreement," CoLO. Rxv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973), as it was
used in Communication Workers, is synonymous with the better known term, "unionsecurity agreement." It should be noted, however, that the Communication Workers vigorously argued that "all-union agreements" as defined by the CLPA were limited to closed
shop agreements, which were legal under federal law prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments adopted in 1947, and that lesser agreements, such as an agency shop, were not
included in this definition and thus were not subject to the referendum requirement. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 245 Wis. 417, 429, 14 N.W.2d 872, 878-79 (1944), construed that state's referendum requirements for all-union agreements, Wis. STAT. ch. 57, § 111.06(1)(c) (1939), as
amended Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1)(c)1 (Supp. 1.01 1976-77), in conjunction with 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970) and held that "all-union agreements" applied only to those agreements
that required all employees in the bargaining unit to be members of the union. But see
Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418, 420-24 (1950). The definition of an "all-union agreement" in Wisconsin at that time, Wis. STAT. ch. 57, § 111.02(9) (1939), as amended Wis.
STAT. § 111.02(9) (1974), referred to "all of the employes in such unit" as does the present
Colorado statute, COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973). Prior to Communication Workers
the Colorado Division of Labor interpreted, as did the Wisconsin court, "all-union agreements" as referring only to union-shop clauses. A maintenance-of-membership agreement,
for instance, does not require all employees to be members of the union. Therefore, referenda were not required by the Division of Labor to authorize agency-shop or maintenanceof-membership clauses. Interview with Robert Frey, Labor Mediator with the Colorado
Division of Labor, in Denver, Colorado (Oct. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Second Frey
Interview]. Since most of the collective bargaining contracts in Colorado contain these
latter types of union-security agreements, id., rather than union-shop clauses, few referenda were required by the Division.
"1 COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-108(c) (1973) (emphasis added). There has been no judicial
opinion in Colorado on whether this section requires a three-quarters vote of all employees
in the unit or whether it requires approval of only three-quarters of those voting. The
Colorado Attorney General has issued an opinion stating that only a three-quarter majority among those actually voting is required. [1949-501 CoLO. ATroRNEY GEN. BIENNIAL
Rwowr 94.
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In upholding the employers' refusal to discharge non-paying employees, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling 9 that (1) the statute applies to employers engaged in interstate as well as intrastate commerce; (2) the union-security
clauses in question fall within the Colorado definition of all-union
agreements;"0 and (3) section 14(b) permits states to regulate2' (as
well as forbid) union-security clauses by requiring an authorization referendum. The Colorado Supreme Court also held, however, that determination of the appropriate collective bargaining
unit 22 by secret ballot election is "a condition precedent to any
labor organization's right to enter into an all-union agreement
with an employer under Colorado law. '2 3 While the court recognized that this unit, determined under Colorado law for the specific purpose of a union-security referendum, might be different
from the general purpose collective bargaining unit determined
by the NLRB, 24 it found Colorado's regulation of unit determination to be "merely an incident ' 5 of the authority ceded to the
state by section 14(b).
Unit determination for general collective bargaining purposes has been preempted from the states.2 6 The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has carved out an exception to this policy,
" Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 88 L.R.R.M. 3481 (Dist. Ct. Denver
1974), aff'd, 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976), appeals dismissed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1977).
2* Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973). See note 17 supra.
21Accord, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 301 (1949). See text accompanying notes 29-41 infra.
2 A collective bargaining unit in Colorado is defined as:
an organization selected by secret ballot, as provided in section 8-3-107, by
a majority vote of the employees of one employer employed within the state
who vote at an election for the selection of such unit, except that, where a
majority of such employees engaged in a single craft, division, department,
or plant have voted by secret ballot that the employees of such single craft,
division, department, or plant shall constitute their collective bargaining
unit, it shall be so considered. Two or more collective bargaining units may
bargain collectively through the same representative or where a majority of
the employees in each separate unit have voted to do so by secret ballot, as
provided in section 8-3-107.
Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973).
551 P.2d at 1076.
2, Id. at 1079.
25Id.
21 La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).

SECTION 14(b) AND COMMUNICATION WORKERS

1976

737

with the apparent approval of the United States Supreme
Court," by holding that the state has authority to determine the
appropriate unit for the specific purpose of union-security referenda."
II.

STATE REGULATION OF UNION-SECURITY CLAUSES

The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of section
14(b) is supported, in part, both by a United States Supreme
Court decision, and by a reading of the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments. The text
of section 14(b) provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law. 2'

In the absence of state legislation authorized by this section,
unions are free to negotiate union-security agreements once they
are recognized as exclusive bargaining agents. 9 Employers, of
course, are not required to agree to include such clauses in the
collective bargaining contract. In the so-called "right-to-work"
states, however, legislation has been enacted under section 14(b)
that prohibits union-security agreements, even if both employers
and unions wish to include such clauses in their collective bargaining contracts. Colorado's statute as interpreted takes a middle position. The CLPA permits union-security agreements but
only after two elections: the first to determine the bargaining
unit; and the second, a referendum, in which three-quarters of the
voting employees of the unit to be covered by the union-security
" Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977). The Board also argued against allowing Colorado to determine bargaining units for
specific union-security purposes. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 9-11, Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., supra. Portions of the NLRB's brief are quoted at note
55 infra.
2 551 P.2d at 1078, 1079. The Colorado Supreme Court specifically pointed out that
the unit determined by the state was only for the purpose of an all-union referendum. Id.
Nowhere in the CLPA, however, is there such a limitation of the purpoAes for which a state
unit is chosen.
2
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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agreement must affirmatively approve the negotiation of such an
3
agreement. '
The latter aspect of this two-step process, the referendum,
appears to be compatible with section 14(b): The CLPA is patterned after the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act 2 which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.33 One of the primary
issues in Algoma was whether the NLRB's certification of a unit
representative "ousted" the state from regulating remedies for
violations of the state's union-security statute. In
Communication Workers the union argued3 that the language in
Algoma3 5 upholding the right of a state to regulate under section
14(b) was vague. Specifically, it was urged that Algoma's holding
concerned only the state's right to enforce a remedy against an
employer who sought to give effect to a union-security clause that
was illegal under state law. Had the Colorado Supreme Court
accepted this narrow interpretation, Algoma would not have been
considered dispositive of the referendum issue in Communication
Workers.

36

The union's reading of Algoma is not supported, however, by
an examination of the briefs submitted in that case which indicate that the regulation-by-referendum issue was adequately
argued by both sides. 3 7 Since the Court was presented with this
31

CoLO.

32

WIs. STAT. ch. 57,

§ 8-3-108(c) (1973). See note 18 supra.
§ 111.06(1)(c) (i939), as amended Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1)(c)1
(Supp. 1.01 1976-77). The Wisconsin all-union referendum requirement was amended in
1975 so that unions certified by elections conducted by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board or the NLRB could negotiate and execute "all-union agreements" without an
authorizing referendum. However, unions that are voluntarily recognized by the employer
must still receive authorization through a referendum before entering into such an agreement.
336 U.S. 301 (1949).
" Brief for Appellant Communication Workers at 27, Reply Brief for Appellant Communication Workers at 11-14, Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d
1065 (Colo. 1976).
=' 336 U.S. at 314-15.
" See Local 34, Int'l Molders, 150 N.L.R.B. 913 (1965); Cyclone Sales, Inc., 115
N.L.R.B. 431 (1956); Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 387 (1949); Northland Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 288 (1948); Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 791
(1948). But see Western Elec. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949). These Board interpretations
of section 14(b), which are vague and inconsistent, are only persuasive and not binding
on a court. See Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 166 (1971).
31 Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board relied on the legislative hisREV. STAT.
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issue, the decision should be read in that light.3" Further, as the
following indirect reference indicates, the Supreme Court did
implicitly sanction the Wisconsin referendum requirement:
It is argued, however, that the effect of this section [14(b)] is to
displace State law which "regulates" but does not wholly "prohibit"
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. But if there could be any doubt that the
language of the section means that the Act shall not be construed
to authorize any "application" of a union-security contract, such as
discharging an employee, which under the circumstances "is prohibited" by the State, the legislative history of the section would dispel
3
it. 9

The "circumstances" noted by the Court, under which application of a union-security clause was prohibited, stemmed from the
union-security referendum, which then required a two-thirds affirmative vote. The union-security agreement in question had not
been authorized by such a referendum and thus was illegal under
Wisconsin law.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act also supports
the argument that states may, under 14(b), regulate unionsecurity agreements by requiring referenda. 0 Both the Wisconsin
and Colorado statutes were in effect and were considered by Congress when it enacted section 14(b). 41 Indeed, it appears that this
tory of section 14(b), Brief for Respondent at 6-14, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949), which supports the view that
section 14(b) sanctions not only those state policies which prohibit union-security agreements but also those which are more restrictive than federal law. See H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 34, 44 (1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60
(1947); 93 CONG. REc. 7503 (1947) (President Truman's veto message); 93 CONG. REC. 666566 (1947) (analysis of bill by Senator Murray); 93 CONG. REc. 6613, 6678 (1947) (remarks
of Representative Landis). For a judicial interpretation of the legislative history of section
14(b) see Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 98-105 (1963); Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 314 (1949).
In Algoma the petitioners argued, however, that there should not be a resort to Congressional debate and hearings when the statute is clear on its face. Brief for Petitioner at 816, Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, 14, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
"[T]hat [this issue] was considered by the [Clourt must be assumed; it was
referred to and discussed in each of the briefs presented." Dostal v. Magee, 273 Wis. 228,
231, 77 N.W.2d 604, 606-07 (1956); accord, Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211, 21819 (1935).
3' 336 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
See legislative history cited in note 37 supra.
" H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1947).
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section was inserted to clarify Congress' intent that such statutes
not be preempted by federal law. Therefore, section 14(b) does
not seem to preclude states from requiring union-security referenda.
A.

HI. THE COLLECTIVE
The Colorado "Unit"

BARGAINING UNIT

The Algoma decision appears to authorize state mandated
union-security clause referenda. One question which was not
raised in Algoma, however, was whether the state could also
"regulate" the appropriate unit in which the referendum was
to be conducted. In Communication Workers, the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted the referendum requirement under
the CLPA as being closely, if not inextricably, 2 tied to a determination of the appropriate collective bargaining unit. The
court held that the CLPA mandates, as a prerequisite to the
referendum, a secret ballot election to determine the bargaining
43
unit.
The court did not, however, specify exactly what was intended by the term "collective bargaining unit." To add further
confusion, the definition of such a "unit" under the Colorado
statute is ambiguous. 4 Usually, the term "unit" refers to the
group of employees to be represented, not to the representative
agent of that group. The unit might include the employees in an
entire plant; or there may be several units within a single plant,
each unit consisting of employees from separate crafts, divisions,
or departments, and each unit having a different representative
agent. The CLPA seems to confuse the concept of a unit with that
of the representative agent of that unit, 4 and the Colorado Sul2"Nor

can an essential part of an act, which colors the whole, be stricken as invalid

and the remainder sustained." City & County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 108, 18
P.2d 907, 910 (1932).
, See note 51 infra.
" See discussion in note 46 infra.
s CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973). The determination of the representative
agent, usually a union, has also been preempted from the states:
The federal Board's machinery for dealing with certification problems also
carries implications of exclusiveness. Thus, a State may not certify a union
as the collective bargaining agent for employees where the federal Board, if
called upon, would use its own certification procedure.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 476 (1955). The Colorado requirement would
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preme Court does not clearly indicate which of these concepts it
is using. 6 Despite its imprecision, however, the court seems to
have been referring, as a practical matter, to the unit as the
also appear to conflict with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(i) (1970), which only allows an employer
to enter into a union-security agreement with a labor organization which is determined
as the representative of the employees as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
" The different interpretations of what a "unit" refers to in the CLPA were presented
to the court. While the Communication Workers maintain that a "unit" is the group of
employees to be represented, the Teamsters Union, in an amicus brief, argued with some
hesitancy that a "unit" in Colorado is the representative union. Brief for ColoradoWyoming Joint Council of Teamsters No. 54 as Amicus Curiae at 14, Communication
Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (1976).
When the Colorado Supreme Court compares "certification or recognition under the
Federal Act" with the "recognition/definition section" of the CLPA, 551 P.2d at 1077, it
does not refer to La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
18 (1949), or Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947), both of which directly concern the preemption of unit determination. Instead, the
court refers to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969), which deals
primarily with the validity of NLRB orders instructing employers to bargain with the
union as the exclusive representative of the unit. 551 P.2d at 1077. The question of the
unit as the group of employees to be represented was not at issue in Gissel. A more
appropriate comparison could have been made with Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium
Div., 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966). Thus, while the Colorado Supreme Court did not explicitly
state which interpretation of a collective bargaining unit it accepted, if either, the citation
of Gissel would seem to indicate an implicit acceptance of a Colorado unit as referring to
the representative agent itself. The more likely explanation, however, in view of the
general meaning that usually attaches to the term "unit," is that the court was just
imprecise in its choice of citations.
In examining the different sections of the CLPA it becomes apparent that the statute
does not clearly indicate what constitutes a Colorado unit. Among the various descriptions
are the following: (1) 'Collective bargaining unit' means an organization selected by
secret ballot." CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973) (emphasis added); (2) "A unit chosen
for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the exclusive representativeof all of the
employees in such unit .... " CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-107(1) (1973) (emphasis added);

(3) A '[riepresentative' includes any person who is the duly authorized agent of a
collective bargaining unit." Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(17) (1973); (4) A .'[pierson'
includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, or receivers." CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 8-3-104(16) (1973). These sections of the
CLPA confuse the distinction between the group of employees to be represented, the unit,
and the representative agent, usually the union. Furthermore, a comparison of the parallel
sections of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act upon which the CLPA was modeled
indicates that the Colorado Legislature did not create these distinctions, as did the Wisconsin Legislature, and used the term "unit" to refer to both a group of employees and a
representative agent. Compare CoLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 8-3-107(1)-(4) (1973) with Wis. STAT.
§§ 111.05(1)-(4) (1974). Since the court has not clarified this point, the CLPA should be
amended to avoid further confusion. The Colorado Division of Labor, however, had apparently, in administering the CLPA, differentiated these concepts prior to Communication
Workers, despite the statute's ambiguity. Interview with Robert Frey, Labor Mediator for
Colorado Division of Labor, in Denver, Colorado (Sept. 8, 1976) [hereinafter cited as First
Frey Interview].
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group of employees.4" By construing the CLPA to require a secret
ballot election to determine the bargaining unit, if that unit is to
be recognized for the purpose of negotiating a union-security
agreement, the court appears to have raised a serious question as
to whether there is a substantial conflict between state and federal law on unit determination.
B.

Unit Determinationand the Preemption Question

The issue of preemption arises because of the possibility that
the procedures followed by the NLRB and the election conducted
by the Colorado Division of Labor could result in the recognition
of different bargaining units.4" The NLRB does not always require, or even always allow, elections for unit determination;"9 the
Board has discretion to decide when to allow a unit determination
election.o The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the
" Since the Division of Labor has traditionally treated a "unit" as the group of
employees to be represented, had the court intended to affect this practice and accept the
Teamsters' suggestion that the CLPA might actually be referring to the representative
union when using the term "unit," a more explicit statement of such would have been
expected. See note 46 supra.
Ax

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the
States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (emphasis added).
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
" See note 13 supra and note 50 infra.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). In Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div., 162
N.L.R.B. 387 (1966), a craft severance unit election was not permitted, since the Board
held that a separate craft unit would not be appropriate. This type of unit election, known
as a "Globe election," Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937), allows the
employees to decide whether they want a union that represents the larger, more inclusive
unit, or whether they want the smaller, more fragmented units. The Board will allow such
an election only if it feels that either choice would be appropriate for collective bargaining
purposes. In its decision in Mallinckrodt the Board set forth several factors that it would
consider in determining whether a unit was appropriate, and, therefore, whether a unit
election would be permitted:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and homogenous
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CLPA would require a secret ballot election in all unit determination situations as a prerequisite to the unit's negotiation of an
enforceable union-security agreement. The court said:
Inasmuch as no secret ballot election was conducted for the purpose
of establishing a collective bargainingunit authorized to enter into
an all-union agreement with Mountain States and Western Electric,
C.W.A. is not entitled to enforcement of the all-union agreements
provisions which are, in our opinion, invalid. Even if such an election had been held and an appropriatelyauthorized collective bargainingunit had been established, the union security provisions here
in issue would be invalid and unenforceable because of the lack of
employee approval through an all-union referendum."

Because of the dissimilarity between the policies underlying
the federal and state procedures, the resulting units could arguably be different. To illustrate, the NLRB must frequently balance
group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the functions of their craft
on a nonrepetitive basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct
department, working in trades or occupations for which a tradition of separate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought and at the
plant involved, and at other plants of the employer, with emphasis on
whether the existing patterns of bargaining are productive of stability in
labor relations, and whether such stability will be unduly disrupted by the
destruction of the existing patterns of representation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit have established
and maintained their separate identity during the period of inclusion in the
broader unit, and the extent of their participation or lack of participation in
the establishment and maintenance of the existing pattern of representation
and the prior opportunities, if any, afforded them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production processes, including the extent to which the continued normal operation of the production
processes is dependent upon the performance of the assigned functions of the
employees in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a separate unit,
including that union's experience in representing employees like those involved in the severance action.
162 N.L.R.B. at 397.
11551 P.2d at 1076 (emphasis added). Prior to this decision, the Colorado Division of
Labor had not required a secret election to determine the appropriate unit unless there
was a dispute as to what the unit should be. The effect of this decision is to require such
an election as a condition precedent to the holding of all union-security referenda. Brief
for Appellant Colorado Division of Labor at 7,'Communication Workers v. Western Elec.
Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977); First Frey Interview, supra note 46. In the
absence of a dispute as to the appropriateness of the unit, however, it is not entirely clear
what issue such a secret election would be intended to resolve.
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the policy of seeking stable labor-management relations, which is
more often than not advanced by having a small number of larger
units with which the employer must negotiate, against the employees' freedom to choose a smaller unit, which might represent
a particular craft, department, or division. Generally, the Board
disfavors fragmentation and larger units are thus preferred. 2
Under the CLPA, however, there is a strong policy favoring the
smaller unit, as is evidenced by the mandatory craft severance
election held in conjunction with any uhit determination election.13 Should Colorado recognize a unit different from that recognized by the NLRB, even if only for the limited and specific
purpose of conducting a union-security referendum, employers
would be compelled to negotiate with the same employees as
members of different bargaining units for different purposes. This
situation creates the very confusion which Board certification
was, in the interest of preventing industrial strife, designed to
avoid.
The United States Supreme Court outlined the reasons for
federal preemption of the unit determination question in
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board:"
Thus, if both [the state and federal] laws are upheld, two administrative bodies are asserting a discretionary control over the same
subject matter, conducting hearings, supervising elections and determining appropriate units for bargaining in the same plant. They
might come out with the same determination, or they might come
out with different ones as they have in the past ....
If the two
boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the
appropriate unit of representation, action by one necessarily denies
the discretion of the other ....
The federal board has jurisdiction
of the industry in which these particular employers are engaged and
has asserted control of their labor relations in general. . . . We do
not believe this leaves room for the operation of the state authority
asserted.0
12 Hall, The Appropriate BargainingUnit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor
Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 479, 531-39 (1967).

13Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers Local 304 v. Sunnyside Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, 146 Colo. 31, 37, 360 P.2d 446, 449 (1961). When a craft requests severance from the
larger unit, the NLRB may or may not grant a Globe election. See note 50 supra. However,
under the CLPA the Colorado Division of Labor has no such discretion. Once a craft
severance election is requested, it must be conducted by the Division. CoLo. REv. STAT. §
8-3-107(2) (1973).
330 U.S. 767 (1947).

Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added). The Board has also pointed out the potential
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Against this background, it is difficult to justify the Colorado
Supreme Court's holding that the state and the federal government can exercise concurrent power to determine the appropriate
unit for the same group of employees. To answer this query by
saying that Colorado's determination is limited and not general
is to beg the more basic question of whether or not Colorado's
intrusion into this area creates the potential for confusion and
discord which the policy of federal preemption is designed to
avoid.
conflicts which may result from the Colorado unit determination requirement:
It is also possible that the state units would include individuals who are
not included in the Board unit. The state director is empowered to
"determine which persons shall be qualified and entitled to vote at any
election held by him" (C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-107(5)). Contrary to Section
9(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(b)(3), the Labor Peace Act does not
preclude the inclusion of plant guards in the same unit with other employees.
And, while the Labor Peace Act appears to exclude supervisors from the
definition of "employee" (C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-104(11)(a)), it does not
contain a definition of "supervisors" comparable to that in Section 2(11) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 152(11).
Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 7-8 n.6, Communication Workers v. Western Elec.
Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977).
If the Colorado unit included individuals not in the Board unit, it is
possible that a union security provision could be rejected as the result of the
vote of individuals whom the union, insofar as the NLRA was concerned, did
not represent. On the other hand, should a union security provision be approved in such unit, the union would be compelled, insofar as state law was
concerned, to represent those individuals in negotiations over union security.
Cf. C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-108(c) . ...
Id. at 9 n.9.
The first proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), permits the discharge of an employee for failure to pay union dues as required by a union security agreement only "if [the union] is the representative of the employees as provided in Section 9(a), in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made ***." Accordingly, an employer would violate Section 8(a)(3), and a union Section
8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2), of the NLRA by enforcing a union security
agreement covering a bargaining unit other than that approved by the Board
under Section 9 of the Act. Such violation is particularly likely to occur when
the agreement covers a unit that is clearly inappropriate under the NLRA
because it contains individuals, such as supervisors, who are statutorily excluded from Section 9 units. . . . On the other hand, should an employer

or union attempt to apply a union security arrangement covering the Boardapproved unit, rather than the state-approved union security unit, they
would, under the decision below, violate the Labor Peace Act (see C.R.S.
1973 Section 8-3-108(1)(c), (2)(b)).
Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
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The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the CLPA
was not the court's only alternative. In its conflict of provisions
section, the CLPA provides:
Wherever the application of the provisions of other statutes or
laws conflict with the application of the provisions of this article,
this article shall prevail; except that, in any situation where the
provisions of this article cannot be validly enforced, the provisions
of such other statutes or laws shall apply."

If the court had held the question of unit determination was
preempted by federal law, this section would have substituted the
federal method of unit determination for that provided in the
CLPA. 57 Most of the conflict between the state and federal statutes concerning the determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit would have been avoided. The unit determined by the NLRB
would still have been required to comply with the CLPA's referendum before it could negotiate a union-security agreement,
which, in any event, is the more important consideration from
Colorado's point of view. The court did not, however, choose this
interpretation, and its reading of the statute" is a final interpretation of state law. 9
SCoLO. R v. STAT. § 8-3-120 (1973).
,It is clear that the determination of the collective bargaining [unit]
within which the referendum is to be conducted is made by the Division of
Labor. If ... election for a collective bargaining unit is preempted and,
therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of federal law, the argument is easily
answered in those instances where an appropriate bargaining unit has been
determined either through certification or voluntary recognition under the
provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The director must conduct
the referendum within the unit established.
Answer Brief for Appellee Mountain States at 15, Communication Workers v. Western
Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976). There still may be problems, however, with attempting to conduct a referendum in an NLRB-recognized unit, when that unit cuts across state
boundaries:
[Tihe bargaining unit established in accordance with federal law may be
inconsistent with that required by state regulation. Though the unit for the
Michigan strike vote cannot extend beyond the State's borders, the unit for
which appellant union is the federally certified bargaining representative
includes Chrysler plants in California and Indiana as well as Michigan....
Without question, the Michigan provision conflicts with the exercise of federally protected labor rights. A state statute so at war with federal law cannot
survive.
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1950). But see Western Elec. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019
(1949).
' CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973).
11O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974).
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The Scope of Section 14(b)

The Colorado Supreme Court was aware of the preemption
issues raised by its holding that the state could make a unit
determination decision which might not be in accord with that
reached by the NLRB. However, in an end run of this question,
the court held that the state's authority to determine units in
which union-security referenda could be conducted is "merely an
incident of the state's power to prohibit the application of unionsecurity agreements under the permissive grant of authority contained in § 14(b)."10 The court offers no authority or justification
for this conclusion other than its own interpretation of state powers under section 14(b).
The most explicit statement by the United States Supreme
Court on the scope of state powers under section 14(b) came in
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn.5 1 In upholding the jurisdiction of
a state to enforce its "right-to-work" law," the Court noted that
the authority is narrow. For example, picketing to obtain a unionsecurity agreement is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB even in states which prohibit the execution or application
of such agreements.6 3 The Court further stated that a state's regulatory authority "begins only with the actual negotiation and
execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b). Absent
such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice
would be a matter for the National Labor Relations Board under
Garmon." 4 While Schermerhorn II does not directly address the
state's authority to determine the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit for union-security clause purposes, it does indicate that sec" 551 P.2d at 1079.
61 375 U.S. 96 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Schermerhorn II]; cf. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 96 S. Ct. 2140, 2146 (1976).
12 Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 CALIF.
L. REv. 95, 106-13 (1964). The term "right-to-work" is often used to refer to those states
which absolutely prohibit union-security agreements. A "modified right-to-work" state
refers to a state, such as Colorado, that prohibits union-security agreements, but only
when the required majority approval is not satisfied pursuant to a referendum.
11 375 U.S. at 105; accord, Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542, 547-48 (1963). For a discussion of the problems created by the preemption of
state jurisdiction under section 14(b) with respect to picketing see Comment, Labor Lau:
Extent of State Power to Enforce Right-to-Work Laws, 49 MINN. L. REv. 307 (1964);
Comment, Supreme Court Precludes Relief From Section 14(b) Picketing, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 158 (1964).
" 375 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in original).
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tion 14(b) is a narrow cession of authority back to the states.
Under the principle announced in SchermerhornII, since negotiation of a union-security clause in Colorado cannot even properly
begin prior to the determination of the appropriate unit or its
agent, 5 Colorado's attempt to regulate unit determination would
seem to fall outside the scope of jurisdiction granted to the state
under section 14(b).
A final twist to the potential state-federal conflict presented
by the Colorado Supreme Court's decision should be noted. There
may be situations when an NLRB-conducted election would satisfy the CLPA's requirement that the appropriate unit be determined by a secret ballot. The CLPA defines elections as those
conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor and "any other
tribunal having competent jurisdiction."6 Assuming that the
NLRB has "competent jurisdiction" within the meaning of the
CLPA, units which had been determined in an NLRB election
could proceed to the union-security referendum. As noted earlier,
however, the NLRB does not always conduct such elections. 7
Those units determined without an election could not proceed to
the union-security referendum. Consequently, depending on the
NLRB's method of unit determination, some, but not all, NLRBdetermined units would be eligible to conduct the union-security
authorization election.
The Algoma decision indicated that states may, pursuant to
section 14(b), set up union-security referenda. However, it appears that the Colorado Supreme Court may have gone too far in
adding an additional requirement that to be eligible to conduct
the union-security referenda the appropriate bargaining unit
must be determined in a CLPA-authorized election. The Colorado Supreme Court treated the unit determination election and
the union-security referendum in the CLPA as an inseparable
procedure. Two constitutional challenges to this process may be
advanced: equal protection and preemption. It is arguably a denial of equal protection to allow those units determined by an
election conducted by the NLRB to proceed with a union-security
U

CoLo.

REV. STAT.

§ 8-3-108(1)(d) (1973). See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961);

Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
u CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(10) (1973).
,"See notes 13 and 50 supra.
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referendum, while denying the same right to units determined by
68
the Board without an election.
Preemption appears, however, to be a stronger argument. By
its adoption of section 14(b), Congress clarified the authority of
the states to be more restrictive in their regulation of unionsecurity agreements than amended section 8(a)(3) of the same
act. Under the Wagner Act, a union-security agreement could be
negotiated by any recognized collective bargaining unit. 9 Section
8(a)(3)(ii) of the Taft-Hartley amendments allowed such agreements only after they had been authorized by a simple majority
of all employees eligible to vote in a unit determination election. 0
Although the mandatory federal authorization election was abandoned in a 1951 amendment to the act,7 the 1947 amendments
indicate a congressional desire to permit states to be more restric" Since this is an economic issue, the traditional equal protection "rational basis"
test would most likely have been applied, considerably reducing the possibility of a successful challenge. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The application of this test almost insures that an act will
be upheld. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Recognizing that this unforseen
and convoluted application of Colorado law could not have been intended by the state
legislature, the Court, on the other hand, might have applied a "rational basis plus" test
in examining the statute, a more stringent test than the traditional "rational basis" test.
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rev. 1, 8-20

(1970). The Burger Court, however, has not used this test in examining economic legislation. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976). See Canby, The Burger Court
and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975
Aiuz. ST. L.J. 1, 7-18; Forum: Equal Protectionand the Burger Court, 2 HAsT. CONST. L.Q.
645 (1975); cf. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
" Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1940) (amended 1947).

T'Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(a)(3)(ii), 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1940)). Before this section was amended it brought
about an unusual result in several instances:
In an election for the approval of a union-shop agreement, a majority of all
eligible employees may vote in favor of such agreement, but this may be less
than three-fourths of the employees actually voting, in which case the contract would be legal under Taft-Hartley, but illegal under the Colorado Act.
In another case, three-fourths of the employees actually voting might vote
affirmatively, but might not constitute a majority of all employees eligible
to vote, in which case the contract would be legal under Colorado law but
not under Taft-Hartley.
Hornbein, The Extent to Which Taft-Hartley Has Superseded State Labor Laws, 28 DICTA

47, 50 (1951) (footnote omitted).
1,National Labor Relations Act Amendments, ch. 534, § b, 65 Stat. 601 (1951).
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tive of union-security agreements than the federal policy, if they
so choose. Among the more restrictive state policies in force at the
time section 14(b) was debated and of which Congress was aware
were those statutes, such as the Colorado and Wisconsin acts,
that required something more than the simple majority of the
federal referendum provision governing union-security clauses.
The more restrictive state policies permitted by section 14(b)
might then be interpreted as being limited to the authorizing
referendum. While Congress clearly intended to allow states to
regulate union-security agreements in this fashion under section
14(b), nowhere in the legislative history does it appear that
Congress wished to permit states to regulate unit determinations
for union-security purposes.7 3 Thus, section 14(b) should not be
used to uphold this exception to the Bethlehem Steel holding that
unit determinations are preempted from state authority.
In light of the Colorado Supreme Court's lack of authority for
this exception, the United States Supreme Court's summary dismissal on appeal does little to clarify the extent of state powers
under section 14(b). By holding that no substantial federal question was involved in Communication Workers-a somewhat surprising determination in light of the serious constitutional issues
raised by the case-the Supreme Court leaves us to speculate on
how the conflicts arguably resulting from the enforcement of the
CLPA are to be reconciled with the preemption doctrine."

IV.

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF

Communication Workers

Colorado, by basing the referendum on the unit election requirement, may force unions to put pressure on the NLRB, as a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, to conduct unit determination
11H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 6665-66 (1947)
(analysis of the bill by Senator Murray).
13 While Congress was aware of the recent Bethlehem Steel decision, 330 U.S. 767
(1947), preempting unit determination, it made no attempt when considering section
14(b) to include within the section a statutory exception for unit determination for unionsecurity purposes. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
" A number of attorneys familiar with Communication Workers feel that one explanation for this dismissal was that the Supreme Court accepted the appellee's contention
that, since fragmentation or conflict of bargaining units had not yet actually occurred, the
issue was not sufficiently ripe for review. Brief for Appellee Western Elec. Co. at 14-20,
Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977).
Another plausible explanation is the Court's reluctance to deal with this issue, in light of
President Carter's support for the repeal of section 14(b).
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elections so that those Colorado units can then proceed to the
union-security election. This could inhibit the Board's discretion
in the performance of its duties.75
An additional problem is that the Colorado Division of
Labor, which has the primary responsibility under the CLPA for
conducting unit elections and referenda, does not have the capability to supervise the potential overload of elections which enforcement of Communication Workers might impose on it." In
1975 the Division conducted only seven or eight unit determination elections, and only 27 union-scurity referenda.77 Since 1943
there have been only 375 union shop referenda.78 There are approximately 4,750 to 5,700 collective bargaining units in Colorado,79 95% of which have already been recognized or certified by
the NLRB.' Many, if not most, of these units have not been
determined by a CLPA unit election. 8 Thus, a unit election
would be required before a referendum could be held. And with
the possibility of unit fragmentation as a result of the CLPA unit
severance provisions, an even greater number of referenda might
be necessary.
Since the Division is not currently capable of meeting such
a dramatic increase in the demand for unit determination and
union-security elections, the practical effect of this decision may
be to frustrate employees and unions in their attempts to seek
11"As the political winds change and new members are appointed [to the Board]
the unit decisions may show drastic turnabouts." J. ABODEELY, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNrr 13 (1971). By exercising its discretion as to whether or not to hold
a unit election, the Board can, either directly or indirectly, affect which unit shall prevail.
This, in turn, may determine the issue of union representation. Id. at 225, citing Liberty
Coach Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 182 (1970), where the bargaining unit found appropriate by the
Board was determinative of the representative question. The Board's decision on unit
appropriateness, and thus on unit elections, will determine whether a union representing
that unit can ever obtain a legal union-security agreement.
76The Division of Labor has estimated that it might need between 20 and 50 more
employees and between one and three million more dollars to conduct these elections.
Carey, Union 'security agreements' in jeopardy, Rocky Mountain News (Denver), Feb. 7,

1977, at 6, col. 1.
" Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
.' Motion for stay of mandate by the defendant State of Colorado with attached
affidavit at 1, 3-4, Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Motion for stay].
7 Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
Motion for stay, supra note 78.
"

Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
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unit and union-security elections. These elections have usually
been conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor within two
weeks of the request. 2 A significant increase in the number of
requests for these elections may create long delays during which
time an employer might seek to discourage employees from voting
for a union-security agreements or to persuade employees to vote
against the formation of a CLPA bargaining unit; or, in hopes of
dividing union solidarity, the employer might seek to encourage
craft fragmentation of the bargaining unit. The problems created
by having a single NLRB unit for general collective bargaining
purposes that encompasses several CLPA units for the specific
purpose of the authorization referendum can only lead to confusion for employers, employees, and unions.
During the potential delays before elections, union funds derived from initiation fees and dues could drop significantly, since
union-security provisions requiring such payments would notyet
have been validated. Even though the union, which has been
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent by the NLRB, might
be crippled financially, it will still be required under federal law
to fairly represent all the employees in grievance, arbitration, and
collective bargaining matters, regardless of whether the employees have tendered dues to that union. 4 Employees who are paying

'2First Frey Interview,

supra note 46.
u Even if the director of the Division of Labor should find that the employer has
committed an unfair labor practice by interfering with the employees' free choice in the
referendum, there is some question as to whether an adequate remedy is available. If the
referendum is still required to authorize a union-security clause, there appears to be little
discouragement of employers from interfering with this right. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 8-3108(4) and 8-3-110(7) (1973).
, In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), the Court stated:
The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the Act
extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own group
members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the
agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing
their interests fairly and impartially.
Id. at 255. See also Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLun. L. Rv.
556, 565-67 (1945). For a critique of this principle see Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive
Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be
Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 897 (1975). It is this principle of exclusivity, with its
concomitant requirement of fair representation of all employees in the unit, to which many
point when supporting the concept of union security:
Copgress recognized that in the absence of a union-security provision "many
employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish by
collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost."
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for the union's services might be expected to put pressure on their
fellow employees who are not. This pressure would probably be
most pronounced in the many small units that predominate on
the Colorado labor scene, since most employees would know each
other, and therefore would know who was not contributing his or
her fair share.
Unions, to insure their success in these elections which now
become so vital to their financial strength, can be expected to
expand their campaign activity among the employees. Rather
than attempting to foster greater cooperation between labor and
management, union activists may emphasize their conflicts with
management in these campaigns in order to gain greater support
from other employees. 5 It takes little imagination to see both that
S. RE. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
Section 8(a)(3) gives employers and employees who feel that union-security
agreements promote stability by eliminating "free riders" the right to continue such arrangements.
Id. at 7.
For a comparison of the exclusive representation question in foreign countries see Bok,
Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws, 84 HAav. L. REV. 1394,
1425-30 (1970); Summers, American and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness
of Foreign Experience, 16 Burr. L. REv. 210 (1966).
In criticizing the original Taft-Hartley majority referendum requirement to authorize union-security clauses, Archibald Cox pointed out the negative factors resulting from
a referendum election requirement:
One disadvantage is the delay which will result in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. The election will have to be held before negotiations for the contract can be commenced and, even if the Board is able to
expedite its processes, the election proceedings are likely to take a considerable period of time. A second disadvantage is the election campaign which will
inevitably precede each ballot. Union leaders will be under heavy pressure
to arouse the employees' enthusiasm for strengthening their organization
against the employer; and any competing union in the plant, if not the
employer himself, will be tempted to campaign against the union. Such a
period builds up intense emotions; friction develops and production is
slowed. Nor is it easy to resume normal relationships. In newly organized
plants the problem will be especially difficult for, instead of the period of
readjustment which should follow the selection of a collective bargaining
representative, there will come renewed conflict over the union shop.
Moreover, the execution of the initial union shop contract may not always mark the end of the struggle. Section 9(e)(2), by providing for votes as
often as once a year upon petition of 30% of the employees, holds out the
constant hope that the union's authority may be subsequently curtailed.
Thus, each annual bargaining conference will be conducted under the threat
of being suddenly interrupted by the filing of a petition and the subsequent
turmoil of an election campaign.
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this situation could produce the very industrial confusion and
strife which the National Labor Relations Act was designed to
minimize and that the United States Supreme Court should have
more closely considered these issues.
CONCLUSION

Algoma supports Colorado's regulation of union-security
clauses by the referendum vehicle. Bethlehem Steel holds that
Colorado's power to determine appropriate units for general purposes of collective bargaining has been preempted by federal legislation. Determination of the representative agent is also within
the sole responsibility of the NLRB. Schermerhorn II and the
legislative history of section 14(b)86 indicate that the scope of
authority granted to the states by this section should be narrowly
construed and should not be extended to encompass unit determination for the specific purpose of conducting union-security
referenda. The United States Supreme Court's handling of the
case, in effect affirming Communication Workers, requires speculation as to why the Court found no substantial federal question.
If, and when, actual conflict does occur between federal and state
policy on unit determination, a closer scrutiny by the Court of
these issues seems justified.
The Colorado Supreme Court, by interpreting the CLPA as
mandating a unit election as a necessary prerequisite to a unionsecurity referendum, may have so entangled these two requirements that the entire unit and referendum procedure might have
fallen had the United States Supreme Court struck down the unit
election provision. 7 Had this occurred, employers and employees
could have freely negotiated union-security agreements absent an
authorizing referendum under section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.88 The Colorado Legislature, however, could
have reinstituted the authorization referendum requirement by
simply amending the CLPA, so that such a referendum could be
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv. L. REv. 274,
298 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
" See note 37 supra.
" Another alternative is that had the United States Supreme Court struck down the
CLPA unit election requirement a remand to the state court of Communication Workers
could have been ordered for a determination of the severability of the unit and referendum
requirements.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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conducted in that portion of any NLRB-recognized unit contained within Colorado, whether determined by an election or
otherwise.
In light of the low number of state referenda conducted in the
past, and the high rate of approval for union-shop agreements in
these elections, elimination of the referendum is the most logical,
economical, and administratively manageable alternative."
Employee input into the union-security issue would be preserved.
The employees can seek to influence the type, if any, of unionsecurity clauses negotiated through their normal union channels.
More importantly, employees can force the federal Board, by
petition of 30% of the employees,9 0 to conduct a deauthorizing
referendum which would rescind a union-security clause." While
the authorizing referendum conducted by Colorado, which
" From 1945 to 1960 the Industrial Commission (which supervised Colorado labor
election procedures before this responsibility was transferred to the Division of Labor)
conducted only 347 all-union referenda, of which the union won 314. H. SELIGSON & G.
BARDWELL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN COLORADO 147 (1969). This high rate of
approval involves union-shop agreements-the most stringent form of union-security
clause now permitted. Even higher rates of approval might be expected in referenda
conducted for lesser or modified union-security agreements, such as a maintenance-ofmembership clause. Seligson and Bardwell also point out that the Industrial Commission
"conduct[ed] all-union elections in collective bargaining units which have been certified
in representative elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board." Id. at 146.
The Division of Labor has followed this procedure. Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
Wisconsin, which also has a referendum requirement, has had similar experiences.
The unions there have won all-union referenda about 87% of the time. G. HAFERBECKER,
WISCONSIN LABOR LAWS 168 (1958). This probably understates the number of unionsecurity clauses agreed to in Wisconsin, since "[iut is obvious that a large number of allunion agreements have been executed in defiance of the statutory provisions." Id. at 168,
quoting 11941-1942] WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. ANN. REP. 8. This defiance
is interesting in light of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board's opinion in MathieRuder Brewing Co., Dec. No. 1506 (1948), cited in Comment, A Study of the Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act-Part Il-Union Security, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 481, 487-88. This
comment points out that "the mere inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of an
unauthorized 'all-union' clause is a violation of the Act."
Since over 90% of the unions in Colorado have negotiated some form of union-security
clauses, and few referenda have been held, First Frey Interview, supra note 46, it appears
that Colorado employers, as well as Wisconsin employers, have been willing to agree to
all-union contracts without referenda. The federal referendum requirement was dropped
in 1951 because of the high cost of holding these elections, as well as the high rate of unionsecurity clause approvals. H.R. REP. No. 1082, 82d Cong., lst Sess. (1951); 1949 NLRB
ANN. REP. 6.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1970).
"
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(ii) (1970). A majority of the employees eligible to vote is
required to rescind the union-security clause.
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usually results in approval of the union-security clause anyway,
would not then be mandated by the state, the deauthorizing referendum conducted by the NLRB would still be available upon
petition to provide similar protection of employee rights. The
additional and unnecessary time and expense to the State of
Colorado would be avoided, along with all the potential confusion
accompanying these elections.
Legislative elimination of Colorado's union-security authorization referendum, 2 either by the state 93 or by congressional repeal of section 14(b), would merely legitimize the traditional
practice in Colorado of negotiating and executing such agreements absent a referendum," and thereby reinstate the status
quo prior to Communication Workers.
August Randall Vehar
12 For a discussion of the policy considerations and controversy surrounding unionsecurity agreements see Dempsey, The Right-to-Work Controversy, 16 LAB. L.J. 387
(1965); McDermott, Union Security and Right-to-Work Law, 16 LAB. L.J. 667 (1965);
Niebank, In Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 8 LAB. L.J. 459 (1957); Toner, There's No
Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 9 LAB. L.J. 566 (1958); Warshal, "Right-to-Work," Pro
and Con, 17 LAB. L.J. 131 (1966).
For a survey of right-to-work laws in other states see Morgan, Right-to-Work Laws:
The Current State of Affairs, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 570 (1972). For problems created
by these laws see Eissinger, The Right-to-Work Imbroglio, 51 N. DAK. L. REv. 571 (1975).
" In the one instance where the people of Colorado were able to render a direct
opinion on this issue, they overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to make Colorado a "rightto-work" state and prohibit all union-security agreements by a vote of 318,480 to 200,319.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment No. 5, An Act to Amend Article II of the State
Constitution Providing that Membership in Any Labor Union or Organization Shall Not
Be Required as a Condition to Obtain or Retain Employment, Nov. 4, 1958. On file with
the Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado State Capitol, Denver, Colorado.
" See note 89 supra.
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